1. The theory of the affections of the soul had to be examined for its own sake, but the inquiry was made even more necessary by Chrysippus and his followers, who used it for proving the location of the soul’s governing part. Having shown, as they themselves thought, ² that all the affections (pathē) arise in the region of the heart — but in fact that only the affections of the spirited part (thumos) arise there —, and then having added (as a second premise) that where the affections of the soul are, there its reasoning part is also, they then proceeded to draw the conclusion that reason is in the heart. We grant that ³ they are right when they say that the affections of the spirited part arise here, but we do not grant that the spirited and rational parts must be in one place or that they are the work of one power: and as with the other points of their argument, so here too we ask the Stoics to prove that the affections and reason must have the same source.

1. Ὁ περὶ τῶν παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς λόγος ἀναγκαῖος μὲν ἦν ἡμῖν ἐσκέφθαι καὶ δι΄ ἑαυτόν͵ ἀναγκαιότερον δὲ ἐποίησαν αὐτὸν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ περιέχοντος ² τόπου τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονοῦν προσχρησάμενοι. δείξαντες γάρ͵ ὡς μὲν αὐτοὶ νομίζουσιν͵ ἅπαντα τὰ πάθη συνιστόμενα κατὰ τὴν καρδίαν͵ ὡς δὲ τἀληθὲς ἔχει͵ τὰ κατὰ μόνον τὸν θυμόν͵ ἔπειτα προσλαβόντες ὡς ἔνθα ἂν ᾖ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ἐνταῦθ΄ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον αὐτῆς͵ οὕτως ἤδη περαίνουσιν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ λογιστικὸν ὑπάρχειν. ³ ἡμεῖς δὲ ὅτι μὲν ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμᾶται τὰ κατὰ τὸν θυμὸν ἀληθεύειν αὐτούς φαμεν͵ οὐ μὴν οὔθ΄ ὅτι καθ΄ ἕνα τόπον ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι τό τε θυμούμενον εἶναι καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον οὔθ΄ ὅτι μιᾶς δυνάμεώς ἐστον ἔργα συγχωροῦμεν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀποδεικνύειν αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῦμεν͵ ὥσπερ τἆλλα τὰ κατὰ τὸν λόγον͵ οὕτω καὶ ὅτι τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν εἶναι τῶν τε παθῶν καὶ τοῦ λογισμοῦ.

⁴ Now Chrysippus in the first book of his work On the Affections  tries to prove that the affections are certain judgments of the reasoning part. Zeno, however, held that the affections are not the actual judgments but the contractions and expansions, risings and fallings of the soul that supervene on judgments. Posidonius, ⁵ disagreeing with both, both praises and accepts the Platonic view and refutes Chrysippus. He points out that the affections are not judgments and do not supervene on judgments; they are certain motions of other, irrational powers, which Plato called desiderative and spirited. He said many things in support of the ancient doctrine; ⁶ and I tried to mention briefly his most important points at the end of the preceding book, the fourth of the entire treatise. In the earlier ⁷ books I gave my own account of the evident facts that are in conflict with Chrysippus’ teaching and of the things he said in opposition to his own views, not waiting for someone else to attack him.

⁴ Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀποδεικνύναι πειρᾶται κρίσεις τινὰς εἶναι τοῦ λογι στικοῦ τὰ πάθη͵ Ζήνων δ΄ οὐ τὰς κρίσεις αὐτάς͵ ἀλλὰ τὰς ἐπιγιγνομένας αὐταῖς συστολὰς καὶ χύσεις ἐπάρσεις τε καὶ ⁵ ταπεινώσεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνόμιζεν εἶναι τὰ πάθη. ὁ Ποσειδώνιος δ΄ ἀμφοτέροις διενεχθεὶς ἐπαινεῖ τε ἅμα καὶ προσίεται τὸ Πλάτωνος δόγμα καὶ ἀντιλέγει τοῖς περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὔτε κρίσεις εἶναι τὰ πάθη δεικνύων οὔτε ἐπιγιγνόμενα κρίσεσιν͵ ἀλλὰ κινήσεις τινὰς ἑτέρων δυνάμεων ἀλόγων ἃς ὁ Πλάτων ὠνόμασεν ἐπιθυμητικήν τε καὶ θυμοειδῆ. ⁶ πολλῶν δ΄ εἰρημένων αὐτῷ πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ παλαιοῦ δόγματος͵ ἃ μέν ἐστιν ἐπίκαιρα͵ ταῦτ΄ ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου λόγῳ τετάρτῳ τῆς ὅλης ὄντι πραγματείας ἐπειράθην εἰπεῖν διὰ βραχέων ⁷ ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ γράμματος. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν αὐτὸς ἐπ΄ ἐμαυτοῦ διῆλθον ὅσα τε μάχεται τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων τῷ Χρυσίππου δόγματι καὶ ὅσα πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐναντιολογούμενος εἴρηκεν οὐκ ἀναμείνας τὸν ἔξωθεν κατήγορον. ⁸

That earlier discussion would have been enough to prove that the powers by which we desire and are angry and reason are more than one, not one only, as Chrysippus imagiries. But again in this book no few instances will be added where Chrysippus, in contradicting himself, bears witness both to the truth and to the ancient view. I decided to pass over the rest of his errors, numerous as they are; for I considered that a treatise of many books would be required if I were to refute all of them properly, and I was convinced that the champions of Chr ysippus ‘ doctrines would answer rne rather contentiously on these matters because of their desire to compete with the ancients. But in the places where he refutes himself and at the same time contradicts obvious facts, I think a person might feel shame and change to the better view, as Posidonius did; he was ashamed to defend the doctrine, obviously false, of the other Stoics, who went to such an extreme of contentiousness that they admitted that since, as they maintained, the affections belong to the reasoning power, irrational animals have no share in them; and most (of the Stoics) admitted that children do not share in them either, because, obviously, children too are not yet rational. Such shamelessness in the face of facts obvious to all mankind is the work of sophists; but not to be able to maintain even their own assumptions but to write things inconsistent with them, that is the mark of persons untrained in reasoning. Chrysippus, that most remarkable man, is found in very many of his treatises to be of this description. We shall postpone the other items.

ἱκανὰ μὲν οὖν ἦν καὶ ἐκεῖνα πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ πλείους εἶναι δυνάμεις αἷς ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ θυμούμεθα καὶ λογιζόμεθα καὶ μὴ μίαν͵ ὡς ὁ Χρύσιππος οἴεται. προσ κείσεται δ΄ οὐκ ὀλίγα καὶ κατὰ τοῦτον ἔτι τὸν λόγον ὅσα ὁ Χρύσιππος αὐτὸς ἐναντιολογούμενος αὑτῷ μαρτυρεῖ τοῖς τ΄ ἀληθέσιν ἅμα καὶ τῷ παλαιῷ δόγματι. ⁹ τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα τὰ κακῶς εἰρημένα παρ΄ αὐτοῦ καίτοι πάμπολλα τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα παρελθεῖν ἔκρινα πολύβιβλόν τε ἅμα τὴν πραγματείαν ἔσεσθαί μοι νομίζων εἰ πάντ΄ ἐξελέγχοιμι καλῶς͵ πεπεισμένος τε ὑπὸ φιλονεικίας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς παλαιοὺς ἐριστικώτερον ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀντεροῦντάς μοι τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας τὰ Χρυσίππου δόγματα· ¹⁰ ἐν οἷς δὲ αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν καταβάλλει μετὰ τοῦ καὶ μάχεσθαι τοῖς ἐναργῶς φαινομένοις͵ ἐν τούτοις ἡγοῦμαι τάχ΄ ἂν αἰδεσθῆναί τέ τινα καὶ μεταστῆναι πρὸς τὰ βελτίω κα θάπερ καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐποίησεν αἰδεσθεὶς συναγορεῦσαι ψευδεῖ φανερῶς δόγματι τῷ τῶν ἄλλων Στωϊκῶν͵ οἵ γε μέχρι τοσούτου φιλονεικίας ἥκουσιν ὥστ΄ ἐπειδὴ τῆς λογικῆς δυνά μεως ἔφασαν εἶναι τὰ πάθη͵ τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις μὴ μετέχειν αὐτῶν συγχωρεῖν͵ οἱ πλεῖστοι δ΄ οὐδὲ τοῖς παιδίοις ὅτι δηλαδὴ καὶ ταῦτ΄ οὐδέπω λογικά. ¹¹ τὸ μὲν οὖν οὕτως ἀναι σχυντεῖν πρὸς τὰ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἐναργῶς φαινόμενα σο φιστῶν ἔργον ἐστί͵ τὸ δὲ μηδὲ ἅπερ ὑπέθεντο δύνασθαι διαφυλάττειν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐναντία γράφειν αὐτῶν͵ ἀγυμνάστων περὶ λόγον ἀνθρώπων͵ οἷόσπερ καὶ ὁ θαυμασιώτατος Χρύσιππος ἐν παμπόλλαις εὑρίσκεται πραγματείαις. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἑτέρωθι.

2. But on the subject of the soul’s affections, that they do not belong to the reasoning power, I have already filled the book before this one with his own involuntary admissions, and I shall fill the present (book) no less, taking my start from the following Point. That affection is an unnatural (para phusin) and irrational (alogos) motion of the soul is acknowledged not only by the ancients but also by Chrysippus. Furthermore, both (parties) admit that this motion does not arise in the souls of the better sort of men. But when they come to describe the soul of inferior men, both during and prior to affections, their accounts are no longer the same. Chrysippus says that their soul is analogous to a body which is apt to fall into fever or diarrhoea or something else of that kind from a small and chance cause. Posidoniusis critical of this comparison; he says that the soul of inferior persons should not be compared to these (bodies) but simply to healthy bodies. For with respect to their experiencing the affection and being led to suffer it in any way whatever, it makes no difference whether the cause of their fever is large or small; the difference Between them is that the one kind (of body) contracts the disease easily, while the other does so with difficulty. Thus Chrysippus erred, he says, in his comparison ⁵ of health of soul to health of body, and disease (of soul) to a bodily state that easily falls into disease, for there is a soul — that of the wise man, obviously — that becomes immune to affection, whereas no body is immune to disease; it would be more correct to compare the souls of inferior persons “either to physical health with a proneness to disease” — that is Posidonius’ phrase — “or to the disease itself”; for there is a constitution that is either sickly or already laboring from a disease. But he himself agrees with Chrysippus to the extent of saying that all inferior men are diseased in soul and that their disease is comparable to the above-mentioned states of the body. His actual words are as follows: “Therefore the disease of the soul ⁷ does not resemble, as Chrysippus had supposed, the sickly constitution of the body, whereby it is carried off in such a way as to fall into irregular, non-periodic, fevers ; rather, disease of the soul resembles either physical health with a proneness to disease, or the disease itself. For disease of the body is a state already diseased, but What Chrysippus calls disease resembles rather a proneness to fever.”

