deVITORIA

On the Obligation to eat food:

Cronin, pp. 35-36

Regarding the first argument to the contrary, . . . I would say secondly that if a sick man can take food or nourishment with some hope of life, he is held to take the food, as he would be held to give it to one who is sick.

..Ad argumentum in contrarium, ad primum . . . Secundo dico quod si aegrotus potest sumere cibum, vel alimentum cum aliqua spe vitae, tenetur sumere cibum, sicut teneretur dare aegrotanti.

Thirdly, I would say that if the depression of spirit is so low and there is present such consternation in the appetitive power

Tertio dico, quod si animi dejectio tanta est et appetitivae virtutis tanta consternatio,

that only with the greatest of effort and as though by means of a kind of torture, can the sick man take food,

ut non nisi per summum laborem et quasi cruciatum quendam, aegrotus possit sumere cibum,

right away that is reckoned a certain impossibility, and therefore he is excused,

jam reputatur quaedam impossibilitas et ideo excusatur,

at least from mortal sin, especially where there is little hope of life, or none at all.

saltem a mortali, maxime ubi est exigua spes vitae aut nulla.

Responding by way of confirmation: first of all a similar case does not exist in reference to food and drugs. For, food is per se a means ordered to the life of the animal and it is natural, drugs are not: man is not held to employ all the possible means of conserving his life, but the means which are per se intended for that purpose

Ad confirmationem respondetur. Primo, quod non est simile de pharmaco et alimento. Alimentum enim per se medium ordinatum ad vitam animalis et naturale, non autem pharmacum: nec tenetur homo adhibere, omnia media possibilia ad conservandam vitam, sed media per se ad hoc ordinata

. . . Thirdly, we say that if one were to have moral certitude that by means of a drug he would gain health, without the drug, however, he would die, he really does not seem to be excused from mortal sin: because if he did not give the drug to a sick neighbor, he would sin mortally, and medicine per se is intended also by nature for health,

. . . Tertio dicimus quod si quis haberet certitudinem moraliter, quod per pharmacum reciperet incolumitatem, sine pharmaco autem moreretur, noon videtur profecto excusari a mortali: quia si non daret pharmacum proximo sic aegrotanti, peccaret mortaliter et medicina per se etiam ordinata est ad salutem a natura,

but since this rarely can be certain, therefore they are not to be condemned of mortal sin who have universally declared an abstinence from drugs, although this is not laudable because God created medicine because of its need, as Solomon says . . . 107

sed quia hoc vix potest esse certum, ideo non sunt damnandi de mortali, qui in universum decreverunt abstinere a pharmacis, licet non sit laudabile, cum creaverit Deus medicinam propter necessitatem ut aid Salomon . . . w—F. a Vitoria, Relec. de Temp., n. 1.

Cronin, pp. 36-37

Later on then, discussing the lawfulness of abstaining perpetually from certain type of food, even in extreme necessity, Vitoria has this to say:

Finally, for a solution of the objections, it must be noted: it is one thing not to protect life and it is another to destroy it: for man is not always held to the first and it is enough that he perform that by which regularly a man can live: if a sick man could not have a drug except by giving over his whole means of subsistence, I do not think he would be bound to do so.108

Pro solutione tandem argumentorum, notandum est: quad aliud est non protelare vitam, aliud est abrumpere: nam ad primum non semper tenetur homo et satis est, quad det operam, per quam homo regulariter potest vivere: nec puto, si aeger non posset habere pharmacum nisi daret totam substantiam suam, quod teneretur facere».—ibid., n. 9. 109

Then he adds:

Second conclusion: One is not held to protect his life as much as he can by means of foods. This is clear because one is not held to use foods which are the best, the most delicate and most expensive, even though these foods are the most healthful, indeed this is blameworthy . . . Likewise, one is not held to live in the most healthful place, therefore neither must he use the most healthful food . . . .1 "

«Secunda conclusio: non tenetur quis protelare vitam per alimenta quantum potest. Patet, quia non tenetur uti cibis optimis et delicatissimis et pretoisissimis etiamsi ea sint saluberrima, imo hoc est reprehensible, . . . Item non tentur vivere in loco saluberrimo, ergo nec uti cibo saluberrimo . n. 12.

Again:

Third conclusion: If one uses foods which men commonly use and in the quantity which customarily suffices for the conservation of strength, even though from this his life is shortened, even notably and this is noticed, he would not sin . . . From this, the corollary follows that one is not held to use medicines to prolong his life even where the danger of death is probable, for example to take for some years a drug to avoid fevers or anything of this sort. "°

no.Tertia conclusio—Si quis utatur alimentis, quibus homines communiter utuntur et in quantitate, quae solet sufficere ad valetudinem conservandam, dato quad ex hoc abbrevietur vita, etiam notabiliter et hoc percipiatur, non peccat . . . Ex quo sequitur corollarium, quad non tenetur quis uti medicinis, ad prolongandum vitam, etiam ubi esset probabile periculum mortis, puta quotannis sumere pharmacum ad vitandas febrew, vel aliquid huiusmodi».—loc. cit.

