TP Q[85] A[1] OTC

Penitence / Penance is Virtue

= BALANCE

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law are about acts of virtue, because “a lawgiver intends to make the citizens virtuous” (Ethic. ii, 1). But there is a precept about penance in the Divine law, according to Mt. 4:17: “Do penance,” etc. Therefore penance is a virtue.

[51301] IIIª q. 85 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod praecepta legis dantur de actibus virtutum, quia legislator intendit cives facere virtuosos, ut dicitur in II Ethic. Sed praeceptum divinae legis est de poenitentia, secundum illud Matth. III, poenitentiam agite, et cetera. Ergo poenitentia est virtus.

TP Q[85] A[1] Body

BALANCED=PROPER GRIEVING

(pain/sorrow)

I answer that, As stated above (OBJ[2]; Q[84], A[10], ad 4), to repent is to deplore something one has done. Now it has been stated above (Q[84] , A[9]) that sorrow or sadness is twofold. First, it denotes a passion of the sensitive appetite, and in this sense penance is not a virtue, but a passion. Secondly, it denotes an act of the will, and in this way it implies choice, and if this be right, it must, of necessity, be an act of virtue. For it is stated in Ethic. ii, 6 that virtue is a habit of choosing according to right reason. Now it belongs to right reason than one should grieve for a proper object of grief* as one ought to grieve, and for an end for which one ought to grieve. And this is observed in the penance of which we are speaking now; since the penitent assumes a moderated grief for his past sins, with the intention of removing them. Hence it is evident that the penance of which we are speaking now, is either a virtue or the act of a virtue.

[51302] IIIª q. 85 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dictis patet, poenitere est de aliquo a se prius facto dolere. Dictum est autem supra quod dolor vel tristitia dupliciter dicitur. Uno modo, secundum quod est passio quaedam appetitus sensitivi. Et quantum ad hoc, poenitentia non est virtus, sed passio alio modo, secundum quod consistit in voluntate. Et hoc modo est cum quadam electione. Quae quidem si sit recta, necesse est quod sit actus virtutis, dicitur enim in II Ethic. quod virtus est habitus electivus secundum rationem rectam. Pertinet autem ad rationem rectam quod aliquis doleat* de quo dolendum est. Quod quidem observatur in poenitentia de qua nunc loquimur, nam poenitens assumit moderatum dolorem de peccatis praeteritis, cum intentione removendi ea. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia de qua nunc loquimur, vel est virtus, vel actus virtutis.

doleo, dolere, dolui, dolitus: hurt; feel/suffer pain; grieve;
be afflicted/pained/sorry;

TP Q[85] A[3] OTC

On the contrary, Augustine says in De Poenitentia [*De vera et falsa Poenitentia, the authorship of which is unknown]: “Penance is the vengeance of the sorrowful, ever punishing in them what they are sorry for having done.” But to take vengeance is an act of justice, wherefore Tully says (De Inv. Rhet. ii) that one kind of justice is called vindictive. Therefore it seems that penance is a species of justice.

[51318] IIIª q. 85 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in libro de poenitentia, poenitentia est quaedam dolentis vindicta, semper puniens in se quod dolet se commisisse. Sed facere vindictam pertinet ad iustitiam, unde Tullius, in sua rhetorica, ponit vindicativam unam speciem iustitiae. Ergo videtur quod poenitentia sit species iustitiae.

TP Q[85] A[3] Body

I answer that, As stated above (A[1], ad 2) penance is a special virtue not merely because it sorrows for evil done (since charity would suffice for that), but also because the penitent grieves for the sin he has committed, inasmuch as it is an offense against God, and purposes to amend. Now amendment for an offense committed against anyone is not made by merely ceasing to offend, but it is necessary to make some kind of compensation, which obtains in offenses committed against another, just as retribution does, only that compensation is on the part of the offender, as when he makes satisfaction, whereas retribution is on the part of the person offended against. Each of these belongs to the matter of justice, because each is a kind of commutation. Wherefore it is evident that penance, as a virtue, is a part of justice.