2.  περὶ δὲ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι τῆς λογιστι κῆς δυνάμεως ἤδη μέν μοι καὶ τὸ πρὸ τούτου πεπλήρωται βιβλίον ὧν αὐτὸς ἄκων ὁμολογεῖ͵ πληρωθήσεται δ΄ οὐδὲν ² ἧττον καὶ τοῦτο τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνθένδε ποιησαμένῳ. τὸ πάθος τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησίν τινα παρὰ φύσιν ἄλογον ὑπάρχειν οὐχ οἱ παλαιοὶ μόνον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ Χρύσιππος ὁμολογεῖ. καὶ μὲν δὴ καὶ ὡς ἡ κίνησις αὕτη ταῖς τῶν ἀστείων οὐκ ἐγγίνεται ψυχαῖς͵ ³ ὡμολόγηται παρ΄ ἀμφοῖν. ὁποία δέ τίς ἐστιν ἡ τῶν φαύλων ψυχὴ κατά τε τὰ πάθη καὶ πρὸ τῶν παθῶν οὐκέθ΄ ὁμοίως ἐξηγοῦνται. Χρύσιππος μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν αὐτήν φησι τοῖς ἐπιτηδείοις σώμασιν εἰς πυρετοὺς ἐμπίπτειν ἢ διαρροίας ⁴ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον ἐπὶ μικρᾷ καὶ τυχούσῃ προφάσει. καὶ μέμφεταί γε ὁ Ποσειδώνιος αὐτοῦ τὴν εἰκόνα· χρῆναι γάρ φησιν οὐ τούτοις ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἁπλῶς ὑγιαίνουσι σώμασιν εἰκάσαι τὴν τῶν φαύλων ψυχήν· εἴτε γὰρ ἐπὶ μεγάλοις αἰ τίοις εἴτ΄ ἐπὶ μικροῖς πυρέττοιεν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ὡς πρὸς τὸ πάσχειν τε αὐτὰ καὶ εἰς πάθος ἄγεσθαι καθ΄ ὁτιοῦν͵ ἀλλὰ τῷ τὰ μὲν εὐέμπτωτα εἶναι τὰ δὲ δύσπτωτα διαφέρειν ἀλλήλων. ⁵ οὔκουν ὀρθῶς εἰκάζεσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυ σίππου τὴν μὲν ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγιείᾳ͵ τὴν δὲ νόσον τῇ ῥᾳδίως εἰς νόσημα ἐμπιπτούσῃ καταστάσει τοῦ σώματος· ἀπαθῆ μὲν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ψυχὴν τὴν τοῦ σοφοῦ δηλονότι͵ σῶμα δ΄ οὐδὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀπαθές· ἀλλὰ δικαιότερον εἶναι προσεικάζειν τὰς τῶν φαύλων ψυχὰς ἤτοι τῇ σωματικῇ ὑγιείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπτωτον εἰς νόσον (οὕτω γὰρ ὠνόμασεν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος) ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ νόσῳ͵ εἶναι γὰρ ἤτοι νοσώδη τινὰ ἕξιν ἢ ἤδη νοσοῦσαν. ⁶ συμφέρεται μέντοι τῷ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ αὐτὸς ὡς νοσεῖν τε λέγειν τὴν ψυχὴν ἅπαντας τοὺς φαύλους ἐοικέναι τε τὴν νόσον αὐτῶν ταῖς εἰρημέναις τοῦ σώματος καταστάσεσι. λέγει γοῦν ὧδε κατὰ ⁷ λέξιν· διὸ καὶ ἡ νόσος τῆς ψυχῆς ἔοικεν οὐχ ὡς ὁ Χρύ σιππος ὑπείληφε τῇ νοσώδει καχεξίᾳ τοῦ σώματος͵ καθ΄ ἣν ὑποφέρεται ῥεμβώδεσιν οὐχὶ περιοδικοῖς οἷα τ΄ ἐμπίπτειν πυρετοῖς͵ ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ψυχικὴ νόσος ἤτοι σω ματικῇ ὑγιείᾳ ἐχούσῃ τὸ εὐέμπτωτον εἰς τὴν νόσον ἢ αὐτῇ τῇ νόσῳ. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ μὲν σωματικὴ νόσος ἕξις ἤδη νοσοῦσα͵ ἡ δὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου λεγομένη νόσος εὐεμπτωσίᾳ μᾶλλον ⁸ ἔοικεν εἰς πυρετούς.

In this passage I commend Posidonius for stating that the ⁸ souls of inferior persons, when free from affections, are like healthy bodies; but I do not approve his calling such a state a disease. If the ⁹ comparison were properly made, the souls of virtuous men ought to be compared to bodies immune to disease, whether any such bodies exist or not — for that inquiry is not germane to the analogy now before us —; the souls of those progressing in virtue should be compared to bodies of robust constitution, souls of intermediate persons to bodies that are healthy without being robust, souls of the multitude of ordinary men to bodies that become ill at a slight cause, and souls of men who are angry or enraged or in any affected state whatever to bodies that are actually diseased. Still it is my opinion that ¹⁰ Posidonius was careful not to be caught disagreeing with Chrysippus at every point. What other reason could be given for his making the disease of the soul similar to the condition both of healthy bodies and of (bodies) that are actually diseased? He would have done better not to compare diseased souls to both, but only to diseased bodies; for it is impossible that one thing, disease of the soul, be assimilated to two opposites, health and disease. If that is the case, Then ¹² health will necessarily be like disease, since each of them resembles disease of the soul. For surely things that are like the same thing are also like each other.

ἐν τούτοις τὸν Ποσειδώνιον ἐπαι νῶ μὲν ὅτι τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι σώμασιν ὁμοίως ἔχειν φησὶ τὰς τῶν φαύλων ψυχὰς ὅταν ἔξω παθῶν καθεστήκωσιν͵ οὐκ ἐπαινῶ δὲ νόσον ὀνομάζοντα τὴν τοιαύτην κατάστασιν. ⁹ ἐχρῆν γάρ͵ εἴπερ ὀρθῶς εἴκαζε͵ τὰς μὲν τῶν σπουδαίων ψυχὰς ὁμοίως ἔχειν φάναι τοῖς ἀπαθέσι σώμασιν͵ εἴτ΄ οὖν ἐστιν εἴτ΄ οὐκ ἔστιν τινὰ τοιαῦτα͵ περιττὸν γὰρ ὡς πρὸς τὴν προ κειμένην εἰκόνα διασκέπτεσθαι τοῦτο͵ τὰς δὲ τῶν προκο πτόντων τοῖς εὐεκτικοῖς͵ τὰς δὲ τῶν μετρίων ἀνδρῶν τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι χωρὶς εὐεξίας͵ τὰς δὲ τῶν πολλῶν τε καὶ φαύλων τοῖς ἐπὶ σμικρᾷ προφάσει νοσοῦσι͵ τὰς δὲ τῶν ὀργιζομένων ἢ θυμουμένων ἢ ὅλως ἐν πάθει τινὶ καθεστώτων τοῖς ἤδη ¹⁰ νοσοῦσιν. ἀλλὰ γὰρ εὐλαβηθῆναί μοι δοκεῖ διαφερόμενος ἐν ἅπασι φωραθῆναι Χρυσίππῳ· τίνα γὰρ ἄν τις ἄλλην αἰτίαν εἴποι τοῦ τὴν νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς ὁμοιοῦν αὐτὸν τῇ καταστάσει ¹¹ τῶν θ΄ ὑγιαινόντων σωμάτων τῶν τ΄ ἤδη νοσούντων; οὐ γὰρ ἀμφοτέροις ἀλλὰ μόνοις τοῖς νοσοῦσι δικαιότερον ἦν παραβεβλῆσθαι τὰς νοσούσας ψυχάς· ἀδύνατον γὰρ ἓν πρᾶγμα τὴν νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς δυσὶν ἐναντίοις ὡμοιῶσθαι πράγμασιν͵ ¹² ὑγιείᾳ τε ἅμα καὶ νόσῳ. εἰ γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο͵ καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται τῇ νόσῳ παραπλησίαν ὑπάρχειν͵ εἴ γε δὴ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς νόσῳ προσέοικεν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν· τὰ γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ παραπλήσια πάντως που καὶ ἀλλήλοις ἐστὶ παρα πλήσια.

Chrysippus even more absurdly does not even grant that ¹³ disease of the soul is comparable to the state of a person who is suffering from a recurrent fever, tertian or quartan for example. He ¹⁴ writes: “We must suppose that the disease of the soul is most similar to a feverish physical state in which fevers and chills do not occur at regular intervals but irregularly and at random from the constitution (of the man) and at the incidence of small causes.” I ¹⁵ don’t know what he was thinking when he said that persons prone to disease are already diseased, and persons already diseased are not diseased at all. For those who suffer from tertian and quartan periods, ¹⁶ when they experience a chill or fever, are in an affected state; but when their unhealthy condition changes and they are not experiencing any of these things but are in the intervals, as we call them, they are outside the affection. A person might compare their sickly state, I ¹⁷ think, to persons who are mourning or are affected by love or envy or something else of that kind. When these persons are drowsy or ¹⁸ are thinking of something else, they are outside their affection; when presently they recall it, they enter a state similar to a recurring attack of fever. Those who are not involved in mourning or some present desire or anger are like persons in physical health. But since some of ¹⁹ these (healthy persons) are easy prey to disease and some are not, so some of the healthy in soul will resemble the one set, some the other; nevertheless they will not be said to be diseased in soul any more than those others are called diseased in body.

¹³ Χρύσιππος δ΄ ἀτοπώτερον ἔτι μηδ΄ ἐν ταῖς περιο δικαῖς τισι νόσοις καθεστῶσιν͵ οἱονεὶ τριταίων ἢ τεταρταίων πυρετῶν͵ ὡμοιῶσθαι συγχωρῶν τὴν νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς. γρά ¹⁴ φει γοῦν ὧδε· ὑπονοητέον τοίνυν τὴν μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς νόσον ὁμοιοτάτην εἶναι τῇ τοῦ σώματος πυρετώδει καταστάσει καθ΄ ἣν οὐ περιοδικῶς ἀλλ΄ ἀτάκτως πυρετοὶ καὶ φρῖκαι γίνονται καὶ ἄλλως ἀπὸ τῆς διαθέσεως καὶ μικρῶν ἐπιγινο ¹⁵ μένων αἰτίων. οὐκ οἶδα τί ποτε δόξαν αὐτῷ τοὺς μὲν ἑτοίμως ἔχοντας πρὸς τὸ νοσῆσαι νοσεῖν ἤδη φησί͵ τοὺς δ΄ ἤδη νοσοῦντας οὐδ΄ ὅλως νοσεῖν. ¹⁶ οἱ γὰρ ἐν τεταρταίαις καὶ τριταίαις περιόδοις ὄντες͵ ἐπειδὰν μὲν ῥιγῶσί τε καὶ πυρέττω σιν͵ ἐν πάθει καθεστήκασι͵ κινουμένης δ΄ αὐτῶν τῆς νοσώ δους κατασκευῆς ἐπειδὰν μηδὲν τούτων πάσχωσιν ἀλλ΄ ἐν ¹⁷ τοῖς καλουμένοις διαλείμμασιν ὦσιν͵ ἔξω τῶν παθῶν εἰσι. τὴν μέντοι νοσώδη κατάστασιν εἰκάζοι τις ἄν͵ οἶμαι͵ τοῖς ἤτοι πεν θοῦσιν ἢ ἐρῶσιν ἢ φθονοῦσιν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον πάσχουσι. ¹⁸ καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι͵ καθ΄ ὃν μὲν ἂν χρόνον ἢ ὑπνώττωσιν ἢ πρὸς ἄλλῳ τινὶ τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχωσιν͵ ἔξω τῶν παθῶν γίνονται͵ μετ΄ ὀλίγον δὲ ἀναμνησθέντες αὐτῶν εἰς παραπλησίαν τινὰ κατά στασιν ἀφικνοῦνται ταῖς καταβολαῖς τῶν πυρετῶν. ὅσοις μέντοι μήτε πένθος ἐνέστηκε μήτ΄ ἐπιθυμία τις ὑπόγυος ἢ θυμός͵ ¹⁹ οὗτοι τοῖς ὑγιαίνουσι τὰ σώματα παραπλησίως ἔχουσιν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ τούτων αὐτῶν ἔνιοι μέν εἰσιν εὐάλωτοι νόσοις͵ ἔνιοι δ΄ οὔ͵ καὶ τῶν τὰς ψυχὰς ὑγιαινόντων οἱ μὲν τούτοις οἱ δ΄ ἐκείνοις ὁμοίως ἕξουσιν͵ οὐ μὴν λεχθήσονταί γε νοσεῖν²⁰ τὰς ψυχὰς εἴπερ μηδὲ ἐκεῖνοι τὰ σώματα.

