Secunda Secundæ [IIa.IIæ],
Q. 84: On the Cause of Sin

Quaestio 84 De causa peccati

We must now consider the cause of sin, insofar as one sin can be the cause of another. Under this head there are four points of inquiry:

 Deinde considerandum est de causa peccati secundum quod unum peccatum est causa alterius. Et circa hoc quaeruntur quatuor.

1. Whether covetousness is the root of all sins?

Primo, utrum cupiditas sit radix omnium peccatorum.

2. Whether pride is the beginning of every sin?

Secundo, utrum superbia sit initium omnis peccati.

3. Whether other special sins should be called capital vices, besides pride and covetousness?

Tertio, utrum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, debeant dici capitalia vitia aliqua specialia peccata

4. How many capital vices there are, and which are they?

Quarto, quot et quae sint capitalia vitia.

 
[... Articles 1 and 2 ...]
 

[Secunda Secundæ (IIa.IIæ),Q. 84: On the Cause of Sin]
 ARTICLE 3

 Articulus 3

Whether any other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital?

trum praeter superbiam et avaritiam, sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia

Objection 1: It would seem that no other special sins, besides pride and avarice, should be called capital. Because the head seems to be to an animal, what the root is to a plant, as stated in De Anima ii, text. 38: for the roots are like a mouth. If therefore covetousness is called the root of all evils, it seems that it alone, and no other sin, should be called a capital vice.

Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod praeter superbiam et avaritiam, non sint quaedam alia peccata specialia quae dicantur capitalia. Ita enim se videtur habere caput ad animalia, sicut radix ad plantas, ut dicitur in II de anima, nam radices sunt ori similes. Si igitur cupiditas dicitur radix omnium malorum, videtur quod ipsa sola debeat dici vitium capitale, et nullum aliud peccatum.

Obj. 2: Further, the head bears a certain relation of order to the other members, insofar as sensation and movement follow from the head. But sin implies privation of order. Therefore sin has not the character of head: so that no sins should be called capital.

Praeterea, caput habet quendam ordinem ad alia membra, inquantum a capite diffunditur quodammodo sensus et motus. Sed peccatum dicitur per privationem ordinis. Ergo peccatum non habet rationem capitis. Et ita non debent poni aliqua capitalia peccata.

Obj. 3: Further, capital crimes are those which receive capital punishment. But every kind of sin comprises some that are punished thus. Therefore the capital sins are not certain specific sins.

Praeterea, capitalia crimina dicuntur quae capite plectuntur. Sed tali poena puniuntur quaedam peccata in singulis generibus. Ergo vitia capitalia non sunt aliqua determinata secundum speciem.

On the contrary, Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) enumerates certain special vices under the name of capital.

Sed contra est quod Gregorius, XXXI Moral., enumerat quaedam specialia vitia, quae dicit esse capitalia.

Wherefore a capital vice is not only the principle of others, but is also their director and, in a way, their leader: because the art or habit, to which the end belongs, is always the principle and the commander in matters concerning the means. Hence Gregory (Moral. xxxi, 17) compares these capital vices to the leaders of an army.

Et ideo vitium capitale non solum est principium aliorum, sed etiam est directivum et quodammodo ductivum aliorum, semper enim ars vel habitus ad quem pertinet finis, principatur et imperat circa ea quae sunt ad finem. Unde Gregorius, XXXI Moral., huiusmodi vitia capitalia ducibus exercituum comparat.

Reply Obj. 1: The term capital is taken from caput and applied to something connected with, or partaking of the head, as having some property thereof, but not as being the head taken literally. And therefore the capital vices are not only those which have the character of primary origin, as covetousness which is called the root, and pride which is called the beginning, but also those which have the character of proximate origin in respect of several sins.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod capitale dicitur denominative a capite, quod quidem est per quandam derivationem vel participationem capitis, sicut habens aliquam proprietatem capitis, non sicut simpliciter caput. Et ideo capitalia vitia dicuntur non solum illa quae habent rationem primae originis, sicut avaritia, quae dicitur radix, et superbia, quae dicitur initium, sed etiam illa quae habent rationem originis propinquae respectu plurium peccatorum.

Reply Obj. 2: Sin lacks order insofar as it turns away from God, for in this respect it is an evil, and evil, according to Augustine (De Natura Boni iv), is the privation of mode, species and order. But insofar as sin implies a turning to something, it regards some good: wherefore, in this respect, there can be order in sin.

