Selections on euthanasia
Evangelium Vitae:
On the Value and Inviolability of Human Life
(Pope John Paul II, March 25, 1995)

 

It is I who bring both death and life (Dt 32:39): the tragedy of euthanasia  

 

 64. At the other end of life’s spectrum, men and women find themselves facing the mystery of death. Today, as a result of advances in medicine and in a cultural context frequently closed to the transcendent, the experience of dying is marked by new features. When the prevailing tendency is to value life only to the extent that it brings pleasure and well-being, suffering seems like an unbearable setback, something from which one must be freed at all costs. Death is considered “senseless” if it suddenly interrupts a life still open to a future of new and interesting experiences. But it becomes a “rightful liberation” once life is held to be no longer meaningful because it is filled with pain and inexorably doomed to even greater suffering.

64. Altero in vitae extremo ante hominis oculos mortis ob­versatur arcanum. Propter magnos in re medicina factos pro­gressus atque intra culturalia rerum adiuncta, unde transcen­dentia excluditur, novis quibusdam nunc notis distinguitur ipse moriendi actus. Etenim, quamdiu aestimare homines fere eate­nus malunt vitam quatenus voluptatem ea gignit prosperita­temque, exstat dolor veluti haud toleranda clades, ex qua omni­bus modis quis est liberandus. Mors vero, quae « absurda » iudi­catur si inopinato interrumpit vitam adhuc patentem ad futura tempora experientiis pulchris repleta, « vindicata liberatio » con­tra evadit, cum omni significatione carere iam existimatur vita doloribus obruta ac necessario quodam fato ad maiorem etiam venturum cruciatum destinata.

Furthermore, when he denies or neglects his fundamental relationship to God, man thinks he is his own rule and measure, with the right to demand that society should guarantee him the ways and means of deciding what to do with his life in full and complete autonomy. It is especially people in the developed countries who act in this way: they feel encouraged to do so also by the constant progress of medicine and its ever more advanced techniques. By using highly sophisticated systems and equipment, science and medical practice today are able not only to attend to cases formerly considered untreatable and to reduce or eliminate pain, but also to sustain and prolong life even in situations of extreme frailty, to resuscitate artificially patients whose basic biological functions have undergone sudden collapse, and to use special procedures to make organs available for transplanting.

Principalem porro suam cum Deo necessitudinem repudians aut oblivione oblitterans, homo semet regulam esse censet nor­mamque sibi, dum ius simul sibi esse arbitratur ut a societate postulet certain confirmatamque facultatem ac rationem de propria vita decernendi secundum plenam ac planam sui iuris condicionem. Ita nominatim se gerit homo qui Civitates magis progressas incolit: impulsus illuc praeterea sibi videtur conti­nuatis medicinae artis augmentis et rationibus ipsis usque per­fectioribus. Per technicos modos apparatusque summe consum­matos iam tales hodie se praebent scientia et medicina, ut non tantum insolubiles antehac dissolvere possint difficultates dolo­remque ipsum aut mitigare aut funditus exterminare, verum vi­tam etiam sustinere vel in debilitate extrema uertrahere. homi nes ipsos artificio quodam resuscitare quorum biologici proces­sus primarii improvisos pertulerunt lapsus, intercedere ut trans­plantanda aliquando praesto sint organa.

In this context the temptation grows to have recourse to euthanasia, that is, to take control of death and bring it about before its time, “gently” ending one’s own life or the life of others. In reality, what might seem logical and humane, when looked at more closely is seen to be senseless and inhumane. Here we are faced with one of the more alarming symptoms of the “culture of death”, which is advancing above all in prosperous societies, marked by an attitude of excessive preoccupation with efficiency and which sees the growing number of elderly and disabled people as intolerable and too burdensome. These people are very often isolated by their families and by society, which are organized almost exclusively on the basis of criteria of productive efficiency, according to which a hopelessly impaired life no longer has any value. 

Hisce in rerum adiunctis magis ac magis alliciuntur homines ad euthanasiam, ut morte videlicet dominentur in antecessum inducenda morte sicque suae vel alienae vitae « dulciter > impo­nendo finem. Re autem vera, quod rationi consentaneum atque humanum videri potest, si altius introspicitur absurdum depre­henditur et inhumanum. Aliquo consistimus coram signo maxi­me quidem conturbante illius e culturae mortis », quae in locis prosperitatis potissimum percrebrescit et quam mens quaedam designat ad rerum efficientiam propensa, ubi nimium onerosus et vix tolerabilis habetur numerus crescens hominum seniorum et infirmorum. Persaepe quidem a suis segregantur familiis et societate ipsa; quae nempe instituta administrantur fere unice ad leges efficientis rerum effectionis, secundum quas vita sine remedio inhabilis iam nihil prae se fert boni.