But by heaven, some Stoic may say — as indeed they do say —, ²⁰ there is not the same analogy between soul and body in respect of affections and diseases and health. But why then, good people, we ²¹ would reply to them, do you compare the soul’s affections to the affections and diseases of the body? Why does Chr ysippus write as follows in his treatise on the Ethics of the Affections? “It is not true ²² that whereas there is an art, called medicine, concerned with the diseased body, there is no art concerned with the diseased soul, or that the latter (art) should be inferior to the former in the theory and treatment of individual cases. Therefore just as the physician ²³ of the body must be ‘inside’, as they say, the affections that befall the body and the proper cure for each, so it is incumbent on the physician of the soul to be ‘inside’ both of these (things) in the best possible way. And a person might understand that this is so, since the ²⁴ analogy with them was set up at the start. For the correlative affinity with them will also make evident to us, as I think,. the similarity of the cures and in addition, the analogy that the two kinds of healing have, with each other.” It has become clear, I think, that ²⁵ they intend an analogy between the (affairs) of the soul and those of the body; (this is evident) not only from the passage just quoted but also from What he writes immediately thereafter, which goes as follows : “Just as strength and weakness, firmness and softness, are ob ²⁶ served in the body, and also health and disease, robustness and sickliness”, and all the other affections, infirmities, and diseases that he goes on to list, “in the same way”, he says, “there are certain things in the rational soul that exist and are named analogously to all of there”. He then continues: “I fancy that this sort of analogy and ²⁷ similarity has led to the sameness of their names. For we do in fact say that some persons are strong or weak also in soul, and firm or soft, diseased or healthy; and we speak in this way of affection, infirmity, and the like in the soul.” Clearly Chrysippus wishes to preserve ²⁸ here a certain analogy between soul and body in their affections, infirmities, diseases, health, robustness, strength, weakness, and, in a word, everything that has the same name in both; for they have both the same name and the same definition, since he calls them ‘same in name’. Therefore whatever universal definition is given to disease ²⁹ in the body, the soul’s disease must be defined in the same way.

ἀλλὰ νὴ Δία͵ φήσει τις ἴσως τῶν Στωϊκῶν͵ ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ λέγουσιν͵ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀναλογίαν εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα κατά τε τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰ νοσήματα καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν. ²¹ τί ποτ΄ οὖν͵ ὦ βέλτιστοι͵ φαίημεν ἂν ἡμεῖς πρὸς αὐτούς͵ εἰκάζετε τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πάθεσί τε καὶ νοσήμασι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη; τί δὲ ²² Χρύσιππος ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν ἠθικῷ γράφει ταυτί; οὔτε γὰρ περὶ τὸ νοσοῦν σῶμά ἐστί τις τέχνη ἣν προσαγορεύο μεν ἰατρικήν͵ οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν νοσοῦσαν ψυχήν ἐστί τις τέχνη οὔτ΄ ἐν τῇ κατὰ μέρος θεωρίᾳ τε καὶ θεραπείᾳ δεῖ λείπεσθαι ταύτην ἐκείνης. ²³ διὸ καὶ καθάπερ τῷ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἰατρῷ καθήκει τῶν τε συμβαινόντων αὐτοῖς πα θῶν ἐντὸς εἶναι͵ ὡς εἰώθασι τοῦτο λέγειν͵ καὶ τῆς ἑκάστῳ οἰκείας θεραπείας͵ οὕτω καὶ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἰατρῷ ἐπιβάλλει ²⁴ ἀμφοτέρων τούτων ἐντὸς εἶναι ὡς ἔνι ἄριστα. καὶ ὅτι οὕ τως ἔχει μάθοι ἄν τις τῆς πρὸς ταῦτ΄ ἀναλογίας παρατε θείσης ἀπ΄ ἀρχῆς. ἡ γὰρ πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντιπαρατείνουσα οἰκειότης παραστήσει͵ ὡς οἴομαι͵ καὶ τὴν τῶν θεραπειῶν ὁμοιότητα καὶ ἔτι τὴν ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ἰατρειῶν πρὸς ἀλλή λας ἀναλογίαν. ²⁵ ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἀναλογίαν τινὰ βούλονται εἶναι τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα͵ δῆλον οἶμαι γεγο νέναι καὶ οὐ μόνον γε διὰ τῆς προγεγραμμένης ῥήσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ δι΄ ὧν ἐφεξῆς γράφει τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἐχόντων· ²⁶ καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος θεωρεῖται ἰσχύς τε καὶ ἀσθένεια͵ εὐτονία καὶ ἀτονία [καὶ τόνος]͵ πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὑγίειά τε καὶ νόσος͵ καὶ εὐεξία τε καὶ καχεξία͵ καὶ τἆλλα ὅσα τούτοις ἑξῆς καταλέγει πάθη τε καὶ ἀρρωστήματα καὶ νοσή ματα͵ κατὰ τὸν αὐτόν φησι τρόπον ἀνάλογόν τινα πᾶσι τούτοις καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ συνίσταταί τε καὶ ὀνομάζεται. ²⁷ εἶθ΄ ἑξῆς ἐπιφέρων φησίν͵ ὡς οἴομαι͵ ἀπὸ τῆς τοιαύτης ἀνα λογίας τε καὶ ὁμοιότητος καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς συνωνυμίας γεγενημένης· καὶ γὰρ καὶ κατὰ ψυχήν τινας λέγομεν ἰσχύειν καὶ ἀσθενεῖν καὶ εὐτόνους καὶ ἀτόνους εἶναι καὶ ἔτι νοσεῖν καὶ ὑγιαίνειν͵ οὕτω πως καὶ τοῦ πάθους καὶ τοῦ κατ΄ αὐ τὴν ἀρρωστήματος λεγομένου καὶ τῶν τούτοις παραπλησίων. ²⁸ ἐναργὼς γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀναλογίαν τινὰ βού λεται σώζεσθαι τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ πα θῶν πρὸς πάθη καὶ ἀρρωστημάτων πρὸς ἀρρωστήματα καὶ νοσημάτων πρὸς νοσήματα καὶ ὑγιείας πρὸς ὑγίειαν καὶ εὐε ξίας πρὸς εὐεξίαν καὶ ἰσχύος πρὸς ἰσχὺν καὶ ἀσθενείας πρὸς ἀσθένειαν καὶ ἁπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἁπάντων τῶν συνωνύμως λεγο μένων πρὸς ἅπαντα· καὶ γὰρ τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον αὐτῶν εἶναι τὸν αὐτὸν εἴ γε δὴ συνώνυμά φησιν ὑπάρ ²⁹ χειν αὐτά. ὥστε ὅπως ἄν τις ὁρίζηται καθόλου τὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι νόσον͵ ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τούτῳ καὶ τὴν ἐν ψυχῇ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ὁρίζεσθαι.

From this it is clear that Chrysippus’ purpose is to explain and preserve the entire analogy. If he tried and failed, we ³⁰ must not give up the similarity but rather • condemn his teaching as untrue. This applies no less to the teaching of all the subsequent account in his Ethics of the Affections. He writes: “Therefore Zeno’s ³¹ argument proceeds as it should. And disease of the soul is most similar to an unsettled state of the body. Disease of the body is said to be the lack of proportion in its components, hot and cold, dry and wet.” A little later he says, “Health in the body is a kind of blend ³² and proportion of the (things) expressly stated”; and then, “for in my opinion robustness of body is the best blend of the (things) mentioned” ; and after that, “It is not out of place to say this of the body, ³³ because proportion or lack of proportion in its components, hot, cold, wet, dry, is health or disease; proportion or lack of it in the sinews is strength or weakness, firmness or softness; and proportion or the lack of it in the limbs is beauty or ugliness.” All this, most ³⁴ noble Chrysippus , you explained very well; but give us, as you promised, the analogy of the things in the soul that have the same names as these (bodily things), beginning with health and disease.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν πρόκειται τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τὴν ἀναλογίαν ἅπασαν ἐξηγεῖσθαί τε καὶ φυλάττειν͵ ³⁰ ἐκ τούτων δῆλον. εἰ δὲ ἐπιχειρήσας αὐτὸ ποιεῖν οὐ τυγχάνει τοῦ προτεθέντος͵ οὐκ ἀποστατέον ἐστὶ τῆς ὁμοιότητος ἀλλὰ τῇ διδασκαλίᾳ μεμπτέον ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖ. τοῦτο δ΄ οὐδὲν ἧττον αὐτῇ καὶ κατὰ τὸν ἐφεξῆς ὑπάρχει λόγον ἅπαντα τὸν ³¹ ἐν τῷ περὶ παθῶν ἠθικῷ. γράφει γοῦν ὧδε· διὸ καὶ κατὰ τρόπον προῆκται Ζήνωνι λόγος. ἡ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς νόσος ὁμοιοτάτη ἐστὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἀκαταστασίᾳ. λέγεται δὲ εἶναι σώματος νόσος ἡ ἀσυμμετρία τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ͵ θερμοῦ ³² καὶ ψυχροῦ͵ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ. καὶ μετ΄ ὀλίγα͵ ἡ δ΄ ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγίεια εὐκρασία τις καὶ συμμετρία τῶν διειρημένων· καὶ πάλιν ἐφεξῆς͵ οἶμαι γὰρ εἶναι εὐεξίαν σώματος τὴν ἀρί στην τῶν ῥηθέντων εὐκρασίαν· καὶ πάλιν ἐφεξῆς͵ ³³ λέγεται δὲ καὶ ταῦτα οὐκ ἄπο τρόπου ἐπὶ τοῦ σώματος͵ διότι ἡ ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς γενομένη συμμε τρία ἢ ἀσυμμετρία ἐστὶν ὑγίεια ἢ νόσος͵ ἡ δ΄ ἐν νεύροις συμμετρία ἢ ἀσυμμετρία ἰσχὺς ἢ ἀσθένεια καὶ εὐτονία ἢ ἀτονία͵ ἡ δ΄ ἐν τοῖς μέλεσι συμμετρία ἢ ἀσυμμετρία κάλλος ³⁴ ἢ αἶσχος. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μέν͵ ὦ γενναιότατε Χρύσιππε͵ καλῶς ἅπαντα διῆλθες͵ ἀπόδος δ΄ ἡμῖν͵ ὡς ἐπηγγείλω͵ τὴν ἀνα λογίαν τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνωνύμως αὐτοῖς ὠνομασμένων ἀρξάμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ὑγιείας τε καὶ τῆς νόσου.

For as health of body is the proportion of its simplest parts, which ³⁵we also call its elements — I mean hot, cold, dry, wet in the same way, I suppose, health of the soul would be a proportion of its simplest parts. You must explain what these parts are, how many they are, and how related to one another, if you are not to omit anything of what you promised. Similarly, disease of the soul Will be a dispro ³⁶ portion and mutual conflict in these very same parts whose proportion was the soul’s health. These parts, on Plato’ s view, are the spirited, ³⁷ rational, and desiderative, so that the analogy of soul to body in health and disease is preserved in every respect. For when the three parts are ³⁸ in harmony with each other and are not in conflict at all, they produce health of soul, but when in disharmony and conflict, (they produce) disease.