Ad secundum dicendum quod peccatum caret ordine ex parte aversionis, ex hac enim parte habet rationem mali; malum autem, secundum Augustinum, in libro de natura boni, est privatio modi, speciei et ordinis. Sed ex parte conversionis, respicit quoddam bonum. Et ideo ex hac parte potest habere ordinem.

Reply Obj. 3: This objection considers capital sin as so called from the punishment it deserves, in which sense we are not taking it here.

Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de capitali peccato secundum quod dicitur a reatu poenae. Sic autem hic non loquimur.

[Secunda Secundæ (IIa.IIæ),Q. 84: On the Cause of Sin]
 ARTICLE 4

Articulus 4

Whether the seven capital vices are suitably reckoned: vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, and lust?

 Utrum sit dicendum septem esse vitia capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, gula, luxuria

Objection 1: It would seem that we ought not to reckon seven capital vices, viz., vainglory, envy, anger, sloth, covetousness, gluttony, lust. For sins are opposed to virtues. But there are four principal virtues, as stated above (Q61, A2). Therefore there are only four principal or capital vices.

Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod non sit dicendum septem esse vitia capitalia, quae sunt inanis gloria, invidia, ira, tristitia, avaritia, gula, luxuria. Peccata enim virtutibus opponuntur. Virtutes autem principales sunt quatuor, ut supra dictum est. Ergo et vitia principalia, sive capitalia, non sunt nisi quatuor

Obj. 2: Further, the passions of the soul are causes of sin, as stated above (Q77). But there are four principal passions of the soul; two of which, viz., hope and fear, are not mentioned among the above sins, whereas certain vices are mentioned to which pleasure and sadness belong, since pleasure belongs to gluttony and lust, and sadness to sloth and envy. Therefore the principal sins are unfittingly enumerated.

Praeterea, passiones animae sunt quaedam causae peccati, ut supra dictum est. Sed passiones animae principales sunt quatuor. De quarum duabus nulla fit mentio inter praedicta peccata, scilicet de spe et timore. Enumerantur autem aliqua vitia ad quae pertinet delectatio et tristitia, nam delectatio pertinet ad gulam et luxuriam, tristitia vero ad acediam et invidiam. Ergo inconvenienter enumerantur principalia peccata.

Obj. 3: Further, anger is not a principal passion. Therefore it should not be placed among the principal vices

Praeterea, ira non est principalis passio. Non ergo debuit poni inter principalia vitia.

Obj. 4: Further, just as covetousness or avarice is the root of sin, so is pride the beginning of sin, as stated above (A2). But avarice is reckoned to be one of the capital vices. Therefore pride also should be placed among the capital vices.

.Praeterea, sicut cupiditas, sive avaritia, est radix peccati, ita superbia est peccati initium, ut supra dictum est. Sed avaritia ponitur unum de septem vitiis capitalibus. Ergo superbia inter vitia capitalia enumeranda esset.

Obj. 5: Further, some sins are committed which cannot be caused through any of these: as, for instance, when one sins through ignorance, or when one commits a sin with a good intention, e.g., steals in order to give an alms. Therefore the capital vices are insufficiently enumerated.

Praeterea, quaedam peccata committuntur quae ex nullo horum causari possunt, sicut cum aliquis errat ex ignorantia; vel cum aliquis ex aliqua bona intentione committit aliquod peccatum, puta cum aliquis furatur ut det eleemosynam. Ergo insufficienter capitalia vitia enumerantur.

On the contrary, stands the authority of Gregory who enumerates them in this way (Moral. xxxi, 17).

Sed in contrarium est auctoritas Gregorii sic enumerantis, XXXI Moralium.

I answer that, As stated above (A3), the capital vices are those which give rise to others, especially by way of final cause. Now this kind of origin may take place in two ways. First, on account of the condition of the sinner, who is disposed so as to have a strong inclination for one particular end, the result being that he frequently goes forward to other sins. But this kind of origin does not come under the consideration of art, because man’s particular dispositions are infinite in number. Second, on account of a natural relationship of the ends to one another: and it is in this way that most frequently one vice arises from another, so that this kind of origin can come under the consideration of art.

Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, vitia capitalia dicuntur ex quibus alia oriuntur, praecipue secundum rationem causae finalis. Huiusmodi autem origo potest attendi dupliciter. Uno quidem modo, secundum conditionem peccantis, qui sic dispositus est ut maxime afficiatur ad unum finem, ex quo ut plurimum in alia peccata procedat. Sed iste modus originis sub arte cadere non potest, eo quod infinitae sunt particulares hominum dispositiones. Alio modo, secundum naturalem habitudinem ipsorum finium ad invicem. Et secundum hoc, ut in pluribus unum vitium ex alio oritur. Unde iste modus originis sub arte cadere potest.

Accordingly therefore, those vices are called capital, whose ends have certain fundamental reasons for moving the appetite; and it is in respect of these fundamental reasons that the capital vices are differentiated. Now a thing moves the appetite in two ways. First, directly and of its very nature: thus good moves the appetite to seek it, while evil, for the same reason, moves the appetite to avoid it. Second, indirectly and on account of something else, as it were: thus one seeks an evil on account of some attendant good, or avoids a good on account of some attendant evil.

Secundum hoc ergo, illa vitia capitalia dicuntur, quorum fines habent quasdam primarias rationes movendi appetitum, et secundum harum rationum distinctionem, distinguuntur capitalia vitia. Movet autem aliquid appetitum dupliciter. Uno modo, directe et per se, et hoc modo bonum movet appetitum ad prosequendum, malum autem, secundum eandem rationem, ad fugiendum. Alio modo, indirecte et quasi per aliud, sicut aliquis aliquod malum prosequitur propter aliquod bonum adiunctum, vel aliquod bonum fugit propter aliquod malum adiunctum.

Again, man’s good is threefold. For, in the first place, there is a certain good of the soul, which derives its aspect of appetibility, merely through being apprehended, viz., the excellence of honor and praise, and this good is sought inordinately by vainglory.

Second, there is the good of the body, and this regards either the preservation of the individual, e.g., meat and drink, which good is pursued inordinately by gluttony,

or the preservation of the species, e.g., sexual intercourse, which good is sought inordinately by lust.

Third, there is external good, viz., riches, to which covetousness

is referred. These same four vices avoid inordinately the contrary evils.

Bonum autem hominis est triplex. Est enim primo quoddam bonum animae, quod scilicet ex sola apprehensione rationem appetibilitatis habet, scilicet excellentia laudis vel honoris, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur inanis gloria

Aliud est bonum corporis, et hoc vel pertinet ad conservationem individui, sicut cibus et potus, et hoc bonum inordinate prosequitur gula;

aut ad conservationem speciei, sicut coitus, et ad hoc ordinatur luxuria.

 Tertium bonum est exterius, scilicet divitiae, et ad hoc ordinatur avaritia.

Et eadem quatuor vitia inordinate fugiunt mala contraria.

Or again, good moves the appetite chiefly through possessing some property of happiness, which all men seek naturally. Now in the first place happiness implies perfection, since happiness is a perfect good, to which belongs excellence or renown, which is desired by pride or vainglory.

Second, it implies satiety, which covetousness seeks in riches that give promise thereof.

Third, it implies pleasure, without which happiness is impossible, as stated in Ethic. i, 7; x, 6,7,8 and this gluttony and lust pursue.

Vel aliter, bonum praecipue movet appetitum ex hoc quod participat aliquid de proprietate felicitatis, quam naturaliter omnes appetunt. De cuius ratione est quidem primo quaedam perfectio, nam felicitas est perfectum bonum, ad quod pertinet excellentia vel claritas, quam appetit superbia vel inanis gloria.

Secundo de ratione eius est sufficientia, quam appetit avaritia in divitiis eam promittentibus.

Tertio est de conditione eius delectatio, sine qua felicitas esse non potest, ut dicitur in I et X Ethic., et hanc appetunt gula et luxuria

On the other hand, avoidance of good on account of an attendant evil occurs in two ways. For this happens either in respect of one’s own good, and thus we have sloth, which is sadness about one’s spiritual good, on account of the attendant bodily labor:

or else it happens in respect of another’s good, and this, if it be without recrimination, belongs to envy, which is sadness about another’s good as being a hindrance to one’s own excellence,

while if it be with recrimination with a view to vengeance, it is anger. Again, these same vices seek the contrary evils.