            65. For a correct moral judgment on euthanasia, in the first place a clear definition is required. Euthanasia in the strict sense is understood to be an action or omission which of itself and by intention causes death, with the purpose of eliminating all suffering. “Euthanasia’s terms of reference, therefore, are to be found in the intention of the will and in the methods used”.

65. Clare ideo in primis ut rectum de euthanasia feratur mo­rale iudicium, est defnienda illa. Sub nomine euthanasiae vero proprioque sensu accipitur actio vel omissio quae suapte natura et consilio mentis mortem affert ut hoc modo omnis dolor remo­veatur. ((Euthanasia igitur in voluntatis proposito et procedendi rationibus, quae adhibentur, continetur >.76

Euthanasia must be distinguished from the decision to forego so-called “aggressive medical treatment”, in other words, medical procedures which no longer correspond to the real situation of the patient, either because they are by now disproportionate to any expected results or because they impose an excessive burden on the patient and his family. In such situations, when death is clearly imminent and inevitable, one can in conscience “refuse forms of treatment that would only secure a precarious and burdensome prolongation of life, so long as the normal care due to the sick person in similar cases is not interrupted”. Certainly there is a moral obligation to care for oneself and to allow oneself to be cared for, but this duty must take account of concrete circumstances. It needs to be determined whether the means of treatment available are objectively proportionate to the prospects for improvement. To forego extraordinary or disproportionate means is not the equivalent of suicide or euthanasia; it rather expresses acceptance of the human condition in the face of death.[78]

Ab ea separetur oportet consilium illud, quo quis tracta­ tionem reiciat sic dictam < vehementiam therapeuticam >, aliquos nempe medicos interventus non amplius aegrotantis statui con­gruentes, quia impares lam sunt its effectibus quos sperari lice­ret vel etiam quia nimis omnino ipsi aegroto eiusque familiae molesti. His enim in casibus, cum nuntiata iam instat mors nec vitari potest, licet ex conscientia < consilium inire curationibus renuntiandi, quae nonnisi precariam et doloris plenam vitae di­lationem afferre valent, haud intermissis tamen ordinariis curis, quae in similibus casibus aegroto debentur >>.77 Officium certissime adest morale ut quis se curet curetque se curandum; quod ta­men officium metiendum est secundum concreta rerum adiuneta: in re namque nata necesse est diiudicare conveniantne the­rapeutica instrumenta ad manus aliquando melioris condicionis ipsis exspectationibus. Haud vero tantum valet consiliorum extraordinariorum vel nimiorum reiectio quam voluntaria mors vel euthanasia; consensum potius illa declarat cum humano statu ante mortem.78

In modern medicine, increased attention is being given to what are called “methods of palliative care”, which seek to make suffering more bearable in the final stages of illness and to ensure that the patient is supported and accompanied in his or her ordeal. Among the questions which arise in this context is that of the licitness of using various types of painkillers and sedatives for relieving the patient’s pain when this involves the risk of shortening life. While praise may be due to the person who voluntarily accepts suffering by forgoing treatment with pain-killers in order to remain fully lucid and, if a believer, to share consciously in the Lord’s Passion, such “heroic” behaviour cannot be considered the duty of everyone. Pius XII affirmed that it is licit to relieve pain by narcotics, even when the result is decreased consciousness and a shortening of life, “if no other means exist, and if, in the given circumstances, this does not prevent the carrying out of other religious and moral duties”. In such a case, death is not willed or sought, even though for reasonable motives one runs the risk of it: there is simply a desire to ease pain effectively by using the analgesics which medicine provides. All the same, “it is not right to deprive the dying person of consciousness without a serious reason: as they approach death people ought to be able to satisfy their moral and family duties, and above all they ought to be able to prepare in a fully conscious way for their definitive meeting with God.