³⁵ ὥσπερ γὰρ ὑγίεια σώματός ἐστιν ἡ συμμετρία τῶν ἁπλουστάτων αὐτοῦ μορίων͵ ἃ δὴ καὶ στοιχεῖα προσαγορεύομεν͵ τοῦ θερμοῦ λέγω καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ͵ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρό πον εἴη ἂν οἶμαι καὶ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίεια συμμετρία τις τῶν ἁπλῶν αὐτῆς μορίων· ἅτινά ποτ΄ ἐστὶ καὶ ὁπόσα καὶ ὅπως ἔχοντα πρὸς ἄλληλα͵ διελθεῖν ἀναγκαῖον ἔσται σοι μέλλοντί γε μηδὲν παραλείψειν ὧν ἐπηγγείλω. ³⁶ καὶ δὴ καὶ ἡ νόσος ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὡσαύτως ἀσυμμετρία τις ἔσται καὶ στάσις πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων μορίων͵ ὧν ἡ συμμε ³⁷ τρία τῆς ψυχῆς ἦν ὑγίεια. τὰ δὲ μόρια ταῦτα κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνα τὸ θυμοειδές ἐστι καὶ τὸ λογιστικὸν ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις τρίτον τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν· ὥστε σώζεσθαι τήν τε τῆς ὑγιείας καὶ τὴν τῆς νόσου κατὰ πᾶν ὁμοιότητα τῆς ψυχῆς ³⁸ πρὸς τὸ σῶμα. συμφωνοῦντα μὲν γὰρ ἀλλήλοις τὰ τρία καὶ κατὰ μηδὲν στασιάζοντα τὴν ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπεργάζε ται͵ διαφωνήσαντα δὲ καὶ στασιάσαντα τὴν νόσον.

Disease is a higher and rnore general term than was indicated by ³⁹ the statement I made a moment ago. Let us therefore give a comprehensive definition of the concept : it is ‘the destruction of what is by nature congenial as a result of some dissension’. That was P¹ at o’ s definition in the Sophist. It is not difficult to ascertain that this ⁴⁰ formulation is at a higher level and accurately covers all particular diseases, those of our soul, those of our body, those found in other animals and plants, and even those of whole cities. Thus we say, I ⁴¹ believe, that cities divided by civil war are internally diseased, as though their components, congenial by nature, had come to blows. This is the most generic concept of all disease. The mutual conflict of ⁴² the simplest parts is less generic than this, and still less generic is the statement that disease is a lack of proportion of things hot, cold, dry and wet. For this (last) is disease of the body only, and of nothing else, just as the conflict of the rational is disease of nothing but the soul.

³⁹ ἔστι γὰρ ἡ νόσος ἀνωτέρω καὶ καθόλου μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς μικρὸν ἔμπρο σθεν εἴρηται. περιλάβωμεν οὖν αὐτῆς τὴν ἔννοιαν· ἡ τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθορά· οὕτως γὰρ ἐν ⁴⁰ Σοφιστῇ Πλάτων ὡρίσατο. ὅτι δ΄ ἀνωτάτω τ΄ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀπό δειξις ἥδε καὶ πάσας τὰς κατὰ μέρος νόσους ἀκριβῶς ἐπι λαμβάνει͵ τάς τε τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν καὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε καὶ φυτοῖς͵ ἤδη δὲ κἀν ταῖς πόλεσιν ὅλαις͵ οὐ χαλεπὸν καταμαθεῖν. ⁴¹ οὕτω γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ τὰς στασιαζούσας πόλεις ἐμφυλίῳ πολέμῳ νοσεῖν ἐν ἑαυ ταῖς λέγομεν͵ ὡς ἂν εἰς μάχην ἀφιγμένων τῶν ἐν αὐταῖς ⁴² φύσει συγγενῶν. αὕτη μὲν ἡ γενικωτάτη νόσου πάσης ἔννοια. τῶν δ΄ ἁπλουστάτων μορίων ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσις ἧττον ταύτης ἐστὶ γενική͵ καὶ ταύτης ἔθ΄ ἧττον ἐπειδὰν θερμῶν καὶ ψυχρῶν καὶ ξηρῶν καὶ ὑγρῶν ἀμετρία τις εἶναι λέγηται. σώματος γὰρ αὕτη γε μόνου καὶ οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ νόσος͵ ὥσπερ γε καὶ ἡ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ στάσις οὐδενὸς τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ πλὴν ψυχῆς νόσος.

Chrysippus commits a double error in his teaching on these ⁴³ matters : first, he contradicts himself when he says in his Ethics of the Affections that disease of soul is the ‘same in name’ as disease of body, but throughout the first (book) on the Theory (of the Affections) compares it to unstable and precarious health; and second, he was not able to demonstrate the very thing that he promised to demonstrate in his book called Therapy and Ethics. What was that thing ? The ⁴⁴ mutual proportion and disproportion of the soul’s parts by reference to which the soul is said to be healthy or diseased. As he supposes that ⁴⁵ all its affections and diseases arise in a single part, reason, it is not surprising that he is unable to explain what those parts are, the proper proportion of which is the soul’s health. Similarly, as he supposes ⁴⁶  that beauty arises in a proportion of parts, and ugliness in a disproportion, it is not surprising that he is unable to explain what is the nature of those parts of the soul whose proportion is beauty and whose disproportion is ugliness. And yet immediately after the ⁴⁷ passages I quoted a moment ago he writes: “Therefore by analogy the soul will also be called beautiful or ugly in terms of the proportion or disproportion of certain parts of such and such a kind.” Chrysippus ⁴⁸ was correct in saying that the soul should be called beautiful or ugly, healthy or diseased, in terms of a certain proportion or disproportion of certain parts of such and such a kind. But as he was unable to say what there parts of the soul are, since he placed its health and disease, beauty and ugliness in one part only, the rational, he was compelled to twist the argument and to count the soul’s activities as its parts. Thus he continues: “They are parts of the soul through which its ⁴⁹ reason and the disposition of its reason are constituted. And a soul is beautiful or ugly by virtue of its governing part being in this or that state with respect to its own proper divisions.” If you would go on to ⁵⁰ state what its own proper divisions are, Chrysippus, you would relieve us of our difficulty. But you did not go on to state them here ⁵¹ or in any other of your writings; instead, as though the entire validity of your treatment of the affections did not depend on this, you suddenly withdraw from explaining it and prolong the discussion in irrelevancies. You should rather have dwelt on this matter and pointed out (to us) whatever are the parts of the rational part of the soul.

⁴³ ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος ἁμαρτάνει διττὰ κατὰ τὴν ἐν τούτοις διδασκαλίαν· πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι διαφέρεται πρὸς αὑτὸν ἐν μὲν τῷ περὶ παθῶν ἠθικῷ συνω νύμως ὠνομάσθαι λέγων τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νόσον τῇ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα͵ διὰ δὲ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν λογικῶν εἰκάζων αὐτὴν εὐλύτῳ καὶ εὐδιαφθάρτῳ ὑγιείᾳ· ἔπειθ΄ ὅτι μηδ΄ ὅπερ [ἀλη θῶς] ὑπέσχετο κατὰ τὸ θεραπευτικὸν καὶ ἠθικὸν ἐπιγραφό ⁴⁴ μενον βιβλίον ἠδυνήθη δεῖξαι. τί δ΄ ἐστὶ τοῦτο; τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρία τε καὶ ἀσυμμετρία καθ΄ ἣν ὑγιαίνειν τε λέγεται καὶ νοσεῖν. ⁴⁵ πάντα γὰρ αὐτῆς τά τε πάθη καὶ τὰ νοσήματα καθ΄ ἓν ὑποθέμενος γίγνεσθαι τὸ λογιστικὸν εἰκότως ἀπορεῖ δεικνύναι τίνων μέν ἐστι μορίων ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγίεια συμμετρία. ⁴⁶ κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐν συμμετρίᾳ μερῶν ὑποθέμενος γίγνεσθαι τὸ κάλλος͵ ἐν ἀμετρίᾳ δέ τινι τὸ αἶσχος͵ εἰκότως ἀπορεῖ δεικνύναι ποίων μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν ἡ συμμετρία ⁴⁷ κάλλος ἐστί͵ ποίων δὲ ἀμετρία αἶσχος. καίτοι γράφει γ΄ ἐφεξῆς ὧν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ παρεθέμην ῥήσεων ὡδί· διὸ καὶ καλὴ ἢ αἰσχρὰ ψυχὴ ἀνάλογον ῥηθήσεται κατὰ συμμετρίαν ἢ ἀμετρίαν τοιῶνδέ τινων μερῶν. ⁴⁸ ὅτι μὲν οὖν κατὰ συμμετρίαν τέ τινα καὶ ἀσυμμετρίαν τοιῶνδέ τινων μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ καλὴν ἢ αἰσχρὰν αὐτὴν εἶναι λεκτέον ἐστὶ καὶ ὑγιαίνουσαν καὶ νοσοῦσαν͵ ὀρθῶς εἴρηται τῷ Χρυσίππῳ· τίνα δ΄ ἐστὶ ταῦτα τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς μόρια μὴ δυνάμενος εἰπεῖν͵ ὡς ἂν ἐν ἑνὶ μόνῳ τῷ λογιστικῷ καὶ τὴν ὑγίειαν αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν νόσον καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ αἶσχος τιθέμενος͵ ἀναγκάζεται περιπλέκειν τε τὸν λόγον καὶ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν αὐτῆς ὡς μερῶν μνημονεύειν. ⁴⁹ ἐφεξῆς γοῦν οἷς παρεθέμην ὡδὶ γράφει· ἔστι δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη δι΄ ὧν ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος συνέστηκε καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ διάθεσις. καὶ ἔστι καλὴ ἢ αἰσχρὰ ψυχὴ κατὰ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν μόριον ⁵⁰ ἔχον οὕτως ἢ οὕτως κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους μερισμούς. ποίους οἰκείους μερισμούς͵ ὦ Χρύσιππε͵ προσγράψας ἐφεξῆς ἀπαλλά ξεις ἡμᾶς πραγμάτων. ⁵¹ ἀλλ΄ οὔτ΄ ἐνταῦθα προσέγραψας οὔτ΄ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ τῶν σεαυτοῦ βιβλίων͵ ἀλλ΄ ὥσπερ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ τὸ πᾶν κῦρος ὑπάρχον τῆς περὶ τῶν παθῶν πραγματείας͵ ἀποχωρεῖς τε παραχρῆμα τῆς διδασκαλίας αὐτοῦ καὶ μηκύνεις τὸν λόγον ἐν τοῖς οὐ προσήκουσι͵ δέον ἐπιμεῖναι καὶ δεῖξαι ⁵² τίνα ποτέ ἐστι τὰ μόρια τοῦ λογιστικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς.

Since, then, you passed over the account, whether deliberately ⁵² or not — I cannot conjecture which I shall try by inference from your doctrines to discover your intention and inquire into its truth, taking my start from the passage already quoted, which says :

ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν σὺ παρέδραμες εἴθ΄ ἑκὼν εἴτ΄ ἄκων τὸν λόγον͵ οὐ γὰρ ἔχω συμβαλεῖν͵ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι τοῖς σοῖς δόγμασιν ἑπόμενος ἐξευρεῖν τέ σου τὸ βούλημα καὶ διασκέψασθαι περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀπὸ τῆς προγεγραμμένης ῥή σεως ποιησάμενος ἐχούσης ὧδε·

3. “They are parts of the soul through which its reason is constituted.” Perhaps you are reminding us of what you said in your treatise On Reason, that reason is a ‘collection of notions and concepts’. But if you think that each notion and concept is a part of the soul, you ² are twice wrong.

