1. It was my purpose at the beginning to inquire about the powers that govern us, whether they all have the heart as their only source, as Aristotle and Theophrastus supposed, or whether it is better to posit three sources for them, as Hippocrates and Plato believed. But since ² Chrysippus disputed with the ancients not only about the sources but also about the powers themselves and did not admit the existence of either the spirited (thumoeidē) or the desiderative (epithumetikē)  [power], I decided that I must first examine his view and then return to my original plan, which was to show that the brain, the heart, and the liver are the sources of the powers that govern us. The discussion has now come to this point. I shall begin with an ³ explanation of the terms that I have already used earlier and shall use repeatedly in this intervening discussion. For in order that nothing I say be misunderstood and that precision and clarity be everywhere present, it is most essential that the meaning of every term be accurately defined. Indeed it has turned out that some of the questions that were earlier ⁴ deferred are solved by this means. This is also true, I believe, of the question whether desire, anger and the like are to be called energeiai (activities) or pathé (affections).

Προὔκειτο μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπισκέψασθαι περὶ τῶν διοι κουσῶν ἡμᾶς δυνάμεων͵ εἴτ΄ ἐκ τῆς καρδίας μόνης ὁρμῶνται σύμπασαι͵ καθάπερ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ Θεόφραστος ὑπελάμ βανον͵ εἴτε τρεῖς ἀρχὰς αὐτῶν τίθεσθαι βέλτιον͵ ὡς Ἱππο ² κράτης τε καὶ Πλάτων ἐδόξαζον. ἐπεὶ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὐ περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν μόνον ἠμφισβήτησε πρὸς τοὺς παλαιούς͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αὐτῶν οὔτε τὴν θυμοειδῆ συγχω ρήσας ὑπάρχειν οὔτε τὴν ἐπιθυμητικήν͵ ἔδοξε χρῆναι τὴν τούτου πρότερον δόξαν ἐπισκεψαμένους οὕτως ἐπανέρχεσθαι πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸ προκείμενον ἐξ ἀρχῆς͵ ὡς ἐγκέφαλός τε καὶ καρδία καὶ ἧπαρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν διοικουσῶν ἡμᾶς δυνάμεών εἰσιν. ³ ἀφῖκται οὖν ὁ λόγος ἤδη πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ ἀρχὴν ἕξει γε τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐξήγησιν οἷς ἔμπροσθέν τε ἤδη κεχρήμεθα κἀν τῷ μεταξὺ τούτῳ λόγῳ πολλάκις χρησόμεθα. πρὸς γὰρ τὸ μηδενὸς τῶν εἰρημένων παρακούειν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν ἅπασι τὸ διωρισμένον τε ἅμα καὶ σαφὲς ἕτοιμον ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαιότα τόν ἐστιν ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐφ΄ ὅτου λέγεται πράγμα ⁴ τος ἀκριβῶς ἀφωρίσθαι. καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ λύεσθαί τινα τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ἀναβληθέντων ζητημάτων ἐκ τούτου τοῦ τρόπου συμβέβηκεν͵ ὥσπερ͵ οἶμαι͵ καὶ τόδε͵ πότερον ἐνεργείας ἢ πάθη προσαγορευτέον ἐστὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν καὶ τὸν θυμὸν ὅσα τ΄ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα.

     Now energeia (activity) is an active motion, that is, motion that ⁵ comes from the moving object itself; but -pathos (affection) is a motion in one thing that comes from some other thing. Thus energeia (activity) must often be combined with pathos (affection) in a single underlying situation, differing not in the situation but in definition. For the separation ⁶ made by the cutter in the object cut is one and the same thing, but it is an energeia (activity) of the cutter, a pathos (affection) of the object cut. In the same way anger is an energeia (activity) of the spirited part of ⁷ the soul but a pathêma (affection) of the other two parts, and of our whole body besides, when our body is forcibly driven to its actions by anger.

1.  ⁵ ἡ μὲν οὖν ἐνέργεια κίνησίς ἐστι δραστική͵ δραστικὴν δ΄ ὀνομάζω τὴν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ͵ τὸ δὲ πάθος ἐν ἑτέρῳ κίνησίς ἐστιν ἐξ ἑτέρου. ὥστε ἀναγκαῖον μὲν πολλάκις εἰς ἓν ὑποκείμενον τῷ πάθει τὴν ἐνέργειαν συνέρχεσθαι καὶ ⁶ κατὰ τοῦτο διαφέρειν μηδέν͵ τῷ λόγῳ μέντοι διαφέρειν. ἡ γὰρ ὑπὸ τοῦ τέμνοντος ἐν τῷ τεμνομένῳ διαίρεσις͵ ἓν καὶ ταὐτὸν ὑπάρχουσα πρᾶγμα͵ τοῦ μὲν τέμνοντος ἐνέργεια͵ τοῦ δὲ τεμνομένου πάθος ἐστίν. ⁷ οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ἐνέρ γεια μέν ἐστι τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς͵ πάθημα δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δύο μερῶν καὶ προσέτι τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν παντός͵ ⁸ ὅταν ὑπὸ τοῦ θυμοῦ βιαίως ἄγηται πρὸς τὰς πράξεις.

     This, then, is one meaning of each term; they have another meaning ⁸ when we think of energeia (activity) as a motion according to nature, and pathos (affection) as a motion contrary to nature. And as the term ‘according to nature’ is used in many ways, we must here take it to be used of that which occurs through the agency of nature in the first instance. By ‘that which occurs through the agency of nature in the first ⁹ instance’ I mean that which nature seeks as an end, and not that which necessarily follows on something else. This kind of motion is in accordance with nature, whether the motion has its beginning within the thing moved or is imparted by something else.

ἓν μὲν δὴ τοῦτο [τὸ] σημαινόμενον ἑκατέρου τῶν ὀνομάτων͵ ἕτε ρον δὲ τὴν μὲν ἐνέργειαν κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ κίνησιν ἡμῶν νοούντων͵ τὸ δὲ πάθος παρὰ φύσιν. πολλαχῶς δὲ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν λεγομένου͵ τοῦτ΄ ἀκούειν χρὴ νῦν ὃ κατὰ πρῶτον λόγον ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως γίγνεται. ⁹ κατὰ πρῶτον δὲ λόγον ἐκεῖνα γίγνεσθαί φαμεν ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως͵ ὧν ὥσπερ σκοπῶν ἀντι ποιεῖται καὶ μὴ δι΄ ἀκολουθίαν τινὰ ἑτέροις ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἕπεται. ἡ τοιαύτη κίνησις κατὰ φύσιν͵ εἴτ΄ ἐξ αὑτοῦ κινοῖτο ¹⁰ τὸ κινούμενον εἴθ΄ ὑφ΄ ἑτέρου.