Recentissima in medicina arte magis magisque emergunt sic dictae « curae palliativae >, eo scilicet pertinentes ut extremo morbi tempore tolerabilior fiat dolor utque patienti ipsi consen­taneus simul praestetur comitatus humanus. Hic inter alias quaestiones illud exsistit etiam utrum honestus sit ipse usus ge­nerum diversorum medicaminis analgesici et sedativi, quo aegrotans doloribus subtrahatur, quotiens nempe periculum eodem tempore imminet ne vita ei abscidatur. Laudandus enim si ille potest videri qui ultro suaque sponte pati consentit, repu­diatis id est rationibus antidolorificis, ut lucidam sibi plene ser­vet mentem communicetque, si quidem christifidelis est, con­scio modo Domini passionem, tamen iste sese gerendi « heroicus » modus omnibus imperatus minime existimari debet. Sua iam aetate confirmaverat Pius XII dolorem opprimi medicamentis licere, etiamsi conscius exinde impediretur animus vitaque brevior ipsa evaderet, « si » ut ait - « alia non in pro­cinctu sunt instrumenta atque certis in adiunctis istud non pro­hibet quin religiosa alia compleantur et moralia officia ».79 Ete­nim tune neque cupitur mors nec quaeritur, quamquam iustis de causis eius subest periculum: voluntas ea dumtaxat est ut efficaciter deleniatur dolor, adhibitis analgesicis viis quae auxi­lio datae sunt medicae arti. Verumtamen l< sui conscientia non destitui moribundus absque gravi causa debet »: S0 appropin­quantes iam morti posse adhuc homines oportet suis moralibus satisfacere familiaribusque obligationibus atque potissimum plena cum conscientia ad decretoriam sese comparare cum Deo congressionem.

Taking into account these distinctions, in harmony with the Magisterium of my Predecessors and in communion with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that euthanasia is a grave violation of the law of God, since it is the deliberate and morally unacceptable killing of a human person. This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written word of God, is transmitted by the Church’s Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.[82]

His rite interpositis distinctionibus, Magisterium Nos De­cessorum Nostrorum 81 iterantes atque in communione cum catholicae Ecclesiae Episcopis confirmamus euthanasiam gravem divinae Legis esse violationem, quatenus est conscia necatio per­sonae humanae, quae moraliter probari non potest. Haec doc­trina lege naturali atque Verbo Dei scripto adnixa, Ecclesiae Traditione traducitur atque Magisterio ordinario et universali explicatur.S2

Depending on the circumstances, this practice involves the malice proper to suicide or murder.      

Talis actus, secundum rerum adiuncta, propriam voluntariae mortis ac homicidii inhonestatem secum adfert.

 66. Suicide is always as morally objectionable as murder. The Church’s tradition has always rejected it as a gravely evil choice.[83] Even though a certain psychological, cultural and social conditioning may induce a person to carry out an action which so radically contradicts the innate inclination to life, thus lessening or removing subjective responsibility, suicide, when viewed objectively, is a gravely immoral act. In fact, it involves the rejection of love of self and the renunciation of the obligation of justice and charity towards one’s neighbour, towards the communities to which one belongs, and towards society as a whole.[84] In its deepest reality, suicide represents a rejection of God’s absolute sovereignty over life and death, as proclaimed in the prayer of the ancient sage of Israel: “You have power over life and death; you lead men down to the gates of Hades and back again” (Wis 16:13; cf. Tob 13:2).

66. Suicidium numquam moraliter est admittendum aeque ac homicidium. Ecclesia id graviter malum cum habeat usque respuit.S3 Tametsi certae animi, cultus et societatis condiciones ef­ficere possunt ut eiusmodi facinus patretur quod radicitus abso­num sit a nativa cuiusque in vitam inclinatione, minuendo vel etiam tollendo subiectivam responsalitatem, suicidium objective consideratum graviter immoralis est actus, quandoquidem re­quirit ut amor sui denegetur et caritatis officia reiciantur proxi­mum respicientia, propriam communitatem et universam socie­tatem.84 Intimo eius sensu spectato, illud Dei dominatum in vi­tam et mortem abnuit, qui in precibus sapientis veteris Israelis proclamatur: « Tu enim vitae et mortis babes potestatem, et de­ducis ad portas mortis et reducis > (Sap 16, 13; cfr Tob 13, 2).