3. ἔστι δέ γε τῆς ψυχῆς μέρη δι΄ ὧν ὁ ἐν αὐτῇ λόγος συνέστηκεν· ἀναμιμνήσκων ἴσως ἡμᾶς τῶν ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ λόγου γεγραμμένων ὧν σὺ διῆλθες͵ ὡς ἔστιν ἐννοιῶν τέ τινων καὶ προλήψεων ἄθροισμα. ² ἀλλ΄ εἴπερ ἑκάστην τῶν ἐννοιῶν καὶ προλήψεων εἶναι μόριον νομίζεις τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ἁμαρτάνεις διττά.

First, they should not be called parts of the soul but of reason, as you yourself write in your treatise On Reason; for soul and reason are surely not the same. And besides, you indicated in the ³ passage quoted above that reason is one of the things constituted in the soul; but the soul is not the same as that which is constituted in it. Secondly, even if we should let this pass unchallenged, nevertheless ⁴ notions and concepts must not be called parts, but activities, of the soul. Nothing is composed of its own activities, not the eye, ear, arm, ⁵ leg, or any other thing at all. The activities of the eye are the discernment of the several colors, white, black, yellow, grey, and all the rent; of the ear, the discernment of sounds, high, low, loud, faint, soft, harsh. But these are not the parts of eye or ear. Surely you too are well aware that there is a hornlike tunic, another that is grape-like, and there are also the moist crystalline and hyaloid bodies, and other such parts of the eye, and that the parts of the ear, similarly, are bones, cartilages, nerves, membranes, and a number of other things of that description. Then in the soul too you must not confuse parts with ⁷ activities. Notions and concepts are activities, whereas the soul’s parts, as you yourself explain fully elsewhere, are the auditory pneuma, the optic (pneuma), and in addition the vocal and generative (pneumas), and over all of them the governing (pneuma) in which, you said, reason is constituted; and you say that it is primarily with reference to this part of the soul that ugliness and beauty are found in it. Now this ⁸ pneuma has two parts, elements, or states, that are intermingled throughout, the cold and the hot, or, if you wish to use different appellations and give them the names of their substances, air and fire; and it also takes some moisture from the bodies in which it dwells. But I would be surprised if you should wish to call the proportion of ⁹ these the health or beauty of the governing part. For the health of its body is properly assigned to them, but as the governing part of the soul, its health does not reside in them, even on your view. Thus the whole pattern is destroyed and the claim to the same name ¹⁰ is completely Bone if we cannot show that disease and health, beauty and ugliness, are constituted in the soul’s governing part in the same way as in the whole body. And yet you promised earlier to show this, ¹ i rightly recognizing and preserving the meaning of all that had been said; but you were not able to follow through to the end and you did not expound the analogy and similarity between the things that arise in the soul and those that arise in the body.

πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ οὐ ψυχῆς ἐχρῆν ἀλλὰ λόγου ταῦτ΄ εἶναι μόρια φάσκειν͵ ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ γράφεις ἐν τῇ περὶ λόγου πραγματείᾳ· οὐ γὰρ δήπου ταὐτόν ἐστι ψυχὴ καὶ λόγος. ³ ἄλλως τε καὶ διὰ τῆς προγε γραμμένης ῥήσεως ἐνεδείξω τῶν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ συνισταμένων ὡς ἕν τι καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐστίν· οὐ ταὐτὸν δὲ ψυχή ἐστι καὶ τὸ ⁴ ἐν αὐτῇ συνιστάμενον. ἔπειτα δ΄ εἰ καὶ τοῦτό τις ἐάσειεν ἀνέλεγκτον͵ ἀλλά τοι τάς γ΄ ἐννοίας καὶ προλήψεις οὐ μόρια ⁵ τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι λεκτέον ἀλλ΄ ἐνεργείας τινάς. οὐδὲν δ΄ ἐκ τῶν οἰκείων ἐνεργειῶν σύγκειται͵ οὔτε οὖν ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς οὔτε τὸ οὖς οὔτε χεὶρ οὔτε σκέλος οὔτ΄ ἄλλο τῶν πάντων οὐδέν· ἀλλ΄ εἰσὶν ἐνέργειαι μὲν ὀφθαλμοῦ αἱ τῶν χρωμάτων ἑκάστου διαγνώσεις͵ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος καὶ ξανθοῦ καὶ φαιοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων͵ ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὠτὸς αὖ αἱ τῶν φωνῶν͵ ὀξείας καὶ βαρείας καὶ μεγάλης καὶ μικρᾶς καὶ λείας καὶ τραχείας͵ οὐ μὴν τά γε μόρια ταῦτ΄ ἐστὶν οὔτ΄ ὠτὸς οὔτ΄ ⁶ ὀφθαλμοῦ. ἀλλ΄ οἶσθα δήπου καὶ σὺ σαφῶς ὡς κερατοει δής τέ τίς ἐστι χιτὼν καὶ ῥαγοειδὴς ἕτερος καὶ ἔτι κρυσταλ λοειδές τε καὶ ὑαλοειδὲς ὑγρὸν ἕτερά τε τοιαῦτα μόρια τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν ὥσπερ γε καὶ ὠτὸς ὀστᾶ καὶ χόνδροι καὶ νεῦρα καὶ ὑμένες ὅσα τε ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ⁷ μὴ τοίνυν μηδὲ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς σύγχει τὰ μόρια ταῖς ἐνεργείαις. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔννοιαι καὶ αἱ προλήψεις ἐνέργειαι͵ μόρια δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ὡς αὐτὸς σὺ δι΄ ἑτέρων ἐκδιδάσκεις͵ τό τε ἀκουστικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ τὸ ὀπτικὸν ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις φωνητικόν τε καὶ γεννητικὸν καὶ πρὸ πάντων αὐτῶν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν͵ ἐν ᾧ καὶ τὸν λόγον ἔφης συνίστασθαι͵ καθ΄ ὃ δὴ καὶ μάλιστα μόριον [δὴ] τῆς ψυχῆς αἶσχος καὶ κάλλος ἐγγίνεσθαι λέγεις αὐτῇ. ⁸ τοῦτ΄ οὖν τὸ πνεῦμα δύο μὲν κέκτηται μόριά τε καὶ στοιχεῖα καὶ καταστάσεις͵ δι΄ ὅλων ἀλλήλοις κεκραμένα͵ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ θερμόν͵ εἴπερ δ΄ ἑτέροις ὀνόμασι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐσιῶν ἐθέλοι τις αὐτὰ προσαγορεύειν͵ ἀέρα τε καὶ πῦρ· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἰκμάδα ⁹ τινὰ προσείληφεν ἀπὸ τῶν σωμάτων ἐν οἷς διαιτᾶται. ἀλλὰ θαυμάζοιμ΄ ἂν εἰ τὴν τούτων συμμετρίαν ὑγίειαν ἢ κάλλος εἶναι βουλήσῃ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ σώματος αὐτοῦ τὴν ὑγίειαν ἐν τούτοις τίθεσθαι προσῆκεν͵ ὡς ἡγεμονικοῦ δὲ ψυχῆς οὐκέτ΄ ἐν τούτοις οὐδὲ κατ΄ αὐτὸν σέ. ¹⁰ διέφθαρται τοίνυν ἡμῖν ὅλον τὸ παράδειγμα καὶ ἡ τῆς συνωνυμίας ἐπαγγελία παντάπασιν οἴχεται μὴ δυνηθεῖσιν ἐπιδεῖξαι τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡγεμονικῷ νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν ἢ κάλλος ἢ αἶσχος συνιστάμενα καθάπερ ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ σώματι. ¹¹ καίτοι τοῦτό γ΄ ὑπέσχου πρότερον ὀρθῶς γινώσκων καὶ φυ λάττων τὴν ἔννοιαν ἁπάντων τῶν εἰρημένων͵ οὐ μὴν ἀκο λουθῆσαί γε μέχρι παντὸς ἠδυνήθης οὐδ΄ ἐξηγήσω τὴν ἀνα λογίαν τε καὶ ὁμοιότητα τῶν κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐγγιγνομένων τοῖς κατὰ τὸ σῶμα.

I shall once more review the argument, so that it may now be ¹² brought to an adequate conclusion. Chrysippus in his first (book) On the Affections confused the notion of disease by saying that disease in the soul is analogous to the physical state in which the body is prone to fevers or diarrhoea or something of the kind. In his Therapy ¹³ (of the Affections), however, he preserved the notion of disease, taking no notice of the self-contradiction; but he was utterly unable to fulfil the promise he had made to account for disease in the soul or for the other things which he said were analogous in soul and body. And at the same time he confused the health of the soul with its beauty. For ¹⁴ he distinguished them accurately in the case of the body, placing health in the proportion of the elements, and beauty in the proportion of the members. He showed this clearly in the passage that I quoted ¹⁵ a short time ago, in which he says that health of body is proportion in things that are hot, cold, dry, and wet, which are obviously elements of bodies; but he believes that beauty does not lie in the proportion of the elements but of the members: of finger, obviously, to finger, of all the fingers to palm and wrist, of these to forearm, of forearm to upper arm, and of all to all, as is written in Polycleitus’ Canon. Polycleitus first gave us full information in that book about all the ¹⁶ proportions of the body, then he confirmed his account in action by fashioning a statue in accordance with the demands of the theory; and he gave to the statue, as he did to the treatise, the name Canon. All physicians and philosophers place beauty of body in the proportion ¹⁷ of the members, and health in the proportion of the elements, whatever they may be, to each other. If living bodies are formed from solid ¹⁸ masses and the passages between them, as Asclepiades supposed, health is the proportion of these; or if from Epicurus’ atoms, or Anaxagoras’ homoeomeries, or from hot, cold, dry, and wet, as Chrysippus and all the Stoics teach, and Aristotle and Theophrastus before them, and Plato and Hippo crates even earlier, for all these men the proportion of the elements produces health. Now ¹⁹ if a person should wish to preserve, as Chrysippus promised, the entire analogy between the body’s affairs and those of the soul, he must show that the soul as a whole is composed of certain simple elements, so to speak, so that he may discover its health and its disease in their mutual proportion, as Plato did. But Chrysippus, in spite ²⁰ of his promise, could give an account neither of this similarity nor of the similarity in the soul’s beauty, but he confused its beauty with its health. He said that the soul becomes beautiful or ugly in terms of the ²¹ divisions proper to reason, but he neglected to say how it could become well or ill; for it is my opinion that he confused the two and was unable to make any precise or definite statement about them, such as Plato made in a number of places, notably in the Sophist, where he stated that the conflict of the soul’s parts with each other is disease of the soul, while its disordered and immoderate movements, that is, conative acts, are ugliness, just as he field that the harmony and mutual proportion of its parts is health, but proportion in its movements is beauty. For as a beautiful body has its origin in the ²² proportion of the members, so a beautiful act arises through the proportion of the particular movements. Thus some persons are said to ²³ dance, perform the pancration, wrestle, and walk gracefully and beautifully, others with awkwardness and ugliness. For beauty of actions is recognized in the proportion of the particular movements, and ugliness in their Jack of proportion.