[51319] IIIª q. 85 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, poenitentia non habet quod sit virtus specialis ex hoc solo quod dolet de malo perpetrato, ad hoc enim sufficeret caritas, sed ex eo quod poenitens dolet de peccato commisso inquantum est offensa Dei, cum emendationis proposito. Emendatio autem offensae contra aliquem commissae fit non per solam cessationem offensae, sed exigitur ulterius quaedam recompensatio, quae habet locum in offensis in alterum commissis sicut et retributio, nisi quod recompensatio est ex parte eius qui offendit, ut puta cum satisfactione; retributio autem est ex parte eius in quem fuit offensa commissa. Utrumque autem ad materiam iustitiae pertinet, quia utrumque est commutatio quaedam. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est pars iustitiae.

TP Q[85] A[3] R.O. 4

Reply OBJ 4: Although penance is directly a species of justice, yet, in a fashion, it comprises things pertaining to all the virtues; for inasmuch as there is a justice of man towards God, it must have a share in matter pertaining to the theological virtues, the object of which is God. Consequently penance comprises faith in Christ's Passion, whereby we are cleansed of our sins, hope for pardon, and hatred of vice, which pertains to charity. Inasmuch as it is a moral virtue, it has a share of prudence, which directs all the moral virtues: but from the very nature of justice, it has not only something belonging to justice, but also something belonging to temperance and fortitude, inasmuch as those things which cause pleasure, and which pertain to temperance, and those which cause terror, which fortitude moderates, are objects of commutative justice. Accordingly it belongs to justice both to abstain from pleasure, which belongs to temperance, and to bear with hardships, which belongs to fortitude.

[51323] IIIª q. 85 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod poenitentia, licet directe sit species iustitiae, comprehendit tamen quodammodo ea quae pertinent ad omnes virtutes. Inquantum enim est iustitia quaedam hominis ad Deum, oportet quod participet ea quae sunt virtutum theologicarum, quae habent Deum pro obiecto. Unde poenitentia est cum fide passionis Christi, per quam iustificamur a peccatis; et cum spe veniae; et cum odio vitiorum, quod pertinet ad caritatem inquantum vero est virtus moralis, participat aliquid prudentiae, quae est directiva omnium virtutum moralium. Sed ex ipsa ratione iustitiae non solum habet id quod iustitiae est, sed etiam ea quae sunt temperantiae et fortitudinis, inquantum scilicet ea quae delectationem causant ad temperantiam pertinentem, vel terrorem incutiunt, quem fortitudo moderatur, in commutationem iustitiae veniunt. Et secundum hoc ad iustitiam pertinet et abstinere a delectabilibus, quod pertinet ad temperantiam; et sustinere dura, quod pertinet ad fortitudinem.

TP Q[85] A[4] OTC

BOTH INFUSED VIRTUE AND ACT

of the WILL

On the contrary, Penance is a kind of sacrifice, according to Ps. 50:19: “A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit.” But to offer a sacrifice is an act of the will, according to Ps. 53:8: “I will freely sacrifice to Thee.” Therefore penance is in the will.

[51328] IIIª q. 85 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, poenitentia est sacrificium quoddam, secundum illud Psalmi, sacrificium Deo spiritus contribulatus. Sed offerre sacrificium est actus voluntatis, secundum illud Psalmi, voluntarie sacrificabo tibi. Ergo poenitentia est in voluntate.

TP Q[85] A[4] Body

I answer that, We can speak of penance in two ways: first, in so far as it is a passion, and thus, since it is a kind of sorrow, it is in the concupiscible part as its subject; secondly, in so far as it is a virtue, and thus, as stated above (A[3]), it is a species of justice. Now justice, as stated in the FS, Q[56], A[6], is subjected in the rational appetite which is the will. Therefore it is evident that penance, in so far as it is a virtue, is:

[1] subjected in the will, and

[2] its proper act is the purpose of amending what was committed against God.