     We have now reached a point, I believe, at which the meaning is ¹⁰ clear, but there is no harm in making it even clearer through examples. The movement of the heart in pulsation is an energeia (activity), but in palpitation it is a pathos (affection). Palpitation too begins within the ¹¹ heart itself yet is not according to nature; while pulsation, which also arises within the heart, is according to nature. — You must here understand the term ‘pulsation’ in the sense given it by Praxagoras , Herophilus and just about all their successors down to the present day, since the older usage, found also in the works of Erasistratus and Hippocrates, is different; I shall speak of it later. — Now since we give the ¹² name ‘pulsation’ to the movement proper to the heart, we shall say that palpitation is a pathos (affection) in the second meaning of the word; but we shall not say that all pulsation is energeia (activity). Thus you would not say that a pulse which is greater or less than the natural (pulse), or faster or slower, or at shorter or longer intervals, or departs in any other way, is an energeia (activity) in the second sense of the word. For the heart moves of itself in such pulsation, but it does not move according to nature. Therefore it is not surprising that a single thing may happen to be ¹³ called both pathos (affection) and energeia (activity), as for example a pulse that is less than the natural (pulse), but not with the same meaning. It is an energeia (activity) in the first sense, for the movement in this pulsation too is active; but in the second sense it is not an energeia (activity) but a pathos (affection), since the movement is not in accordance with nature.

ἤδη μὲν οὖν οἶμαι σαφὲς εἶναι τὸ λεγόμενον͵ ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲν χεῖρον ἐπὶ παραδειγμάτων αὐτὸ σαφέστερον ἀπεργάσασθαι. ἡ τῆς καρδίας κίνησις ἡ μὲν κατὰ τοὺς σφυγμοὺς ἐνέργειά ἐστιν͵ ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παλμοὺς πάθος. ¹¹ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς μὲν γάρ ἐστι καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοὺς παλμούς͵ ἀλλ΄ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν͵ ἐξ ἑαυτῆς δὲ καὶ ἡ τῶν σφυγμῶν͵ ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν. δεῖ δὲ τοῦ σφυγμὸς ὀνό ματος ἀκούειν οὕτως νῦν ὡς Πραξαγόρας καὶ Ἡρόφιλος ἅπαντές τε σχεδὸν οἱ μετ΄ αὐτοὺς ἐχρήσαντο μέχρι καὶ ἡμῶν͵ ὡς ἥ γε παλαιοτέρα χρῆσις͵ ἣ κἀν τοῖς Ἐρασι στράτου τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτους εὑρίσκεται γράμμασιν͵ ἑτέρα τίς ἐστι καὶ λεχθήσεται περὶ αὐτῆς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ ταῦτα. ¹² τὴν μέντοι τῆς καρδίας ἰδίαν κίνησιν ὀνομαζόντων ἡμῶν σφυγμὸν ὁ παλμὸς μὲν πάθος εἶναι λεχθήσεται κατά γε τὸ δεύτερον τῆς πάθος φωνῆς σημαινόμενον͵ ὁ σφυγμὸς δ΄ οὐ πᾶς ἐνέργεια. τὸν γοῦν μείζονα τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ μικρό τερον ἢ ὠκύτερον ἢ βραδύτερον ἢ πυκνότερον ἢ ἀραιότερον ἤ πως ἄλλως ἐξιστάμενον οὐκ ἄν τις ἐνέργειαν εἴποι κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον τῆς ἐνεργείας σημαινόμενον· ἐξ ἑαυτῆς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις σφυγμοῖς ἡ καρδία κινεῖται͵ κατὰ φύσιν δ΄ οὐ κινεῖται. ¹³ ὥστ΄ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν͵ οὐδὲν εἶναι θαυμα στὸν ἓν πρᾶγμα καὶ πάθος ὀνομάζεσθαι καὶ ἐνέργειαν͵ ὥσπερ τὸν μικρότερον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν σφυγμόν͵ οὐ μὴν κατά γε ταὐτὸν σημαινόμενον͵ ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρότερον ῥηθὲν ἐνέργειαν͵ ἔστι [μὲν] γὰρ καὶ ἡ κατὰ τοῦτον τὸν σφυγμὸν κίνησις δραστική͵ κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον οὐκ ἐνέργειαν ἀλλὰ πάθος͵ ¹⁴ ὅτι μὴ κατὰ φύσιν ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις.

     The same applies also to anger and the other affections. They are all ¹⁴ energeiai (activities) of the affective part of the soul in the first sense of energeia (activity); but insofar as they are runaway and immoderate _[³⁶⁵_] motions, and not according to nature, they would not be said to be energeiai (activities), but pathë (affections) in the second sense. Anger in ¹⁵ the motion of the spirited part (of the soul) is like the great pulsation in the motion of the arteries, and faint-heartedness is like the little pulsation. For faint-heartedness is a deficiency in the motion of the spirited part, whereas the motion of anger is extreme and in excess of the proper amount. In this way, then, the terms energeia (activity) and pathos ¹⁶ (affection) will both be used of anger, distress, fear, desire, inflamed anger, and the like, but each in a different sense; and besides, inasmuch as the whole body along with the soul is carried away by them, the movement of the animal will be a pathos (affection) in both senses of the word. For the other two (parts of the soul) often follow the ¹⁷ spirited part, often also the desiderative part, being dragged and drawn along, as it were, as when one of a team of horses darts ahead with greater force and drags the other along with it, together with the whole chariot and the charioteer; the other horse from weakness follows abashed, and the charioteer himself is carried away by force. At such a time ¹⁸ the motion of the runaway horse will be called both an energeia (activity) and a pathos (affection) : an energeia (activity) in the first sense — for the motion is from the horse itself —, but in the second sense no longer an energeia (activity) — for its motion is contrary to nature —, but a pathos (affection). The movement of the charioteer, however, is not an ¹⁹ energeia (activity) in either sense, but a pathos (affection) in both, since it is neither from himself nor in keeping with his nature. For many movements, even if they are not active and do not come from the thing itself, are nevertheless called energeiai (activities) because they are according to nature, for example the movement of the leg or the arm. These (members) have their source of motion from others, not like ²⁰ the heart from themselves; nevertheless, walking is and is called an energeia (activity) of the legs in the second sense, even though some persons through lack of training in semantics claim that walking ie not an energeia (activity) of the legs but an energeia (activity) performed by means of the legs. Their statement is indeed true, for they go back to the prior and more proper meaning of the term ; but because they think that one should speak only in this way and do not allow the other expression also, they are in error.