¹² αὖθις οὖν ἀναλήψομαι τὸν λόγον ἵνα δή τι πέρας ἱκανὸν νῦν ἀπολάβῃ. τῆς νόσου τὴν ἔννοιαν ἐν μὲν τῷ πρώτῳ περὶ παθῶν συνέχεεν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἀνά λογον ἔχειν φάμενος τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νόσον τῇ τοῦ σώματος καταστάσει͵ καθ΄ ἣν εὐεμπτώτως εἰς πυρετοὺς ἢ διαρροίας ¹³ ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἔχει· κατὰ μέντοι τὸ θεραπευτικὸν ἐφυλάξατο μὲν τὴν ἔννοιαν τῆς νόσου τῆς πρὸς ἑαυτὸν οὐδὲν φροντίσας ἐναντιολογίας͵ ἐξηγήσασθαι δ΄ ὡς ὑπέσχετο τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νόσον ἅμα τοῖς ἄλλοις οἷς ἀνάλογον ὑπάρχειν αὐτῇ φησι πρὸς τὸ σῶμα παντάπασιν ἠδυνάτησε͵ μετὰ τοῦ καὶ συγχεῖν εἰς ταὐτὸν τήν θ΄ ὑγίειαν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὸ κάλλος. ¹⁴ ἐπὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ σώματος ἀκριβῶς αὐτὰ διωρίσατο τὴν μὲν ὑγίειαν ἐν τῇ τῶν στοιχείων συμμετρίᾳ θέμενος͵ τὸ δὲ κάλλος ἐν τῇ ¹⁵ τῶν μορίων. ἐδήλωσε γὰρ σαφῶς τοῦτο διὰ τῆς προγεγραμ μένης ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν ῥήσεως ἐν ᾗ τὴν μὲν ὑγίειαν τοῦ σώματος ἐν θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς καὶ ὑγροῖς συμμετρίαν εἶναί φησιν͵ ἅπερ δὴ στοιχεῖα δηλονότι τῶν σωμάτων ἐστί͵ τὸ δὲ κάλλος οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῶν στοιχείων ἀλλ΄ ἐν τῇ τῶν μορίων συμμετρίᾳ συνίστασθαι νομίζει͵ δακτύλου πρὸς δάκτυλον δηλονότι καὶ συμπάντων αὐτῶν πρός τε μετακάρπιον καὶ καρπὸν καὶ τούτων πρὸς πῆχυν καὶ πήχεως πρὸς βραχίονα καὶ πάντων πρὸς πάντα͵ καθάπερ ἐν τῷ ¹⁶ Πολυκλείτου κανόνι γέγραπται. πάσας γὰρ ἐκδιδάξας ἡμᾶς ἐν ἐκείνῳ τῷ συγγράμματι τὰς συμμετρίας τοῦ σώματος ὁ Πολύκλειτος ἔργῳ τὸν λόγον ἐβεβαίωσε δημιουργήσας ἀν δριάντα κατὰ τὰ τοῦ λόγου προστάγματα καὶ καλέσας δὴ καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν ἀνδριάντα͵ καθάπερ καὶ τὸ σύγγραμμα͵ κανόνα. ¹⁷ τὸ μὲν δὴ κάλλος τοῦ σώματος ἐν τῇ τῶν μορίων συμμετρίᾳ κατὰ πάντας ἰατροὺς καὶ φιλοσόφους ἐστίν͵ ἡ δ΄ ὑγίεια τῶν στοιχείων αὖ πάλιν͵ ἅττα ποτ΄ ἂν ᾖ͵ πρὸς ἄλληλά ἐστι ¹⁸ συμμετρία. εἴτε γὰρ ἐξ ὄγκων καὶ πόρων ὡς Ἀσκληπιάδης ὑπέθετο τὰ τῶν ζῴων σύγκειται σώματα͵ συμμετρία τούτων ἐστὶν ἡ ὑγίεια· εἴτ΄ ἐξ ἀτόμων ὡς Ἐπίκουρος εἴτ΄ ἐξ ὁμοιομερῶν ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας εἴτ΄ ἐκ θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ καὶ ὑγροῦ καθάπερ ὅ τε Χρύσιππος δοξάζει καὶ πάν τες οἱ Στωϊκοὶ καὶ πρὸ αὐτῶν Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ Θεόφραστος καὶ πρὸ τούτων ἔτι Πλάτων καὶ Ἱπποκράτης͵ ἡ τῶν στοι χείων κατὰ πάντας συμμετρία τὴν ὑγίειαν ἐργάζεται. ¹⁹ εἰ τοί νυν ἐθέλοι τις ἅπασαν τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῶν κατὰ τὸ σῶμα τοῖς κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν διασώζειν͵ ὡς ὑπέσχετο Χρύσιππος͵ ἐπιδεῖξαι χρὴ τοῦτον ἔκ τινων ἁπλῶν ὡσανεὶ στοιχείων συγ κειμένην τὴν ὅλην ψυχὴν ἵνα ἐν τῇ τούτων πρὸς ἄλληλα συμμετρίᾳ τὴν ὑγίειαν καὶ τὴν νόσον αὐτῆς εὕρῃ γιγνομένην͵ ²⁰ ὅπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐποίησε. Χρύσιππος δ΄ οὔτε ταύτην ἠδυνήθη τὴν ὁμοιότητα διδάξαι καίτοι ὑποσχόμενος οὔτε τὴν τοῦ κάλλους τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ἀλλὰ εἰς ταὐτὸν συνέχεεν ὑγιείᾳ τὸ κάλλος. ²¹ κατὰ γὰρ τοὺς οἰκείους τοῦ λόγου μερισμοὺς καλὴν ἢ αἰσχρὰν ἔφησε γίγνεσθαι ψυχήν͵ ὑγιαίνουσα δ΄ ἢ νοσοῦσα πῶς ἂν γένοιτο παρέλιπεν εἰς ταὐτόν͵ οἶμαι͵ συγχέων ἄμφω καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος ἀκριβῶς τε καὶ ὡρισμένως ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν ἀποφή νασθαι͵ καθάπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἐποίησεν ἐν ἄλλοις τέ τισι καὶ τῷ Σοφιστῇ͵ τὴν μὲν τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα στάσιν ἀποφηνάμενος εἶναι νόσον ψυχῆς͵ τὰς δὲ παραφόρους τε καὶ ἀμέτρους κινήσεις αὐτῆς͵ τουτέστι τὰς ἐνεργείας τὰς καθ΄ ὁρμήν͵ αἶσχος͵ ὥσπερ γε τὴν μὲν συμφωνίαν τε καὶ συμμετρίαν πρὸς ἄλληλα τῶν μορίων αὐτῆς ὑγίειαν͵ τὴν δὲ συμμετρίαν τῶν κινήσεων [τὸ] κάλλος. ²² ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ σῶμα τὸ καλὸν ἐν τῇ συμμετρίᾳ τῶν μορίων τὴν γένεσιν ἴσχει͵ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐνέργεια καλὴ διὰ τὴν τῶν κατὰ μέρος ²³ κινήσεων γίγνεται συμμετρίαν. οὕτω γοῦν καὶ ὀρχεῖσθαι καὶ παγκρατιάζειν καὶ παλαίειν καὶ βαδίζειν εὐσχημόνως καὶ καλῶς λέγονταί τινες͵ ἕτεροι δ΄ ἀσχημόνως τε καὶ αἰσχρῶς. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τῇ συμμετρίᾳ τῶν κατὰ μέρος κινήσεων τὸ κάλλος τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐστι γνώριμον͵ κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀμετρίας τὸ αἶσχος.

The passages from Plato’ s Sophist are as follows: “We must say ²⁴ that there are two forms of evil in the soul. — What forms (are they)? — One is like a disease infecting the body, the other like ugliness. — I do not understand. — Perhaps you have not considered that disease and internal conflict are the same thing? — I do not know what I should answer to that, either. — Do you believe internal conflict to be anything ²⁵ but the destruction of what is by nature congenial as a result of some dissension? — It is nothing but that. — And is ugliness anything other than the class of disproportion, which is everywhere unsightly? — No; it is nothing else.” Thus P¹ at o instructs us in universal terms ²⁶ about disease and ugliness, describing the nature of each. Next he tells us how they enter the soul. He says of disease: “Answer me this: have ²⁷ we not seen opinions at odds with desires, anger with pleasures, reason with distress, and all of these with all the others, in the souls of worth­less persons? — Yes, indeed. — But surely all these things are necessarily akin? — Of course. — Then we shall be correct when we speak of baseness as an internal conflict and disease of the soul.” Then he goes ²⁸ on to explain how ugliness arises in the soul: “But what of those parts of the soul that have a share in motion and having set a goal for themselves try to reach it but at every attempt swerve to the side and miss it? Shall we say that they fail because they are in mutual proportion, or, on the contrary, because of a lack of proportion? — Clearly because of a lack of proportion. — But we know that all ignorance in every soul is involuntary. — Quite so. — And when a soul aims at the ²⁹ truth and misses the way that leads to understanding, its ignorance is nothing other than misunderstanding. — That is very true. — Therefore we must set it down that the unintelligent soul is ugly and lacks proportion.” Thus in the Sophist Plato spoke of health and beauty, ³⁰ ugliness and disease in both universal and particular terms; he gave a universal description of the concept of them, and a particular account of the way in which they arise in the soul.

²⁴ ἔχουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥήσεις ἐκ τοῦ Σοφιστοῦ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· δύο μὲν εἴδη κακίας περὶ ψυχῆς ῥητέον. ποῖα; τὸ μὲν οἷον νόσον ἐν σώματι͵ τὸ δ΄ οἷον αἶσχος ἐγγιγνόμενον. οὐκ ἔμαθον. νόσον ἴσως καὶ στάσιν οὐ ταὐτὸν νενόμι κας; οὐδ΄ αὖ πρὸς τοῦτο ἔχω τί χρή με ἀποκρίνασθαι. ²⁵ πότερον ἄλλο τι στάσιν ἡγούμενος ἢ τὴν τοῦ φύσει συγγενοῦς ἔκ τινος διαφορᾶς διαφθοράν; οὐδέν. ἀλλ΄ αἶσχος ἄλλο τι πλὴν τὸ τῆς ἀμετρίας πανταχοῦ δυσει δὲς ὂν γένος; οὐδαμῶς ἄλλο. ²⁶ οὕτως μὲν ἐν τῷ κα θόλου περὶ νόσου τε καὶ αἴσχους ὁποῖόν τι τὴν φύσιν ἑκά τερον αὐτῶν ἐστιν ἐδίδαξεν ἡμᾶς ὁ Πλάτων. καὶ ὅπως ἐγγί γνονται ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐφεξῆς διδάσκων͵ περὶ μὲν τῆς νόσου ²⁷ ταῦτα γράφει· τί δέ; ἐν ψυχῇ δόξας ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ θυμὸν ἡδοναῖς καὶ λόγον λύπαις καὶ πάντα ἀλλήλοις ταῦτα τῶν φλαύρως ἐχόντων οὐκ ᾐσθήμεθα διαφερόμενα; καὶ σφόδρα γε. ξυγγενῆ γε μὴν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ξύμπαντα γέγονε. πῶς γὰρ οὔ; στάσιν ἄρα καὶ νόσον τῆς ψυχῆς πονηρίαν λέγοντες ὀρθῶς ἐροῦμεν. ²⁸ εἶτ΄ ἐφεξῆς ὅπως αἶσχος ἐγγίνεται ψυχαῖς διεξιών φησι· τί δ΄; ὅσα κινήσεως μετέχοντα καὶ σκοπόν τινα θέμενα πειρώμενα τούτου τυγχάνειν καθ΄ ἑκάστην ὁρμὴν παράφορα αὐτοῦ γίγνεται καὶ ἀποτυγχάνει͵ πότερον αὐτὰ φήσομεν ὑπὸ συμ μετρίας τῆς πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ τοὐναντίον ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας αὐτὰ πάσχειν; δῆλον ὡς ὑπὸ ἀμετρίας. ἀλλὰ μὴν ψυχήν γε ἴσμεν ἄκουσαν πᾶσαν πᾶν ἀγνοοῦσαν. σφόδρα γε. ²⁹ τό γε μὴν ἀγνοεῖν ἐστιν ἐπ΄ ἀλήθειαν ὁρμωμένης ψυχῆς παραφόρου συνέσεως γιγνομένης οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ παραφροσύνη. πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ³⁰ ψυχὴν ἄρ΄ ἀνόητον αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἄμετρον θετέον. οὕτω μὲν ἐν τῷ Σοφιστῇ Πλάτων ἀπεφήνατο καὶ καθόλου καὶ κατὰ μέρος ὑπὲρ ὑγιείας τε καὶ κάλλους͵ αἴσχους τε καὶ νόσου͵ καθόλου μὲν ὑπογράψας τὴν ἔννοιαν αὐτῶν͵ κατὰ μέρος δὲ ὅπως ἐγγίγνεται ταῖς ψυχαῖς διδάξας.