Cronin, pp. 37-38

Another pertinent passage comes from Vitoria's Relectio de Homicidio

. . . . One is not held, as I said, to employ all the means to conserve his life, but it is sufficient to employ the means which are of themselves intended for this purpose and congruent. Wherefore, in the case which has been posited, I believe that the individual is not held to give his whole inheritance to preserve his life, . . . From this also it is inferred that when one is sick without hope of life, granted that a certain precious drug could produce life for some hours or even days, he would not be held to buy it but it is sufficient to use common remedies, and he is considered as though dead.'"

"'« Non tenetur quis uti dixi, omnia media ponere ad servandum vitam, sed satis est ponere media ad hoc de se ordinata et congruentia. unde in casu posito credo quad non tenetur dare totum patrimonium pro vita servanda . . Ex quo etiam infertur, quad cum aliquis sine ape vitae aegrotat, data quad aliquo pharmaco pretioso posset producere vitam aliquot horas, aut etiam dies, non tenetur illud emere, sed satis erit uti remediis communibus et ille reputlitur quasi rnortuus».—Relec. de Homicidio, n. 35.

Vitoria uses the same reasoning in his commentary on St. Thomas

. . . . In the second place, I say that one is not held to lengthen his life because he is not held to use always the most delicate foods, that is, hens and chickens, even though he has the ability and the doctors say that if he eats in such a manner, he will live twenty years more, and even if he knew this for certain, he would not be obliged . . So I say, thirdly, that it is licit to eat common and regular foods . . . Granted that the doctor advises him to eat chickens and partridges, he can eat eggs and other common items."'

1124c Secundum dico non tenetur aliquis augere vitam quia non tenetur semper uti delicatissimis cibis, scilicet gallinis et pullis, etiamsi habeat facultatem et medici dicant quad si comedit ex illis vivet plus viginti arms et etiamsi hoc sciret pro certo, non tenetur . . . Et sic dico tertio, quad licet comedere cibos communes et regulares . . Dato quad medicus consuleret illi comedere pullos et perdices, potest comedere ova et alia communia».—F. de Vitoria, Comeritan'ai a la Secunda Secundae de Santo Tomas, in II:II, q. 147, art. 1.

Finally:

Where, however, one were to live in a very strict and singular manner, for example, eating perpetually only bread and water so that he abbreviates his life, perhaps it would not be licit, or even to eat only once in the week would not be licit. But, this ought to happen in a manner common to good men so that it is beside one's intention that death follow and not by intention.'"

113 . Ubi tamen modo arctissimo et singulari quis viveret, puta non comendendo perpetuo nisi panem et aquam ut vitam abbreviaret, forte non liceret vel etiam semel tantum in hebdomada comedere non liceret. Sed debet hoc fieri modo communi hominum bonorum ut praeter intentionem mors sequatur, et non ex intentione».—ibid., q. 64, art. 5.

De SOTO (†1560)

Cronin, p.38

Dominic Soto, 0. P. (t 1560), in his Theologia Moralis adheres to St. Thomas closely. Treating of suicide,"* he explicitly repeats the arguments of the Angelic Doctor. Soto includes this treatment in his tract De Justitia et Jure. The next point for explanation is the problem of mutilation. Soto, in this particular question, treats not only the lawfulness and unlawfulness of mutilation, but touches also on the intriguing speculation of whether or not a person is ever bound to suffer a mutilation, and further, whether the individual could ever be forced to submit to a mutilation. In the course of his discussion, Soto writes:

 . . . a prelate indeed could force a subject, on account of a singular obedience promised to him, to take medicines which he can conveniently accept. But, really, no one can be forced to bear the tremendous pain in the amputation of a member or in an incision into the body: because no one is held to preserve his life with such torture. Neither is he thought to be the killer of himself."'

15.. . . praelatus vero cogere posset subditum propter singularem obedientiam illi promissam, ut medicamina admittat quae commode recipere potest. At vero quod ingentissimum dolorem in amputatione membri aut corporis incisione ferat, profecto nemo cogi potest: quia nemo tenetur canto cruciatu vitam servare. neque ille censendus est sui homicida».—D. Soto, Theologia Moralis, Tract. de Justitia et Jure, Lib. V, q. 2, art. 1.