To concur with the intention of another person to commit suicide and to help in carrying it out through so-called “assisted suicide” means to cooperate in, and at times to be the actual perpetrator of, an injustice which can never be excused, even if it is requested. In a remarkably relevant passage Saint Augustine writes that “it is never licit to kill another: even if he should wish it, indeed if he request it because, hanging between life and death, he begs for help in freeing the soul struggling against the bonds of the body and longing to be released; nor is it licit even when a sick person is no longer able to live”.[85]

Cum quis eodem animo est quo sui interemptor atque in complendo proposito ei adest per « suicidium adiutum #, quod dicitur, fit huius rei socius et nonnumquam actor ipse cuiusdam iniuriae, quae numquam comprobari potest, ne postulata qui­dem forte. S. Augustinus nostrae fere aetatis prope singularem exprimit mentem: ((Non licere alterum occidere, etiam volentem et petentem, et vivere iam non valentem ..., et animam corporis nexibus obluctantem solvique cupientem ».85

Even when not motivated by a selfish refusal to be burdened with the life of someone who is suffering, euthanasia must be called a false mercy, and indeed a disturbing “perversion” of mercy. True “compassion” leads to sharing another’s pain; it does not kill the person whose suffering we cannot bear. Moreover, the act of euthanasia appears all the more perverse if it is carried out by those, like relatives, who are supposed to treat a family member with patience and love, or by those, such as doctors, who by virtue of their specific profession are supposed to care for the sick person even in the most painful terminal stages.

Quamvis non cause­tur euthanasia ex eo quod, sui commodi causa, quis curare recu­sat patientem, eadem falsa pietas est habenda, immo eius gravis u deformitas >>: nam vera N miseratio » efficit ut cum alterius dolo­re homo societur, non autem eum perimit cuius aegritudo tolera­ri non potest. Atque multo flagitiosius videtur euthanasiae faci­nus, si ab its patratur, qui ut familiares consanguineum leniter amanterque iuvare debent vel - ut medici - suam ipso­rum propter artem, aegrotum curare debent, etiamsi in condi­cionibus ille insanabilibus versatur

The choice of euthanasia becomes more serious when it takes the form of a murder committed by others on a person who has in no way requested it and who has never consented to it. The height of arbitrariness and injustice is reached when certain people, such as physicians or legislators, arrogate to themselves the power to decide who ought to live and who ought to die. Once again we find ourselves before the temptation of Eden: to become like God who “knows good and evil” (cf. Gen 3:5). God alone has the power over life and death: “It is I who bring both death and life” (Dt 32:39; cf. 2 Kg 5:7; I Sam 2:6). But he only exercises this power in accordance with a plan of wisdom and love. When man usurps this power, being enslaved by a foolish and selfish way of thinking, he inevitably uses it for injustice and death. Thus the life of the person who is weak is put into the hands of the one who is strong; in society the sense of justice is lost, and mutual trust, the basis of every authentic interpersonal relationship, is undermined at its root.         

Euthanasiae electio gravior fit cum in homicidium vertitur, quod alii in quadam persona patrant quae nullo prorsus modo eam quaesivit eamque comprobavit. Summum deinceps arbi­trium attingitur et iniuria, cum quidam medici vel legum latores de vita morteque decernendi sibi vindicant potestatem. Sollici­tatio illa sic, quae fuit in Eden, renascitur: « Eritis sicut Deus sciences bonum et malum » (cfr Gn 3, 5). Sed penes Deum tan­tum est potestas vitam et mortem constituendi: « Ego occidam et ego vivere faciam » (Dt 32, 39; cfr 2 Reg 5, 7; 1 Sam 2, 6). Ipse dumtaxat secundum sapientiae dilectionisque consilium suam potestatem usque gerit. Cum homo, stulta quadam obsessus mente suique commodi studiosus, hanc potestatem perperam occupat, eandem necessario ad iniuriam et mortem agendas usurpat. Vita sic debilioris in dicione est praepotentis; in horni­num societate iustitiae sensus amittitur, atque mutua fiducia radicitus in discrimen adducitur, quae est fundamentum in quo inter personas sincera nititur necessitudo.