This is not the proper occasion, I think, to cite the other passages, ³¹ no few in number in many of his writings, in which he spoke of health and beauty, ugliness and disease. But when our account has come to health and diseases, when we show that P] ato had the same views about them as Hippo crates, I shall there discuss such passages at length.

³¹ τὰς δ΄ ἄλλας αὐτοῦ ῥήσεις οὐκ ὀλίγας οὔσας ἐν πολλοῖς τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐν οἷς ὑπὲρ ὑγιείας τε καὶ κάλλους αἴσχους τε καὶ νόσου διῆλ θεν οὔ μοι δοκεῖ νῦν εἶναι παρατίθεσθαι καιρός· ἀλλ΄ ἐπειδὰν ὑπὲρ ὑγιείας τε καὶ νόσων ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν περαίνηται δεικνύουσιν ὡσαύτως Ἱπποκράτει τὸν Πλάτωνα γιγνώσκειν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν͵ ἐπὶ πλέον ἐν ἐκείνοις τῶν τοιούτων μνημονεύσω ῥήσεων.

4. For the present, since our purpose from the start has been neither to give simply an account of beauty or health or ugliness or diseases, nor to discuss those of the body only, but to deal with the affections of the soul, I shall omit the rest and consider only the matter before us. My purpose is to show that it is not in a single part of the ² soul nor by virtue of a single power of it that both judgments and affections oceur, as Chrysippus elaimed, but that the soul has both a plurality of powers of different kinds, and a plurality of parts. Posidonius and Aristotle grant that the powers of the soul are ³ three in number, and that by them we desire, feel anger, and reason; but that they are also spatially separate from each other, and that our soul not only contains many powers but is composed of parts that differ in kind and in substance, this is the doctrine of Hippocrates and Plato. I have said much about the truth of it throughout the ⁴ preceding discussion, and I shall have much to say in what follows.

4. Νυνὶ δέ͵ οὔτε γὰρ ἁπλῶς περὶ κάλλους ἢ ὑγιείας ἢ αἴσχους ἢ νοσημάτων ὁ λόγος οὔτε περὶ μόνων τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἡμῖν προὔκειτο͵ παραλείψω μὲν τἆλλα͵ τὸ προκείμενον δ΄ αὐτὸ ² μόνον ἀναλήψομαι. πρόκειται δὲ δεικνύειν ὡς οὔτε καθ΄ ἓν μόριον τῆς ψυχῆς οὔτε κατὰ μίαν αὐτῆς δύναμιν αἵ τε κρίσεις γίγνονται καὶ τὰ πάθη συνίσταται͵ καθάπερ ὁ Χρύ σιππος ἔφασκεν͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ δυνάμεις πλείους αὐτῆς εἰσιν ἑτε ρογενεῖς καὶ μόρια πλείω. ³ τὸ μὲν δὴ τὰς δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς τρεῖς εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν͵ αἷς ἐπιθυμοῦμέν τε καὶ θυμούμεθα καὶ λογιζόμεθα͵ καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ὁμολογεῖ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης· τὸ δὲ καὶ τοῖς τόποις αὐτὰς ἀλλήλων κεχωρίσθαι καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν μὴ μόνον ἔχειν ἐν ἑαυτῇ δυνάμεις πολλάς͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ σύνθετον ἐκ μορίων ὑπάρχειν ἑτερογενῶν τε καὶ δια φερόντων ταῖς οὐσίαις Ἱπποκράτους ἐστὶ καὶ Πλάτωνος δόγμα. ⁴ καί μοι πολλὰ μὲν ἤδη περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας αὐτοῦ διὰ τῶν ἔμπροσθεν εἴρηται͵ πολλὰ δ΄ ἐν τοῖς ἐφεξῆς εἰρήσεται.

I now return to Chrysippus , who refuses to grant that the ⁵ powers mentioned are in our soul and says that all activity and affection arise in the rational part alone; and he fails to teach us how to heal the affections when they occur or to prevent their occurrence. He contradicted himself in this matter, as he did in many others: in the first book of his work On the Soul he states that the soul has those powers that I mentioned in the preceding book, where I quoted his own words; but in his work On the Affections he asserts that the affections are certain judgments of the reasoning part of the soul. Now ⁷ in our opinion his true statements give no ordinary support to the teachings of Hippocrates and Plato, as they were spoken by a man who was not only intelligent but also eager to discredit the older view in every way. Testimony from such persons is ordinarily due to their being compelled by the truth to give it.

⁵ νυνὶ δ΄ ἐπὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον αὖθις ἐπάνειμι μήτε τὰς εἰρημένας δυνάμεις ὁμολογοῦντα κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν ἡμῶν ὑπάρχειν͵ ἀλλὰ πᾶσαν ἐνέργειάν τε καὶ πάθος ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ μόνῳ συνί στασθαι φάσκοντα͵ μήθ΄ ὅπως ἰᾶσθαι χρὴ τὰ πάθη γενόμενα μήθ΄ ὅπως κωλῦσαι γενέσθαι διδάσκοντα. ⁶ διηνέχθη μὲν οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτου πρὸς ἑαυτόν͵ ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ παμπόλ λων ἑτέρων͵ ἐν μὲν τῷ προτέρῳ περὶ ψυχῆς τιθέμενος εἶναι ταύτας δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς ἃς ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου γράμματι παραθέμενος αὐτοῦ τὰς ῥήσεις ἐπέδειξα͵ κατὰ δὲ τὰ περὶ τῶν παθῶν βιβλία κρίσεις τινὰς ὑπάρχειν τὰ πάθη τοῦ λογιστι ⁷ κοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος. ἀλλ΄ ἡμεῖς ἃ μὲν ἀληθῶς εἶπε μαρτύρια τῶν Ἱπποκράτους τε καὶ Πλάτωνος δογμάτων οὐ τὰ τυχόντα νομίζομεν ὑπάρχειν͵ εἰρημένα γε πρὸς ἀνδρὸς οὐ συνετοῦ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ σπεύδοντος ἅπαντι τρόπῳ τὸ παλαιὸν δόγμα διαβαλεῖν. ἡ γὰρ παρὰ τῶν τοιούτων μαρτυ ρία καταναγκαζομένων ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας εἴωθε γίγνεσθαι.

When we turn to other things that Chrysippus wrote on the ⁸ subject now before us, we shall show how some of these too are in disagreement with his own statements, some again are in conflict with evident facts, and some are faulty on both counts. Returning ⁹ first to the view that was under discussion at the end of the preceding section, that the soul’s health and disease, ugliness and beauty, are in its parts, and that its parts are notions and conceptions, I shall grant him this for the moment; for I said earlier that one must never count disease or health as activities, but only ugliness or beauty. But I shall ¹⁰ now try to show that even if we grant this, his next statement, at any rate, is not correct. For if the origin of affections is in the conflict between two judgments, it is necessary either that one of these two judgments is true and the other false, or that both are false — if you will grant this latter point, for it involves a question of logic. But ¹¹ whether we assert that both are false or that one of them is true, in no case will the conflict of judgments be the affection. If the judgments ¹² should be of more or less equal credibility, we must withhold decision about the truth of the matter, but if one of them should appear far more convincing, we must assent to it and perform some act in accordance with our assent, not, however, without circumspection : for example, one who thinks that pleasure is good may nevertheless have some minor thing that draws him toward the opposite view, or the person who makes the supposition that only the honorable is good may himself have yet another supposition that pulls against his trusting it earnestly; or someone may, like Pyrrho, assign equal value to both and withhold his decision about assertion and assent. In none of these ¹³ situations does affection arise, as Chrysippus himself made quite clear in the passages that I quoted in the preceding book, where he says that affection does not arise “if he is carried away by error and ¹⁴ from a misapprehension of something that is in accord with reason”, and the other things of this kind that he added in his account; it arises rather when conation becomes disobedient to reason. So here again Chrysippus is discovered contradicting himself, since he first separated affection from mistaken judgments and then said that the diseases and affections of the soul arise when judgments are in mutual disagreement. Let us no longer marvel, then, that Plato described correctly ¹⁵ the cure of the affections, as Posidonius also testifies, and Chrysippus incorrectly. For a man who lacked the courage to state all the ¹⁶ causes of the affections, and who confessed to being perplexed about the most important causes, as I pointed out in the preceding book, and in those places where he had the courage to speak stated nothing well, that man, I believe, would not be able to find the proper treatment for Chem. But as I have already said, if one were to write an ¹⁷ answer to Chrysippus’ four Books, many more volumes would be needed.