οὕτως οὖν ἔχει κἀπὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων παθῶν. ἅπαντα γὰρ ἐνέργειαί τινές εἰσι τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κατά γε τὸ πρῶτον τῆς ἐνεργείας σημαινόμενον͵ καθ΄ ὅσον δ΄ ἔκφοροί τε καὶ ἄμετροι κινήσεις εἰσὶ καὶ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν͵ οὐκ ἐνέργειαι λέγοιντ΄ ἂν ¹⁵ ὑπάρχειν͵ ἀλλὰ πάθη κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον. οἷον γάρ τι κατὰ τὴν τῶν ἀρτηριῶν κίνησιν ὁ μέγας σφυγμός ἐστι͵ τοιοῦτον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ὁ θυμός͵ οἷον δ΄ αὖ πάλιν ὁ μικρὸς σφυγμός͵ τοιοῦτον ἡ ἀθυμία. αὕτη μὲν γὰρ ἐλλιπής ἐστι κίνησις τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς͵ ὑπερβάλλουσα δὲ καὶ πλεονάζουσα τοῦ προσήκοντος ἡ κατὰ τοὺς θυμούς. ¹⁶ ταύτῃ τε οὖν ἐνέργειαί τε ἅμα καὶ πάθη λεχθήσονται καθ΄ ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἕτερον σημαινόμενον ἥ τε ὀργὴ καὶ ἡ λύπη καὶ ὁ φόβος καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ ὁ θυμὸς ὅσα τε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα͵ καὶ προσέτι καθ΄ ὅσον ὅλον τὸ σῶμα μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπά γεται πρὸς αὐτῶν͵ ἡ κίνησις τοῦ ζῴου πάθος ἔσται κατ΄ ἄμφω τὰ σημαινόμενα. ¹⁷ πολλάκις μὲν γὰρ ἕπεται τῷ θυμοει δεῖ τὰ λοιπὰ δύο͵ πολλάκις δὲ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ͵ καθάπερ ἑλκόμενά τε καὶ συρόμενα παραπλήσιον τρόπον͵ ὡς εἰ καὶ ξυνωρίδος ἵππων ὁ μὲν ἕτερος ἰσχυρότερον ᾄξας ἐπισύρει τὸν ἕτερον ἅμ΄ ἑαυτῷ μετὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος ἅρματός τε καὶ ἡνιόχου͵ ὁ δ΄ ἕτερος ὑπ΄ ἀσθενείας ἕπεται κατεπτηχώς͵ αὐτὸς ¹⁸ δ΄ ὁ ἡνίοχος ἀποφέρεται βίᾳ. τηνικαῦτα γὰρ ἡ μὲν κατὰ τὸν ἔκφορον ἵππον κίνησις ἐνέργειά τε καὶ πάθος αὐτοῦ λεχθήσεται͵ κατὰ μὲν τὸ πρότερον σημαινόμενον ἐνέργεια͵ κίνησις γάρ ἐστιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ͵ κατὰ δὲ τὸ δεύτερον οὐκ ἐνέρ γεια͵ παρὰ φύσιν γ΄ οὖσα κίνησις αὐτῷ͵ ἀλλ΄ ἤδη πάθος. ¹⁹ ἡ μέντοι τοῦ ἡνιόχου κίνησις οὐδὲ καθ΄ ἕτερον τῶν σημαι νομένων ἐνέργειά ἐστιν͵ ἀλλὰ κατ΄ ἄμφω πάθος͵ εἴ γε μήτ΄ ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ μήτε κατὰ φύσιν ἡ κίνησις αὐτῷ. πολλαὶ γὰρ τῶν κινήσεων͵ εἰ καὶ μὴ δραστικαί τινές εἰσι μήτ΄ ἐξ ἑαυ τῶν͵ ἀλλὰ τῷ γε κατὰ φύσιν ὑπάρχειν ἐνέργειαι λέγονται͵ καθάπερ καὶ ἡ τοῦ σκέλους ἢ ὅλης τῆς χειρός. ²⁰ ἐξ ἑτέρων γὰρ ἔχει ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς κινήσεως͵ οὐκ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ὥσπερ ἡ καρδία͵ ἀλλ΄ ὅμως καὶ ἡ βάδισις ἐνέργεια σκελῶν ἐστί τε καὶ λέγεται κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον σημαινόμενον͵ εἰ καί τινες ὑπ΄ ἀγυμνασίας τῆς περὶ τὰ σημαινόμενα τὴν βάδισιν οὐ σκελῶν ἐνέργειαν͵ ἀλλὰ διὰ σκελῶν εἶναί φασιν ἀληθὲς μέν τι λέγοντες͵ ἐπὶ γὰρ τὸ πρότερόν τε καὶ κυριώτερον ἔρχονται σημαινόμενον͵ ὅτι μέντοι μόνον οὕτως λέγειν ἀξιοῦσιν καὶ μὴ συγχωροῦσι καὶ κατὰ θάτερον ἑρμηνεύειν͵ οὐκ ὀρθῶς ποιοῦσιν.

    In this way, then, anger and desire will be called both pathë ²¹ (affections) and energeiai (activities); for since they are certain immoderate and unnatural motions of the innate powers of the soul, they are energeiai (activities) of the powers because the powers have their motions from themselves; but because the motions are immoderate, they are pathë (affections). And these motions of the whole soul and of the ²² two powers that are themselves set in motion are contrary to nature. _[³⁶⁷_] This is so for the irrational powers because of their lack of measure, and for the whole soul because we say that it is in accordance with nature that our life be directed and governed by the judgments of the rational part, not by the motions of the passionate part. When the government is reversed, such a life is clearly carried on contrary to nature, and for this reason it is also carried on in conformity with pathos (affection). For these reasons, then, whether a person speaks of anger or desire or ²³ any other such feeling as an energeia (activity) or a pathos (affection), before you censure him you must ask him about the meaning of his language, what he referred to by these terms.