            67. Quite different from this is the way of love and true mercy, which our common humanity calls for, and upon which faith in Christ the Redeemer, who died and rose again, sheds ever new light. The request which arises from the human heart in the supreme confrontation with suffering and death, especially when faced with the temptation to give up in utter desperation, is above all a request for companionship, sympathy and support in the time of trial. It is a plea for help to keep on hoping when all human hopes fail. As the Second Vatican Council reminds us: “It is in the face of death that the riddle of human existence becomes most acute” and yet “man rightly follows the intuition of his heart when he abhors and repudiates the absolute ruin and total disappearance of his own person. Man rebels against death because he bears in himself an eternal seed which cannot be reduced to mere matter”.[86]

67. Omnino autem alia est amoris sinceraeque pietatis via, quam nostra humanitas communis infert quamque in Christo Redemptore fides, qui mortuus est et resurrexit, novis rationi­bus collustrat. Postulatio, quae ex hominis corde manat instan­tibus novissime dolore et morte, praesertim cum temptatur ut se ipse ad desperationem inclinet atque quasi in ea absumatur, re­quirit potissimum consuetudinem, solidarietatem, atque praesidium difficultatibus obvenientibus. Auxilium postulatur ad in­super sperandum, cum omnes humanae spes praeciduntur. Sicut Concilium Vaticanum II commemoravit, « coram morte aenig­ma condicionis humanae maximum evadit » ipsi homini; atque is (i recte instinctu cordis sui iudicat, cum totalem ruinam et defi­nitivum exitum suae personae abhorret et respuit. Semen aeter­nitatis quod in se gerit, ad solam materiam cum irreductibile sit contra mortem insurgit >.86

This natural aversion to death and this incipient hope of immortality are illumined and brought to fulfilment by Christian faith, which both promises and offers a share in the victory of the Risen Christ: it is the victory of the One who, by his redemptive death, has set man free from death, “the wages of sin” (Rom 6:23), and has given him the Spirit, the pledge of resurrection and of life (cf. Rom 8:11). The certainty of future immortality and hope in the promised resurrection cast new light on the mystery of suffering and death, and fill the believer with an extraordinary capacity to trust fully in the plan of God.

Naturalis haec facultas morti obsistendi atque haec nascens immortalitatis spes collustrantur et complentur christiana fide, quae Christi Resuscitati victoriam participandam pollicetur ac porrigit: victoria est profecto Illius qui per mortem suam re­demptricem hominem a morte vindicavit, « peccati stipendio )) (Rom 6, 23), atque Spiritum subministravit, resurrectionis vitae­que pignus (cfr Rom 8, 11). Futurae immortalitatis certitudo at­que resurrectionis promissae spes patiendi moriendique mysterio novam lucem afferunt itemque fidelibus ingens praebent robur ad Dei mysterium tenendum.

The Apostle Paul expressed this newness in terms of belonging completely to the Lord who embraces every human condition: “None of us lives to himself, and none of us dies to himself. If we live, we live to the Lord, and if we die, we die to the Lord; so then, whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord’s” (Rom 14:7-8). Dying to the Lord means experiencing one’s death as the supreme act of obedience to the Father (cf. Phil 2:8), being ready to meet death at the “hour” willed and chosen by him (cf. Jn 13:1), which can only mean when one’s earthly pilgrimage is completed. Living to the Lord also means recognizing that suffering, while still an evil and a trial in itself, can always become a source of good. It becomes such if it is experienced for love and with love through sharing, by God’s gracious gift and one’s own personal and free choice, in the suffering of Christ Crucified. In this way, the person who lives his suffering in the Lord grows more fully conformed to him (cf. Phil 3:10; 1 Pet 2:21) and more closely associated with his redemptive work on behalf of the Church and humanity. This was the experience of Saint Paul, which every person who suffers is called to relive: “I rejoice in my sufferings for your sake, and in my flesh I complete what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions for the sake of his Body, that is, the Church” (Col 1:24).

Paulus apostolus bane novam rem verbis patefecit signifi­cantibus totam Deo deditionem quamlibet humanam condi­cionem complectentem. « Nemo enim nostrum sibi vivit et nemo sibi moritur; live enim vivimus, Domino vivimus, sive morimur, Domino morimur. Sive ergo vivimus, sive morimur, Domini su­mus » (Rom 14, 7-8). Domino mori propriam mortem vivere si­gnificat veluti summam Patri oboeditionem (cfr Philp 2, 8), dum videlicet ea suscipitur in ipsa N hora >, quam is vult et eligit (cfr Io 13, 1), quandoquidem unus ille scit statuitque tempus de­finitum ex hoc mundo discedendi. Domino vivere agnoscere etiam signif cat dolorem, ut idem per se malum sit et periclitatio, semper boni fontem evadere posse. Istud fit cum suscipitur amandi gratia et amando, dum scilicet Christi passio cruci affixi participatur, Deo id donante et homine libere recipiente. Hoc modo qui in Domino passionem suam experitur, plenius ei accom­modatur (cfr Philp 3, 10; 1 Pe 2, 21) eiusque redemptrici operae pro Ecclesia et humanitate artius sociatur.87 Hoc Apostolus experitur, quod etiam quivis patiens sumendum vocatur: <(Nunc gaudeo in passionibus pro vobis et adimpleo ea, quae desunt passionum Christi, in carne mea pro corpore eius, quod est Ecclesia )) (Col 1, 24).