MOLINA  (†1600)

Cronin, pp. 38-39

In his De Justitia Commutativa, Molina (t 1600) gives a good treatment of the status of man as the custodian and guardian of his life and members. In the course of this treatment he describes the necessity «per accidens* of using the extraordinary means of conserving life.

The section has these words:

Fourth conclusion. Because man has been constituted the custodian and administrator of his own life and members, when he is unwilling, no one can cut a member from him for the sake of curing him or apply any other medicinal remedy to him . . . 16

116 .Quarta conclusio. Quia homo custos et administrator est constitutus suae propriae vitae ac membrorum, nullus ipso renuente, potest secare ab eo membrum gratia curationis, aut medicamentum aliud ei applicare . . .*—L. Molina, De Justitia, Tom. IV, Tract. III, disp. I, col. 514. 117

Soon again then, he says:

The conclusion proposed, therefore, is understood only when it is not entirely certain that the remedy will be of profit for avoiding the grave harm of a neighbor: or when the remedy is such that because of too intense a pain or another legitimate reason, he is not obliged to undergo that which he needs in order to conserve his life or member.'"

117* Conclusio ergo proposita solum intefligitur, quando certum omnino non est remedium profinurum ad grave malum proximi, vitandum: aut quando remedium est tale quod propter nimium dolorem, vel alia legitima causa, non tenetur is sub reatu lethalis culpae illud subire, qui eo indiget ad vitam and membrum conservandum».—loc. cit.

GREGORY SAYRUS  (†1602)

Cronin, p.41

His famous Clavis Regia Casuum Conscientiae

. . . furthermore, since by the natural law each one is bound to employ for the conservation of his body those licit means which he can conveniently undertake, the individual undoubtedly would sin who, when there is not question of great pain, would permit himself to die when he could take care of the health of his body. 'lb this, however, that he suffer the very intense pain of the amputation of a member or of an incision into his body, neither a prelate can oblige his subject, nor a father his son.—The reason is both because the sick individual is not held to conserve the life of his body with such great pain and torture and because superiors can not prescribe all things licit and honest but those only which are moderate.' 25

125 .. . . ac proinde cum unisquisque jure naturali media licita, quae commode sumi possunt ad sui corporis conservationem ponere tenetur, peccaret sine dubio, qui absque magno dolore, cum possit saluti corporis succurrere, se mori permitteret. Ad hoc tamen, ut ingentissimum dolorem in membri amputatione, vel corporis incisione ferret nec subditum praelatus, nec pater filium, obligare potest. Ratio est turn quia nec infirmus tenetur cum canto dolore et cruciatu vitam corporis conservare . . . Turn quia superiores non possunt omnia licita et honesta praecipere sed ea tantum quae moderata sunt..—Ibid., n. 38.

DOMINIC BANEZ (†1604)

Writing about St. Thomas' article on mutilation, Banez treats the question of whether or not the state can force a citizen to undergo an amputation.'"

Among the commentators on the writings of St. Thomas, one of the most famous is Dominic Banez (t 1604). Writing about St. Thomas' article on mutilation, Banez treats the question of whether or not the state can force a citizen to undergo an amputation.'" After this problem, he then places the query

« . . . is the man himself bound to suffer the amputation of a member in order to save his life? »127 In response, he writes:

127*, an ipsemet homo teneatur pati abscissionem membri propter sevandam vitam? »— Loc. cit.

It seems as though the answer is yes: because he is held to conserve his life through means which are ordered for this purpose and proportioned: but the cutting off of a member is a means proportioned to conserving life; therefore, he is bound to suffer the amputation. In answer here is the first conclusion. He is not bound absolutely speaking. The reason is that, although a man is held to conserve his own life, he is not bound to extraordinary means but to common food and clothing, to common medicines, to a certain common and ordinary pain: not, however, to a certain extraordinary and horrible pain, nor to expenses which are extraordinary in proportion to the status of this man. So that if, for example, it were certain that a common citizen would gain health if he spent three thousand ducats for a certain medicine, he would not be held to spend them. Thus, the argument is clear, for although that means is proportioned according to right reason and from the consequence is licit, it is, however, extraordinary.128

124 Et videretur quod sic: quia tenetur servare vitam per media ordinata et proportionata: sed abscissio membri est medium proportionatum ad servandam vitam, ergo tenetur pati abscissionem. Respondetur et sit prima conclusio. Quod non tenetur absolute loquendo. Et ratio est quia quamvis homo teneatur conservare vitam propriam, non tenetur per media extraordinaria, sed per victum et vestitum communem, per medicinas communes, per dolorem quendam communem et ordinarium: non tamen per quendam dolorem extraordinarium et horribilem, neque etiam per sumpus extraordinarios, secundum proportionem status ipsius hominis. Ut, si v.g. communem civem salutem consequuturum esset certum, si insumeret tria millia ducatorum in quadam medicina, ille non tenetur insumere. Per hoc patet ad argumentum, nam quamvis illud medium sit proportionatum secundum rectam rationem et ex consequenti licitum, est tamen extraordinarium».—D. Banez, in II:II, q. 65, art. I.