²¹ οὕτως οὖν καὶ ὁ θυμὸς καὶ ἡ ἐπιθυ μία καὶ πάθη καὶ ἐνέργειαι λεχθήσονται· τῶν γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς συμφύτων δυνάμεων κινήσεις τινὲς ἄμετροί τε καὶ οὐ κατὰ φύσιν ὄντα διότι μὲν ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐκεῖναι κινοῦνται͵ διὰ τοῦτ΄ ἐνέργειαι τῶν δυνάμεών εἰσιν͵ διότι δ΄ ἀμέτρως͵ διὰ τοῦτο πάθη. καὶ τῆς ὅλης μὲν ψυχῆς καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν κινου μένων δυνάμεων ἀμφοτέρων αἱ κινήσεις αὗται παρὰ φύσιν εἰσίν· ²² ταῖς μὲν ἀλόγοις δυνάμεσι διὰ τὴν ἀμετρίαν͵ τῇ δ΄ ὅλῃ ψυχῇ διότι κατὰ φύσιν [ἐπεὶ] οὐχ ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ παθητικοῦ κινήσεων͵ ἀλλ΄ ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσεων ἐπιτροπεύεσθαί τε καὶ διοικεῖσθαί φαμεν τὸν βίον ἡμῶν. ὅταν οὖν ἔμπαλιν διοικώμεθα͵ παρὰ φύσιν τε δηλονότι καὶ ²³ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ πάθος ὁ τοιοῦτος βίος ἐπιτελεῖται. διὰ ταύτας μὲν ἤδη τὰς αἰτίας͵ ἄν τ΄ ἐνέργειάν τις ἄν τε πάθος εἴπῃ τὸν θυμὸν ἢ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων τῶν κατὰ ταῦτα παθῶν͵ οὐ χρὴ μέμφεσθαι τούτῳ͵ πρὶν ἐρέσθαι τὰ σημαινόμενα ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς͵ ἐφ΄ ὅ τι φέρων οὕτως ὠνόμασεν.

     You will find that Plato himself sometimes uses energeia (activity), ²⁴ sometimes pathos (affection), of thirst, hunger, and in short every form of desire and anger. Again, to show that for the present it makes no ²⁵ difference whether we use the one term or the other, he writes as follows in the fourth (book) of the Republic: “Well then, I said, what about assent as against dissent, seeking to obtain a thing as against refusing it, and drawing it to oneself as against pushing it away? Would you not put all such things in the class of opposites to each other, whether they are things we do or things done to us?” And wishing to make the matter ²⁶ clearer through examples, he continues: “Then, I said, what about thirst and hunger and the desires generally, and also consenting and wishing? Would you not assign them all to one or another of the classes just now mentioned? For example, would you not say that in every case the soul of a person who desires a thing either seeks the thing it desires or draws to itself the thing it wishes to possess, or again, to the extent that it is willing that something be brought to it, does it not assent with a nod to itself as though (in answer) to a question, and yearn for the occurrence of the thing? — I would say so. — And what of not wishing and not consenting or desiring? Shall we not put them in the class of repelling and rejecting from oneself and all that is opposite to the former class?” These ²⁷ are the passages from Plato , which not only demonstrate clearly what we were saying, that it makes no difference whether hunger, thirst and desire in general, or pursuit and avoidance, are called ‘things we do’ or ‘things done to us’, that is, energeiai (activities) or pathé (affections); they also teach (us) about the parts of the soul.

²⁴ εὑρίσκεται δὲ καὶ Πλάτων αὐτὸς ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐνεργείας͵ ἐνίοτε δὲ πάθη προσαγορεύων τό τε διψῆν καὶ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τοὺς θυμούς. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς οὐδὲν διαφέρει πρός γε τὰ παρόντα τὸ οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ὀνομάζειν͵ ²⁵ ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὧδε γράφει· ἆρ΄ οὖν͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαί τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι͵ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων; ²⁶ διὰ παραδειγμάτων δ΄ ἐναργέστερον τοῦτο διδάξαι προελόμενος ἐπιφέρων φησί· τί οὖν; ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέ λειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι͵ οὐ πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἴδη τὰ νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα; οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπι θυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ͵ ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληταί οἱ γενέσθαι͵ ἢ αὖ͵ καθόσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορισθῆναι͵ ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὐτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως; ἔγωγε. τί δέ; τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ΄ ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ΄ αὐτῆς ²⁷ καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τὰ ἐναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν; αὗται μὲν αἱ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥήσεις͵ οὐ μόνον ὅπερ ἐλέγομεν ἐπιδεικνύου σαι σαφῶς͵ ὡς τὸ πεινῆν καὶ τὸ διψῆν καὶ ὅλως τὸ ἐπιθυ μεῖν τινος ἢ ἐφίεσθαί τε καὶ φεύγειν εἴτε ποιήματά τις εἴτε παθήματα͵ τουτέστιν εἴτε ἐνεργείας εἴτε πάθη προσαγορεύ σειεν͵ οὐδὲν διαφέρει͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς διδάσκουσαι.

     2. It would be well, therefore, not to hurry over these passages but to review the whole argument that (Plato) presented in the fourth (book) of the Republic in order to prove that the human soul has three forms. Here too we must pay close attention to what he says, beginning  _[³⁶⁹_] once more with his actual words, and we must not suppose that Plato forgot what he had said when after stating that the human soul has three ‘forms’, he later asserts that it is divided into three ‘parts’. I t would ² be correct to term the rational, the spirited and the desiderative both ‘forms’ and ‘parts’ of the soul, just as one might say that vein, artery, nerve, bone, cartilage, flesh and the like are forms of body, and then speak of them as parts. Indeed one could say of such things both that ³ they are truly ‘parts’ of our body — for the whole is made up of them —, and again that they are no less truly ‘forms’ of the body. For it is only in homoeomerous structures that differences are not forms, for example, different parts of flesh or of a vein or of fat ; and it is not correct to say of such things that the whole is composed of such and such forms. But in things that have unlike parts the difference in the forms determines the number of parts. Plato says that our soul is this kind of thing, being composed of three parts. Thus he likens the desiderative part to a manifold ⁴and many-headed beast, the spirited part to a lion, and the rational part to a man. This image is more appropriate than that of the Phaedrus, in which he says that two of the forms have the shape of horses, and the third is the charioteer. He also presented the former image in the ninth (book) of the Republic as a clearer indication of the nature of each form of the soul. Therefore, as Plato holds both that these forms are separated s by their location in the body and that they differ very greatly in essence, he has good reason to call them both forms and parts. But Aristotle and Posidonius do not speak of forms or parts of the soul, but say that there are powers of a single substance which stems from the heart. Chrysippus not only draws anger and desire together into one substance but also brings them under one power. But we have given adequate proof that this man misses the truth by no little distance; and Aristotle ‘ s error in supposing that the three powers belong to one substance has been made sufficiently clear in the earlier (books) and will be no less refuted in the book next after this.