[51329] IIIª q. 85 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de poenitentia dupliciter loqui possumus. Uno modo, secundum quod est passio quaedam. Et sic, cum sit species tristitiae, est in concupiscibili sicut in subiecto. Alio modo, secundum quod est virtus. Et sic, sicut dictum est, est species iustitiae. Iustitia autem, ut in secunda parte dictum est, habet pro subiecto appetitum rationis, qui est voluntas. Unde manifestum est quod poenitentia, secundum quod est virtus, est in voluntate sicut in subiecto. Et proprius eius actus est propositum emendandi Deo quod contra eum commissum est.

TP Q[85] A[5] Body

SPIRITUAL ASCENT FROM FEAR

to LOVE

I answer that, We may speak of penance in two ways: FIRST, as to the habit,

and then it is infused by God immediately without our operating as principal agents,

 but not without our co-operating dispositively by certain acts.

[51338] IIIª q. 85 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod de poenitentia loqui possumus dupliciter. Uno modo, quantum ad habitum. Et sic immediate a Deo infunditur, sine nobis principaliter operantibus, non tamen sine nobis dispositive cooperantibus per aliquos actus.

SECONDLY, we may speak of penance, with regard to the acts whereby in penance we co-operate with God operating,

Alio modo possumus loqui de poenitentia quantum ad actus quibus Deo operanti in poenitentia cooperamur.

the first principle [*Cf. FS, Q[113]] of which acts is the operation of God in turning the heart, according to Lam. 5:21: “Convert us, O Lord, to Thee, and we shall be converted”;

the second, an act of faith;

the third, a movement of servile fear, whereby a man is withdrawn from sin through fear of punishment;

the fourth, a movement of hope, whereby a man makes a purpose of amendment, in the hope of obtaining pardon;

Quorum actuum primum principium est Dei operatio convertentis cor, secundum illud Thren. ult., converte nos, domine, ad te, et convertemur.

Secundus actus est motus fidei.

Tertius actus est motus timoris servilis, quo quis timore suppliciorum a peccatis retrahitur.

Quartus actus est motus spei, quo quis, sub spe veniae consequendae, assumit propositum emendandi.

the fifth, a movement of charity, whereby sin is displeasing to man for its own sake and no longer for the sake of the punishment;

the sixth, a movement of filial fear whereby a person voluntarily offers to make amends to God through reverence for God.

Quintus actus est motus caritatis, quo alicui peccatum displicet secundum seipsum, et non iam propter supplicia.

Sextus actus est motus timoris filialis, quo, propter reverentiam Dei, aliquis emendam Deo voluntarius offert.

TP Q[85] A[5] Body

Accordingly it is evident that the act of penance results from servile fear as from the first movement of the appetite in this direction and from filial fear as from its immediate and proper principle.

Sic igitur patet quod actus poenitentiae a timore servili procedit sicut a primo motu affectus ad hoc ordinante, a timore autem filiali sicut ab immediato et proximo principio.

TP Q[86] A[1] Body

It is also erroneous to say that any sin cannot be pardoned through true Penance. First, because this is contrary to Divine mercy, of which it is written (Joel 2:13) that God is “gracious and merciful, patient, and rich in mercy, and ready to repent of the evil”; for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out.

 Quod autem secundo modo non possit per veram poenitentiam aliquod peccatum remitti, est etiam erroneum. Primo quidem, quia repugnat divinae misericordiae, de qua dicitur, Ioel II, quod benignus et misericors est, et multae misericordiae, et praestabilis super malitia. Vinceretur quodammodo enim Deus ab homine, si homo peccatum vellet deleri, quod Deus delere non vellet.

Secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of Christ's Passion, through which Penance produces its effect, as do the other sacraments, since it is written (1 Jn. 2:2): “He is the propitiation for our sins, and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world.”

Secundo, quia hoc derogaret virtuti passionis Christi, per quam poenitentia operatur, sicut et cetera sacramenta, cum scriptum sit, I Ioan. II, ipse est propitiatio pro peccatis nostris, non solum nostris, sed etiam totius mundi

TP Q[86] A[1] Body

Therefore we must say simply that, in this life, every sin can be blotted out by true Penance.

. Unde simpliciter dicendum est quod omne peccatum in hac vita per poenitentiam deleri potest.

Suppl Q[86] A[3] Body

ALL SINS MUST BE

 CONFESSED