Quod autem aliquis bonum fugiat propter aliquod malum coniunctum, hoc contingit dupliciter. Quia aut hoc est respectu boni proprii, et sic est acedia, quae tristatur de bono spirituali, propter laborem corporalem adiunctum. Aut est de bono alieno, et hoc, si sit sine insurrectione, pertinet ad invidiam, quae tristatur de bono alieno, inquantum est impeditivum propriae excellentiae; aut est cum quadam insurrectione ad vindictam, et sic est ira. Et ad eadem etiam vitia pertinet prosecutio mali oppositi.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue and vice do not originate in the same way: since virtue is caused by the subordination of the appetite to reason, or to the immutable good, which is God, whereas vice arises from the appetite for mutable good. Wherefore there is no need for the principal vices to be contrary to the principal virtues.

Ad primum ergo dicendum quod non est eadem ratio originis in virtutibus et vitiis, nam virtutes causantur per ordinem appetitus ad rationem, vel etiam ad bonum incommutabile, quod est Deus; vitia autem oriuntur ex appetitu boni commutabilis. Unde non oportet quod principalia vitia opponantur principalibus virtutibus.

Reply Obj. 2: Fear and hope are irascible passions. Now all the passions of the irascible part arise from passions of the concupiscible part; and these are all, in a way, directed to pleasure or sorrow. Hence pleasure and sorrow have a prominent place among the capital sins, as being the most important of the passions, as stated above (Q25, A4).

Ad secundum dicendum quod timor et spes sunt passiones irascibilis. Omnes autem passiones irascibilis oriuntur ex passionibus concupiscibilis, quae etiam omnes ordinantur quodammodo ad delectationem et tristitiam. Et ideo delectatio et tristitia principaliter connumerantur in peccatis capitalibus, tanquam principalissimae passiones, ut supra habitum est.

Reply Obj. 3: Although anger is not a principal passion, yet it has a distinct place among the capital vices, because it implies a special kind of movement in the appetite, insofar as recrimination against another’s good has the aspect of a virtuous good, i.e., of the right to vengeance.

Ad tertium dicendum quod ira, licet non sit principalis passio, quia tamen habet specialem rationem appetitivi motus, prout aliquis impugnat bonum alterius sub ratione honesti, idest iusti vindicativi; ideo distinguitur ab aliis capitalibus vitiis.

Reply Obj. 4: Pride is said to be the beginning of every sin, in the order of the end, as stated above (A2): and it is in the same order that we are to consider the capital sin as being principal. Wherefore pride, like a universal vice, is not counted along with the others, but is reckoned as the queen of them all, as Gregory states (Moral. xxxi, 27). But covetousness is said to be the root from another point of view, as stated above (AA1,2).

Ad quartum dicendum quod superbia dicitur esse initium omnis peccati secundum rationem finis, ut dictum est. Et secundum eandem rationem accipitur principalitas vitiorum capitalium. Et ideo superbia, quasi universale vitium, non connumeratur, sed magis ponitur velut regina quaedam omnium vitiorum, sicut Gregorius dicit. Avaritia autem dicitur radix secundum aliam rationem, sicut supra dictum est.

Reply Obj. 5: These vices are called capital because others, most frequently, arise from them: so that nothing prevents some sins from arising out of other causes. Nevertheless we might say that all the sins which are due to ignorance, can be reduced to sloth, to which pertains the negligence of a man who declines to acquire spiritual goods on account of the attendant labor; for the ignorance that can cause sin, is due to negligence, as stated above (Q76, A2). That a man commit a sin with a good intention, seems to point to ignorance, insofar as he knows not that evil should not be done that good may come of it.

Ad quintum dicendum quod ista vitia dicuntur capitalia, quia ex eis ut frequentius alia oriuntur. Unde nihil prohibet aliqua peccata interdum ex aliis causis oriri. Potest tamen dici quod omnia peccata quae ex ignorantia proveniunt, possunt reduci ad acediam, ad quam pertinet negligentia qua aliquis recusat bona spiritualia acquirere propter laborem, ignorantia enim quae potest esse causa peccati, ex negligentia provenit, ut supra dictum est. Quod autem aliquis committat aliquod peccatum ex bona intentione, videtur ad ignorantiam pertinere, inquantum scilicet ignorat quod non sunt facienda mala ut veniant bona.

TP Q[85] A[1] Body

BALANCED=PROPER GRIEVING

(pain/sorrow)