2.  Διὸ καὶ καλῶς ἂν ἔχοι μὴ παραδραμεῖν αὐτάς͵ ἀλλ΄ ὅλον ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν λόγον ὃν ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας διῆλθεν ὑπὲρ τοῦ τρία τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν εἴδη. προσέχειν δὲ χρὴ κἀνταῦθα τῷ λεγομένῳ τὸν νοῦν ἀπ΄ αὐτῶν ἀρξαμένους αὖθις τῶν ὀνομάτων καὶ μὴ νομίζειν ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι τὸν Πλάτωνα τῶν ὑφ΄ ἑαυτοῦ λεγομένων͵ ἐπειδὰν εἴδη τρία τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ἔχειν εἰπὼν αὖθις εἰς τρία μέρη διαιρεῖσθαι φάσκῃ. ² καὶ γὰρ εἴδη καὶ μέρη ψυχῆς ὀρθῶς ἄν τις ὀνομάζοι τὸ λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν͵ ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ σώματος εἴδη τις εἰπὼν εἶναι φλέβα καὶ ἀρτηρίαν καὶ νεῦρον ὀστοῦν τε καὶ χόνδρον καὶ σάρκα καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τοιαῦτα͵ μετὰ ταῦθ΄ ὡς περὶ μερῶν αὐτῶν διαλέγοιτο. καὶ γὰρ καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἡμῶν ἀληθῶς ἄν τις εἶναι λέγοι τὰ τοιαῦτα͵ συμπληροῦται γὰρ τὸ ὅλον ἐξ αὐτῶν͵ καὶ μέντοι καὶ εἴδη τοῦ σώματος οὐδὲν ἧττον· ³ ἐν μόνοις γὰρ τοῖς ὁμοιομερέσι τὸ διαφέρον εἶδος οὐκ ἔστιν͵ οἷον τὸ τῆς σαρκὸς μέρος ἢ τὸ τῆς φλεβὸς ἢ τὸ τῆς πιμελῆς͵ οὐδὲ ἀληθὲς εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῶν τοιούτων ὡς ἐκ τοσῶνδέ τινων εἰδῶν σύγκειται τὸ ὅλον· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀνομοιο μερέσιν ἡ τῶν εἰδῶν διαφορὰ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὁρίζει τοῖς μορίοις. τοιοῦτον δέ τι χρῆμα καὶ ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν ὁ Πλάτων εἶναί ⁴ φησιν ἐκ τριῶν μερῶν συγκειμένην. εἰκάζει δ΄ οὕτω τὸ μὲν ἐπιθυμητικὸν θηρίῳ ποικίλῳ τε καὶ πολυκεφάλῳ͵ τὸ δὲ θυ μοειδὲς λέοντι͵ τὸ δὲ λογιστικὸν ἀνθρώπῳ. αὕτη γὰρ ἡ εἰκὼν οἰκειοτέρα τῆς κατὰ τὸν Φαῖδρον͵ ἐν ᾗ τῶν εἰδῶν ἱππομόρφω μέν τινε δύο φησὶν ὑπάρχειν͵ ἡνίοχον δὲ τρίτον. ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῷ τῆς Πολιτείας ἐνάτῳ τῆς προτέρας εἰκόνος ἐμνημόνευσεν͵ ὡς σαφέστερον ἐνδεικνύμενος ὁποῖον ἕκαστόν ⁵ ἐστι τῶν εἰδῶν τῆς ψυχῆς. ὁ μὲν οὖν Πλάτων καὶ τοῖς τόποις τοῦ σώματος κεχωρίσθαι νομίζων αὐτὰ καὶ ταῖς οὐ σίαις πάμπολυ διαλλάττειν εὐλόγως εἴδη τε καὶ μέρη προσ αγορεύει· ὁ δ΄ Ἀριστοτέλης τε καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος εἴδη μὲν ἢ μέρη ψυχῆς οὐκ ὀνομάζουσιν͵ δυνάμεις δ΄ εἶναί φασι μιᾶς οὐσίας ἐκ τῆς καρδίας ὁρμωμένης· ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ὥσπερ εἰς μίαν οὐσίαν͵ οὕτως καὶ εἰς δύναμιν μίαν ἄγει καὶ τὸν ⁶ θυμὸν καὶ τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν. ἀλλ΄ ὅτι μὲν οὐκ ὀλίγον ἁμαρ τάνει τῆς ἀληθείας ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος͵ αὐτάρκως ἡμῖν ἐπιδέδει κται· ὅτι δὲ οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην σφάλλονται μιᾶς οὐσίας τὰς τρεῖς δυνάμεις εἶναι νομίζοντες͵ ἔν τε τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν ἱκανῶς ἐπιδέδεικται καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον ὁ μετὰ τοῦτον λόγος ἀποδείξει.