We must obey God rather than men” (Acts 5:29):
 
Civil Law and the Moral Law 

a Oboedire oportet Deo magis quam hominibus » (Act 5, 29): civilis lex lexque moralis.

            68. One of the specific characteristics of present-day attacks on human life--as has already been said several times--consists in the trend to demand a legal justification for them, as if they were rights which the State, at least under certain conditions, must acknowledge as belonging to citizens. Consequently, there is a tendency to claim that it should be possible to exercise these rights with the safe and free assistance of doctors and medical personnel.

68. Una ex minationibus, quae hodie vitae humanae insi­diantur, quemadmodum alias dictum est, eo tendit, ut iure illae iustificentur, quasi iura essent, quae, certis saltem exstantibus condicionibus, Natio civibus praestare debet ideoque eadem te­nenda, medicis et valetudinis operariis gratuito et sicure id concedentibus.

It is often claimed that the life of an unborn child or a seriously disabled person is only a relative good: according to a proportionalist approach, or one of sheer calculation, this good should be compared with and balanced against other goods. It is even maintained that only someone present and personally involved in a concrete situation can correctly judge the goods at stake: consequently, only that person would be able to decide on the morality of his choice. The State therefore, in the interest of civil coexistence and social harmony, should respect this choice, even to the point of permitting abortion and euthanasia.

Haud semel existimatur nondum natorum vitam aeque ac graviter imbecillorum imperfectum dumtaxat esse bonum: pro portione vel ad meram rationem cum aliis rebus comparanda est et perpendenda. Iudicatur quoque eum solum, qui re implicatur et involvitur, convenienter haec bona ponderare posse: ideo is unus de moralitate rei eligendae decernere potest. Quocirca Civi­tas, ut civilis convictus socialisque concordia recte serventur, hanc electionem tueri debet, atque etiam abortum et euthana­siam permittere.

At other times, it is claimed that civil law cannot demand that all citizens should live according to moral standards higher than what all citizens themselves acknowledge and share. Hence the law should always express the opinion and will of the majority of citizens and recognize that they have, at least in certain extreme cases, the right even to abortion and euthanasia. Moreover the prohibition and the punishment of abortion and euthanasia in these cases would inevitably lead--so it is said--to an increase of illegal practices: and these would not be subject to necessary control by society and would be carried out in a medically unsafe way. The question is also raised whether supporting a law which in practice cannot be enforced would not ultimately undermine the authority of all laws.

Alias dicitur lex civilis iubere non posse omnes cives vivere ad altiorem moralitatis ordinem quam ipsi noverunt et admit­tunt. Hac de causa mentem voluntatemque maioris civium par­tis semper lex patefacere debet atque iisdem, saltem quibusdam in gravissimis casibus, etiam ius abortus et euthanasiae concede­re. Ceterum abortus atque euthanasiae interdictio et coercitio his in casibus necessario aiunt ad actionum lege vetitarum amplificationem adducunt: quae quidem pergunt illi - socie­tatis respectionem vitant atque abest opportuna medicorum cura. Aliquis praeterea quaerat, lege lata quae servari re non possit, utrum significet cunctarum legum auctoritatem demum labefactari neene.

Finally, the more radical views go so far as to maintain that in a modern and pluralistic society people should be allowed complete freedom to dispose of their own lives as well as of the lives of the unborn: it is asserted that it is not the task of the law to choose between different moral opinions, and still less can the law claim to impose one particular opinion to the detriment of others.           

Acerrimae tandem opinationes asseverant in recentiore mul­tiplicique societate plene suam cuique esse agnoscendam potesta­tem propriae vitae disponendae aeque ac nondum natorum: non est enim legis munus ex diversis moralibus sententiis electionem ducere, eoque minus quandam iniungere opinionem prae aliis.

 

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