deLUGO (†1660)

[cf. Aquinas Sum.Theol. II.II; q 64. art.5]

although man can receive dominion over things which are extrinsic to himself or which are distinct from him, he cannot, however, receive dominion over himself, because from the very concept and definition, it is clear that a master is something relative, for example, a father or a teacher; and just as no one can be father or teacher of himself, so neither can he be master of himself, for to be master always denotes superiority with regard to the one over whom he is the master. Hence, God Himself cannot be master of Himself, even though He possesses Himself most perfectly. Therefore man cannot be master of himself, however, he can be master of his operations, and therefore, he can sell himself and thus, improperly speaking, we might say he gives mastery of himself to another but, he really does not give over mastery of himself basically or radically, but only mastery over certain of his operations, . . . therefore a man can dispose only of his own operations of which he is the master, not of himself, (or to say the same thing) not of his own life over which he is not the master, nor can he be. [transl. Cronin p. 9-10]

quia licet homo potuerit accipere dominium aliarum rerum, quae sunt extra ipsum, vel quae ab ipso distinguuntur; non tamen potuit accipere dolminium sui ipsius, quia ut ex ipso conceptu et definitione constat, dominus est aliquid relativum, sicut pater, et magister; quare sicut nemo potest esse pater vel magister sui ipsius, ita nec potest esse sui ipsius dominus: nam dominus semper dicit superioritatern respectu illius cuius est dominus. unde nec Deus ipse potest esse dominus sui ipsius, quamvis possideat perfectissime seipsum. non potuit ergo homo fieri dominus sui ipsius, potest quidem esse dominus suarum operationum, et ideo potest vendere seipsum, et tunc dicitur improprie dare aleri dominium sui ipsius; sed revera non dat proprie dominium sui simpliciter sed solum in ordine ad aliquas suas operationes . . . solum ergo potest homo disponere de suis operationibus, quarum dominus est, non de seipso, vel, quod idem est, de vita sua, cuius dominus non est, nec esse potest.—J. de Lugo, op. cit., Disp. X, Sec. I, n. 9.

 On non-obligatory Mutilation

 . . he must permit this cure when the doctors judge it necessary, and when it can happen without intense pain; not, if it is accompanied by very bitter pain; because a man is not bound to employ extraordinary and difficult means to conserve his life. [transl. Cronin p. 48]

debere earn curationem permittere, quando medici necessarium judicarent, et absque intenso dolore fieri posset; secus si acerbissimo dolore fieret; quia non tenetur homo media extraordinaria et difficillima adhibere ad vitae conservationem . . .J. De Lugo, De Justitia et Jure, Disp. 10, Sect. I, n. 21.

I said, however, that a man must guard his life by ordinary means against dangers and death coming from natural causes . . . because the one who neglects the ordinary means seems to neglect his life and therefore to act negligently in the administration of it, and he who does not employ the ordinary means which nature has provided for the ordinary conservation of life is considered morally to will his death.[transl. Cronin p. 52]

…dixi tamen, contra pericula, et mortem ex causis naturalibus provenientem debere hominem mediis ordinariis vitam tueri . . . quia qui media ordinaria negligit, videtur negligere vitam, atque ideo negligentem se in ejus gubematione gerere, et moraliter censetur velle mortem, qui mediis ordinariis non utitur, quae natura providit ad ordinariam vitae conservationem . loc.cit.

[

. . . he is not held to the extraordinary and difficult means . . . the bonum of his life is not of such great moment, however, that its conservation must be effected with extraordinary diligence: it is one thing not to neglect and rashly throw it away, to which a man is bound: it is another however, to seek after it and retain it by exquisite means as it is escaping away from him, to which he is not held; neither is he on that account considered morally to will or seek his death. [transl. Cronin p. 53]

nec etiam tunc tenetur ad media extraordinaria et difficilia . . non tamen est tanti _ • momenti hoc vitae bonum ut extraordinaria diligentia procuranda sit ejus conservatio: aliud est eam non negligere et temere projicere, ad quod homo tenetur: aliud vero est eam quaerer et fugientem ex se retmere medus exquisitis, ad quad non tenetur, nec ideo censetur moraliter mortem velle aut quarerere».—loc. cit.