      But first we shall use Plato’s own words to prove that he speaks ⁷ of the rational, the spirited, and the desiderative as forms and ae parts of the soul. When discussing in the Timaeus the desiderative soul, in _[³⁷¹_] which he says that plants also have a share, he writes as follows : “What we arç now speaking of partakes of the third form of soul, which, as the account goes, is situated between the diaphragm and the navel.” And again, when speaking of the rational soul in this same work, he ⁸ says: “You must conceive of that form of the soul that is supreme in us in this way, that God has given it to each man as a daimön which, we say, dwells at the very top of our body and lifts us from earth to a kinship with heaven.” Again in the same work he called the desiderative ⁹ and the spirited together a form of the soul, in this passage: “They also constructed in it (the body) another form of soul, the mortal component, which contains in itself terrible and ineluctable passions.” Again ¹⁰ in this same work, the Timaeus, he speaks of the three parts of men’s souls together as forms of the soul, in the following account: “As we have said many times that he settled three forms of the soul in us.” And similarly in the fourth (book) of the Republic, after first saying ¹¹ about the spirited part that it is different from the desiderative, and then inquiring whether it differs also from the rational, he asks, “Then is it different from this too, or is it some form of the rational, so that there are not three but two forms in the soul, the rational and the desiderative?” He wrote this way also in the ninth (book), both in this ¹² passage, “But when a person has set the two forms at rest and has aroused the third, in which thought resides;” and in this: “But because, I said, the pleasures of each form and the ways of life themselves are in dispute, not merely which way of life is more noble or more shameful, or worse or better, but which is actually more pleasant and less painful, how may we know who among them gives the truest account?”

⁷ πρότερον δὲ ὅτι Πλάτων αὐτὸς εἴδη τε καὶ μέρη ψυχῆς ὀνομάζει τό τε λογιστικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμικὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν͵ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῶν ῥήσεων αὐτοῦ πιστωσόμεθα. ἐν μὲν οὖν τῷ Τιμαίῳ περὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμητικῆς ψυχῆς͵ ἧς καὶ τὰ φυτὰ μετέχειν φησί͵ διαλεγόμενος ὧδέ πως γράφει· μετέχει γε μὴν τοῦτο ὃ νῦν λέγομεν τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἴδους͵ ὃ μεταξὺ φρενῶν ὀμφαλοῦ τε ἱδρῦσθαι λόγος. ⁸ αὖθις δ΄ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βιβλίῳ περὶ τῆς λογιστικῆς ψυχῆς δια λεγόμενος ὧδέ πώς φησι· τὸ δὲ δὴ περὶ τοῦ κυριωτάτου παρ΄ ἡμῖν ψυχῆς εἴδους διανοεῖσθαι δεῖ τῇδε͵ ὡς ἄρα αὐτὸ δαίμονα ὁ θεὸς ἑκάστῳ δέδωκε͵ τοῦτο ὃ δή φαμεν οἰκεῖν μὲν ἡμῶν ἐπ΄ ἄκρῳ τῷ σώματι͵ πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ ⁹ συγγένειαν ἀπὸ γῆς ἡμᾶς αἴρειν. συναμφότερα δ΄ αὖ πάλιν ἐν ταὐτῷ βιβλίῳ͵ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν καὶ τὸ θυμοειδές͵ ἐν τῇδε τῇ ῥήσει ψυχῆς εἶδος ὠνόμασεν· ἄλλο τι εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσῳκοδόμουν τὸ θνητὸν τὸ δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον. ¹⁰ ὁμοῦ δ΄ αὖ πάλιν τὰ τρία μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν εἴδη προσαγορεύει ψυχῆς ἐν ταὐτῷ βιβλίῳ τῷ Τιμαίῳ κατὰ τήνδε τὴν διήγησιν [ἔστι γάρ]· καθάπερ εἴπομεν πολλά ¹¹ κις ὅτι τρία τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν ἡμῖν εἴδη κατῴκισται. ὡσαύτως δὲ κἀν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ κατὰ μὲν τὸ τέταρτον ὑπὲρ τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς προειρηκὼς ὡς ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ͵ κἄπειθ΄ ἑξῆς ζητῶν εἰ καὶ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ διαφέρει͵ φησίν· ἆρ΄ οὖν ἕτε ρον ὂν καὶ τούτου ἢ λογιστικοῦ τι εἶδος͵ ὥστε μὴ τρία͵ ἀλλὰ δύο εἴδη εἶναι ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ͵ λογιστικόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητι ¹² κόν; οὕτω δὲ καὶ κατὰ τὸ ἔνατον ἔγραψεν ἔν τε τῇδε τῇ ῥήσει· ἀλλ΄ ἡσυχάσας μὲν τὼ δύο εἴδη͵ τὸ τρίτον δέ τις κινήσας͵ ἐν ᾧ τὸ φρονεῖν ἐγγίγνεται͵ καὶ προσέτι τῇδε· ὅτι δὴ οὖν͵ εἶπον͵ ἀμφισβητοῦνται ἑκάστου εἴδους αἱ ἡδοναὶ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ βίος͵ μὴ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ κάλλιον καὶ αἴσχιον ζῆν μηδὲ τὸ χεῖρον καὶ ἄμεινον͵ ἀλλὰ πρὸς αὐτὸ τὸ ἥδιον καὶ ἀλυ ¹³ πότερον͵ πῶς ἂν εἰδεῖμεν τίς αὐτῶν ἀληθέστατα λέγει;

      What need is there to quote still other passages? These are enough ¹³ to make his view clear: that he intends these three, the rational, desiderative, and spirited, to be forms of the soul. He says in fact that they exist alone, apart from one another, the desiderative in plants, the _[³⁷³_] rational in the gods. — The reason why the spirited soul cannot exist ¹⁴ by itself in any body will be demonstrated as the argument proceeds, once we have cited the passage in the Timaeus where (Plato), in teaching us the use for which it was brought into being, says that it was on account of the desiderative soul; like a dog, it helps the rational soul against that many-headed and savage beast, the appetite. — He has ¹⁵ good reason, then, to call them forms of soul in the passages cited, and also in many others which I need not mention, since his view is already clearly seen in the passages before us. And if he also calls each of them a part of the soul, it is not surprising. For in the first place he taught ¹⁶ us that whatever is a form may also be called a part, but not every part is also straightway a form; and second, that a composite thing may not be called homoeomerous, as it is not a whole continuous with itself; for a composite is composed of parts limited in number, but it is not possible to put a definite numerical limit to the number of parts of anything homoeomerous. No further argument is needed to prove that ¹⁷ with good reason Plato calls them forms and parts of the soul.

τί ἂν ἔτι δέοιμεν ἑτέρας παραγράφειν ῥήσεις; ἱκαναὶ γὰρ καὶ αἵδε δηλῶσαι τὴν γνώμην τἀνδρός͵ ὡς εἴδη ψυχῶν εἶναι βούλεται τὰ τρία ταυτί͵ λογιστικὸν ἐπιθυμητικὸν [καὶ] θυμοει δές. ἀμέλει μόνας αὐτὰς εἶναί φησι χωρὶς ἀλλήλων ἐν μὲν τοῖς φυτοῖς τὴν ἐπιθυμητικήν͵ ἐν δὲ τοῖς θεοῖς τὴν ¹⁴ λογιστικήν. τὴν μέντοι θυμοειδῆ διὰ τί μόνην οὐχ οἷόν τε κατ΄ οὐδὲν τῶν σωμάτων εἶναι͵ προϊὼν ὁ λόγος ἀποδείξει͵ παραθεμένων ἡμῶν τὴν ἐκ τοῦ Τιμαίου ῥῆσιν ἔνθα τὴν χρείαν τῆς γενέσεως αὐτῆς διδάσκων ἕνεκα τῆς ἐπιθυμητικῆς γεγονέναι φησὶ βοηθὸν τῇ λογιστικῇ ψυχῇ καθάπερ τινὰ κύνα κατὰ τοῦ πολυκεφάλου τε καὶ ἀγρίου θρέμματος͵ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. ¹⁵ εἰκότως οὖν εἴδη ψυχῆς αὐτὰ προσαγορεύει κατά τε τὰς προγεγραμμένας ῥήσεις καὶ προσέτι πολλὰς ἑτέρας͵ ὧν οὐκ ἀνάγκη μνημονεύειν ἐναργῶς ἤδη καὶ διὰ τούτων τῆς γνώμης τἀνδρὸς ἐγνωσμένης. εἰ δὲ καὶ μέρη ψυχῆς ¹⁶ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὀνομάζει͵ θαυμαστὸν οὐδέν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξεν ὡς ὅ τί περ ἂν εἶδος ᾖ͵ τοῦτο καὶ μέρος ὀνομάζειν ἐγχωρεῖ͵ μὴ μέντοι τό γε μέρος ἅπαν εὐθὺς καὶ εἶδος εἶναι· δεύτερον δὲ [μὴ] ὅτι μηδ΄ ἐγχωρεῖ λέγειν μηδὲν σύνθετον ὁμοιομερές͵ ἑαυτῷ γε μὴ συνεχὲς ὅλον ὑπάρχον· ἐξ ὡρισμένων γὰρ τὸν ἀριθμὸν σύγκειται μορίων· οὐδενὸς δὲ ὁμοιομεροῦς ἀριθμῷ περιλαβεῖν ἐγχωρεῖ τὸ πλῆθος τῶν μο ¹⁷ ρίων. ὅτι μὲν οὖν εὐλόγως ὁ Πλάτων εἴδη τε καὶ μέρη ψυχῆς ὀνομάζει ταῦτα͵ μακροτέρων οὐ δέομαι λόγων.

      3. Our purpose from the beginning has been to prove that one (part of the soul) is situated in the head, another in the heart, and the third in the liver; and in the preceding (books) that has been done for two of the parts. The desiderative remains; it requires a special proof which ² we shall present in this (book). But first I preface the argument with the statement that this proof will not be from such clear evidence as before, and its premises, unlike the earlier ones, are not taken directly from the very nature of the thing under investigation, but from properties peculiar to it. For when the nerves were stopped with ligatures or ³ were cut, we could see that the parts continuous with the brain retained their original powers, but those beyond the ligature immediately lost both sensation and motion. And similarly with the arteries: we saw that the natural pulse still remained in the arteries continuous with the heart but disappeared completely in those that were separated off by the ligature. Again, it was clearly evident that the disturbances of ⁴ the soul that occur in anger and fear cause the heart to depart from its natural action. We also mentioned in how many ways the whole body is harmed by pressure on the brain or damage to its ventricles, and that this too clearly indicates that it is the source of motion and sensation. But in the case of the liver we are unable to make any such demonstration, ⁵ whether by exposing it and applying pressure, or by ligating _[³⁷⁵_] veins. For it is not the source of obvious motion, as the heart is of pulsation and the brain of sensation and volition. Nor is it the cause of rapid injury, as each of the others is, but time is required for weakness of the liver to harm the animal’s nutrition and coloring. And similarly, ⁶ when you ligate or completely remove a vein, the member to which it goes is observed to suffer a loss of nourishment and color after a considerable time ; but at the moment there is no damage worth mentioning. Indeed the liver is the source of the kind of power that exists also in ⁷ plants. For the present, let it be called a power, although we shall demonstrate later with more precision that the liver is the source of many powers, and it would be better to speak of a substance of the soul, rather than a power, enclosed in each of the three internal organs: in the brain, the rational substance, in the heart, the spirited, and in the region of the liver, the desiderative or, as Aristotle called it, the nutritive or vegetative or reproductive. He took the name in each case from one activity: from growing, vegetative; from nourishing, nutritive; from begetting, reproductive, whereas Plato called it desiderative, from the large number of its desires. The Stoics , however, do not give to the governing principle in plants the name ‘soul’ at all, but ‘nature’.

3. Ὅτι δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ καθίδρυται͵ τὸ δ΄ ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ͵ τὸ δ΄ ἐν τῷ ἥπατι͵ τοῦτο ἐξ ἀρχῆς προὔκειτο καὶ ² δέδεικται διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν ὑπὲρ τῶν δύο μερῶν. ὑπόλοι πον δὴ ἔτι τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν͵ ἰδίας ἀποδείξεως δεόμενον͵ ἣν ἐν τῷδε διέξιμεν ἐκεῖνο πρότερον ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦ λόγου προει πόντες ὡς οὐκ ἐξ ὁμοίως ἐναργῶν οὐδ΄ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἄντικρυς τοῦ ζητουμένου τῆς φύσεως ἡ ἀπόδειξις ἔσοιτο͵ καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐκ τῶν τούτῳ συμβεβηκότων ἰδίᾳ. ³ τῶν μὲν γὰρ νεύρων βρόχῳ διαλαμβανομένων ἢ τεμνομένων ἐφαίνετο τὰ μὲν ἐγκεφάλῳ συνεχῆ μόρια διασώζοντα τὰς ἀρχαίας δυνάμεις͵ τὰ δ΄ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ βρόχου παραχρῆμα καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀπολλύντα καὶ τὴν κίνησιν· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀρτηριῶν αἱ μὲν τῇ καρδίᾳ συνεχεῖς ἔτι σφύζουσαι κατὰ φύσιν͵ αἱ δ΄ ὑπὸ τοῦ βρόχου διειργόμεναι τελέως ἄσφυκτοι ⁴ γιγνόμεναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ τὰ παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς ὅσα κατὰ τοὺς θυμούς τε καὶ τοὺς φόβους συμπίπτει προφανῶς ἐξιστάντα τὴν καρδίαν ἐφαίνετο τῆς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείας. ἐμνημονεύσαμεν δὲ καὶ ὅσα θλιβόμενος ὁ ἐγκέφαλος ἢ τιτρω σκόμενος εἰς τὰς κοιλίας ἅπαν βλάπτει τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὡς καὶ ταῦτ΄ ἐναργῶς ἐνδείκνυται κινήσεώς τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως ἀρχὴν ⁵ ὑπάρχειν αὐτόν. ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἥπατος οὐδὲν τοιοῦτον ἔχομεν ἐπιδεικνύειν͵ οὔτ΄ εἰ γυμνώσαντες αὐτὸ θλίβομεν οὔτ΄ εἰ βρόχῳ τὰς φλέβας διαλαμβάνομεν. οὔτε γὰρ ἐναργοῦς ἐστι κινήσεως [ἡ] ἀρχή͵ καθάπερ ἡ μὲν καρδία τῆς σφυγμικῆς͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐγκέφαλος τῆς αἰσθητικῆς τε καὶ προαιρετικῆς͵ οὔτ΄ ὀξείας βλάβης αἴτιον͵ ὡς ἐκείνων ἑκάτερον͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ βλάπτεται τὸ ζῷον εἰς εὐτροφίαν τε καὶ εὔχροιαν ἥπατος ἀτονήσαντος. ⁶ ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς ὅπερ ἂν ἐμβάλ λουσαν φλέβα βρόχῳ διαλάβῃς ἢ καὶ παντάπασιν ἐκκόψῃς ἀτροφώτερόν τε καὶ ἀχρούστερον ἐν πλέονι χρόνῳ φαίνεται γιγνόμενον͵ οὐ μὴν ἔν γε τῷ παραυτίκα βλαπτόμενον οὐδέν͵ ὅτι ἄξιον λόγου. τοιαύτης γὰρ δυνάμεως ἀρχὴ τὸ ἧπαρ οἵα καὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς ὑπάρχει. ⁷ καλείσθω γὰρ ἔν γε τῷ παρ όντι δύναμις͵ ὕστερον ἐπιδειξόντων ἡμῶν ἀκριβέστερον ὡς πολλῶν ἐστι δυνάμεων ἀρχὴ τὸ ἧπαρ καὶ κάλλιον οὐσίαν ψυχῆς ὀνομάζειν͵ οὐ δύναμιν͵ ἐν ἑκάστῳ τῶν τριῶν σπλάγ χνων περιεχομένην͵ ἐν ἐγκεφάλῳ μὲν λογιστικήν͵ ἐν καρδίᾳ δὲ θυμοειδῆ͵ κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἧπαρ ἐπιθυμητικὴν [ἢ φυτικὴν ἢ γεννητικήν·] ἢ ὡς οἱ περὶ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλην͵ θρεπτικὴν ἢ φυτικὴν ἢ γεννητικήν͵ ἀφ΄ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου τοὔνομα θέμενον͵ ἀπὸ μὲν τοῦ φύειν φυτικήν͵ ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ τρέφειν θρεπτικήν͵ ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ γεννᾶν γεννητι κήν· ὁ Πλάτων δ΄ ἀπὸ τοῦ πλήθους τῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἐπι θυμητικήν. ⁸ οἱ δὲ Στωϊκοὶ οὐδὲ ψυχὴν ὅλως ὀνομάζουσι τὴν τὰ φυτὰ διοικοῦσαν͵ ἀλλὰ φύσιν.

      Now let each person name it as he pleases, but let him offer scientific ⁸ proof about the differences in the things themselves. We gave such proofs earlier for the brain and heart, and we are undertaking to do so in the present book for the liver. We shall begin with things that are more evident, so that by training in them we may more easily discover what is more obscure, and also that we may have a good supply of premises for dealing with it. It is more evident to begin from the veins and to ⁹ ask whether their source is the liver, as the heart is source of the arteries and the brain of the nerves, or whether, as some suppose, not only the arteries but also the veins receive their natural powers from the heart. For the investigation of this matter it is best to examine first the generation ¹⁰ and government of plants ; for it is reasonable to expect that since the power we are investigating is the only (power) they have, they will provide clearer indications of the part that is its source.

ὀνομαζέτω μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ὡς ἂν ἐθέλῃ͵ περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς πρά γμασι διαφορῶν ἀποδείξει πιστούσθω͵ καθάπερ ἡμεῖς ἐπὶ μὲν ἐγκεφάλου καὶ καρδίας ἔμπροσθεν ἐποιήσαμεν͵ ἐφ΄ ἥπατος ⁹ δὲ κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα λόγον ὁρμώμεθα διελθεῖν. ἀρξόμεθα δ΄ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐναργεστέρων͵ ἵν΄ ἅμα τε γυμνασθέντες ἐν τούτοις ῥᾷον ἐξεύρωμέν τι τῶν ἀμυδροτέρων ἅμα τε προτάσεων εὐπορή σωμεν εἰς αὐτά. ἐναργέστερον δ΄ ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τῶν φλεβῶν ἄρξασθαι καὶ ζητῆσαι πότερον καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀρχὴ τὸ ἧπαρ͵ ὡς ἀρτηριῶν μὲν ἡ καρδία͵ τῶν νεύρων δ΄ ὁ ἐγκέφαλος͵ ἢ καθάπερ ἔνιοι νομίζουσιν͵ οὐ ταῖς ἀρτηρίαις μόναις͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς φλεψὶν ἐπιπέμπει τὰς φυσικὰς δυνάμεις ἡ καρδία. ¹⁰ κάλλιστον οὖν εἰς τοῦτο περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰ φυτὰ γεννήσεώς τε ἅμα καὶ διοικήσεως ἐπισκέψασθαι πρότερον· εἰκὸς γάρ που μόνην ἐκείνοις ὑπάρχουσαν τὴν ζητουμένην δύναμιν ἐναργέστερα τεκμήρια τοῦ μέρους ὅθεν ὁρμᾶται παρασχέσθαι.