⁸ μεταβάντες δὲ πάλιν ἐφ΄ ἕτερα τῶν ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ γεγραμμένων εἰς τὸ προκείμενον ἐπιδείξομεν ὅπως καὶ τούτων ἔνια μὲν οἷς αὐτὸς εἶπεν οὐ συμφωνεῖ͵ ἔνια δ΄ αὖ τοῖς ἐναργέσι μάχε ⁹ ται͵ τινὰ δὲ κατ΄ ἄμφω πεπλημμέληται. καὶ πρῶτόν γε πάλιν ἀναλαβὼν εἰς ὅπερ ἐτελεύτησεν ὁ προγεγραμμένος μοι λό γος͵ ὡς ὑγίεια καὶ νόσος αἶσχός τε καὶ κάλλος ψυχῆς ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι γίγνεται αὐτῆς καὶ ὡς τὰ μέρη ταῦτα ἔννοιαί τε καὶ προλήψεις εἰσί͵ συγχωρήσω μὲν αὐτῷ τήν γε πρώτην· ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ὅλως οὐ χρὴ κατὰ τὰς ἐνεργείας τίθεσθαι νόσον ἢ ὑγίειαν ἀλλ΄ αἶσχος ἢ κάλλος μόνον͵ εἴρηταί μοι πρόσθεν. ¹⁰ ὅτι δ΄ οὐδ΄ εἴ τις οὕτω συγχωρήσειε τὰ γοῦν ἑξῆς ὀρθῶς εἴρηται͵ νῦν ἐπιδεῖξαι πειράσομαι. εἴπερ γὰρ ἐν τῷ μάχεσθαι δύο κρίσεις ἀλλήλαις ἡ τῶν παθῶν ἐστι γένεσις͵ ἀνάγκη τῶν δύο τούτων κρίσεων ἤτοι τὴν ἑτέραν μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀληθῆ͵ τὴν ἑτέραν δὲ ψευδῆ͵ ἢ ἀμφοτέρας ψευδεῖς͵ εἴ τις καὶ τοῦτο συγχωρήσειεν͵ ἔχει γάρ τινα ζήτησιν λογικήν. ¹¹ εἴτε δὲ ἀμφο τέρας ψευδεῖς εἴτε τὴν ἑτέραν αὐτῶν ἀληθῆ φαίημεν ὑπάρ ¹² χειν͵ οὐδαμῶς ἡ μάχη τῶν κρίσεων ἔσται τὸ πάθος. ἀλλ΄ εἰ μὲν ἰσάζοιέν πως ἀλλήλαις αἱ κρίσεις ὡς πρὸς πίστιν͵ ἐπέχειν ἀναγκαῖον ἡμᾶς ἔσται περὶ τῆς τοῦ πράγματος ὑπάρ ξεως͵ εἰ δ΄ ἡ ἑτέρα φαίνοιτο μακρῷ πιστοτέρα͵ συγκατατίθε σθαι μὲν καὶ πράττειν γέ τι κατὰ τὴν συγκατάθεσιν͵ οὐκ ἀπερισκέπτως δέ͵ καθάπερ εἰ καί τις τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν οἰόμενος ὑπάρχειν ἔχοι τι βραχὺ περιέλκον εἰς τοὐναντίον ἢ εἰ μόνον τὸ καλὸν ἀγαθὸν ὑπολαμβάνων ὅμως ἔτι καὶ αὐτὸς ἀντισπῶσαν ἑτέραν ὑπόληψιν ἔχοι πρὸς τὸ μὴ διατετα μένως πιστεύειν ἢ εἰ καθάπερ ὁ Πύρρων͵ ἀμφοτέρας ὁμοτί μως τιθέμενος ἐπέχοι περὶ τῆς ἀποφάσεώς τε καὶ συγκαταθέ σεως. ¹³ ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων συνίσταται τὸ πάθος͵ ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐναργῶς ἐδήλωσε δι΄ ὧν ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου γράμματι παρεθέμην ῥήσεων͵ ἐν αἷς φησιν ¹⁴ οὐχὶ εἰ διημαρτημένως φέρεται καὶ παριδών τι κατὰ τὸν λόγον͵ ὅσα τ΄ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα προσέγραψε͵ συνίστασθαι τὸ πάθος͵ ἀλλ΄ ὅταν ἀπειθὴς ἡ ὁρμὴ γίγνηται τῷ λόγῳ͵ ὥστε κἀνταῦθα πάλιν ἐναντιολογίαν τινὰ εὑρίσκεσθαι τοῦ Χρυσίπ που πρὸς ἑαυτόν͵ εἴπερ ἀποχωρίσας τὸ πάθος τῶν διημαρ τημένων κρίσεων αὖθις ἐν τῇ τῶν κρίσεων πρὸς ἀλλήλας ἀνομολογίᾳ τά τε νοσήματα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ πάθη συνί στασθαι λέγει. ¹⁵ μὴ τοίνυν θαυμάζωμεν ἔτι μηδ΄ ὅτι τὰς θεραπείας τῶν παθῶν ὀρθῶς μὲν ὁ Πλάτων ἔγραψεν͵ ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος αὐτῷ μαρτυρεῖ͵ μοχθηρῶς δ΄ ὁ Χρύσιπ ¹⁶ πος. ὁ γὰρ μήτε πάσας τὰς αἰτίας τῶν παθῶν ἀποφήνασθαι τολμήσας͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐν ταῖς κυριωτάταις ἀπορεῖν ὁμολογήσας͵ ὡς ἐν τῷ πρὸ τούτου δέδεικται γράμματι͵ μήτ΄ ἐν αἷς ἐτόλμησεν εἰπεῖν τι καλῶς ἀποφηνάμενος͵ οὗτος οὐκ ἄν͵ οἶμαι͵ δύναιτο ¹⁷ τὴν θεραπείαν αὐτῶν ποιήσασθαι κατὰ τρόπον. ἀλλ΄ ὅπερ εἶπον ἤδη καὶ πρόσθεν͵ εἴ τις ἐξελέγχοι τὰ τέσσαρα τοῦ Χρυσίππου βιβλία͵ πολὺ πλεόνων αὐτῷ δεήσει συγγραμμάτων.

5. Let us therefore consider only those things that are most essential to the present treatise, and of these let us first present the matter of the governing Power in little children. We cannot say that ² their conations are supervised by reason, for they do not yet possess reason, or that they do not feel anger, distress and pleasure, or do not laugh and cry and experience countless other such affections. In fact, the affections are much more numerous and more intense in children than in adults. But these (facts) do not follow from the doctrines of ³ Chrysippus or from the view that there is no natural feeling of kinship with pleasure or alienation from pain. For all children rush untaught toward pleasures and turn and flee from pains.

5. Ὅσα τοίνυν ἀναγκαιότατα πρὸς τὴν προκειμένην ἡμῖν πραγματείαν ἐστί͵ ταῦτα ἐπέλθωμεν μόνα καὶ πρῶτόν γε αὐτῶν προχειρισώμεθα τὸ περὶ τῆς τῶν παιδίων διοικήσεως. ² οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ λόγου τὰς ὁρμὰς αὐτῶν ἐπιτροπεύεσθαι δυνα τὸν εἰπεῖν͵ οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσιν ἤδη τὸν λόγον͵ οὔθ΄ ὡς οὐ θυμοῦταί τε καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἥδεται καὶ γελᾷ καὶ κλαίει καὶ τοιαῦθ΄ ἕτερα πάθη πάσχει μυρία. πολὺ γὰρ δὴ καὶ πλείω καὶ σφοδρότερα τὰ πάθη τοῖς παιδίοις ἐστὶν ἢ τοῖς τελείοις. ³ οὐ μὴν ἀκολουθεῖ γε ταῦτα τοῖς Χρυσίππου δόγμασιν͵ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν εἶναι φύσει πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἀλλοτρίωσιν πρὸς πόνον. ᾄττει μὲν γὰρ ἀδιδάκτως ἅπαντα τὰ παιδία πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς͵ ἀποστρέφεται δὲ καὶ φεύγει τοὺς ⁴ πόνους.

And we see ⁴ them angry, kicking, biting, wanting to win and get the better of their own kind, as some animals do, when no prize is offered beyond victory itself. Such behavior as this is clearly observed in quail, cocks, ⁵ partridges, the ichneumon, the asp, the crocodile, and thousands of others. In the same way children also appear to feel a kinship with ⁶ pleasure and victory, and at some later time, as they grow older, they show that they have a certain natural kinship with what is right. Thus ⁷ they are ashamed of their errors as they grow older, they take pleasure in noble acts, they lay claim to justice and the other virtues, and they Perform many acts in accordance with their notions of these virtues; but earlier, when they were still small, they lived by their affections and took no notice of the commands of reason. Thus there are these ⁸ three things with which we feel a natural kinship, corresponding to each form of the soul’s parts: pleasure, through the desiderative (forrn); victory, through the spirited (form); and what is morally excellent, through the rational (form). E picurus saw only the kinship felt by the worst part of the soul, Chrysippus only that felt by the best, saying that we have a kinship only with what is morally excellent, which, he holds, is obviously also good. The ancient philosophers were the only ones who saw that we have a kinship with all three.

ὁρῶμεν δ΄ αὐτὰ καὶ θυμούμενα καὶ λακτίζοντα καὶ δάκνοντα καὶ νικᾶν ἐθέλοντα καὶ κρατεῖν τῶν τοιούτων͵ ὥσπερ ἔνια τῶν ζῴων͵ οὐδενὸς ἄθλου προβαλλομένου παρὰ ⁵ τὸ νικᾶν αὐτό. φαίνεται δ΄ ἐναργῶς τὸ τοιοῦτον ἐπ΄ ὀρτύ γων καὶ ἀλεκτρυόνων καὶ περδίκων ἰχνεύμονός τε καὶ ἀσπί δος [τε] καὶ κροκοδείλου καὶ μυρίων ἑτέρων. ⁶ οὕτως οὖν οἰκειοῦσθαι καὶ τὰ παιδία φαίνεται καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς νίκην͵ ὥσπερ ὕστερόν ποτε δείκνυσιν͵ ἐπειδὰν προβαίνῃ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν͵ ὅτι πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἔχει τινὰ φυσικὴν οἰκείωσιν. ⁷ αἰδεῖται γοῦν ἁμαρτάνοντα προϊούσης αὐτοῖς τῆς ἡλικίας καὶ χαίρει τοῖς καλοῖς ἔργοις καὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν ἀντιποιεῖται καὶ πράττει πολλὰ κατὰ τὰς τῶν ἀρετῶν τούτων ἐννοίας͵ ἔμπροσθεν͵ ἡνίκα ἦν ἔτι σμικρά͵ κατὰ πάθος ζῶντα καὶ τῶν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου προσταγμάτων οὐδεμίαν φρον τίδα ποιούμενα. ⁸ τριῶν οὖν τούτων ἡμῖν οἰκειώσεων ὑπαρ χουσῶν φύσει καθ΄ ἕκαστον τῶν μορίων τῆς ψυχῆς εἶδος͵ πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἡδονὴν διὰ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν͵ πρὸς δὲ τὴν νίκην διὰ τὸ θυμοειδές͵ πρὸς δὲ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ λογι στικόν͵ Ἐπίκουρος μὲν τὴν τοῦ χειρίστου μορίου τῆς ψυχῆς οἰκείωσιν ἐθεάσατο μόνην͵ ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος τὴν τοῦ βελτίστου͵ φάμενος ἡμᾶς οἰκειοῦσθαι πρὸς μόνον τὸ καλόν͵ ὅπερ εἶναι δηλονότι καὶ ἀγαθόν. ἁπάσας δὲ τὰς τρεῖς οἰκειώσεις θεά σασθαι μόνοις τοῖς παλαιοῖς ὑπῆρξε φιλοσόφοις.

Since Chrysippus omitted two of them, it is not surprising that ⁹ he was perplexed about the origin of vice. He could not state its cause or the ways in which it comes to exist; and he could not discover how it is that children err. On all these points it was reasonable, I think, for Posidonius to censure and refute him. For if from the start children ¹⁰ felt a kinship with rnoral excellence, their misconduct could not arise internally or from themselves, but would necessarily come to them only from the outside. But even though they are brought up in good habits ii and are given the education that they ought to have, yet they are invariably observed doing something wrong ; and Chrysippus acknowledges this fact. To be sure, he could have ignored the obvious ¹² facts and have admitted only the conclusion that follows from his own suppositions; he could have claimed that if children are well trained they will surely become wise men in due time. But he did not venture ¹³ on this particular falsification of the facts; he granted that even if children were raised under the exclusive care of a philosopher and never saw or heard any example of vice, nevertheless they would not necessarily become philosophers. There are two causes (he says) of ¹⁴ their corruption; one arises in them from the conversation of the majority of men, the other from the very nature of the things (around them). I have objections to both of these causes, beginning with that which arises from associations (with men). It occurs to me to wonder ¹⁵ why it is that when they have seen and heard an example of vice, they do not Nate it and flee from it, since they feel no kinship with it; and I wonder all the more that they should be corrupted when they have neither seen nor heard such examples and are deceived by the very things themselves. What necessity is there that children be enticed by ¹⁶ pleasure as a good thing, when they feel no kinship with it, or that they avoid and flee from pain if they are not by nature also alienated from it? And what necessity is there that they be eager for praise and ¹⁷ honor and take delight in them, but are distressed by dispraise and disgrace and try to avoid them, if they do not feel some natural kinship and alienation relative to these things also? If Chrysippus ¹⁸ does not actually say so, yet his words seem to imply acceptance of the view that we feel a natural kinship and alienation relative to each of the things mentioned. For when he says that corruption arises in ¹⁹ inferior men in regard to good and evil because of the persuasiveness of appearances and the talk of men, we must ask him why it is that pleasure projects the persuasive appearance that it is good, and pain that it is evil. Similarly, when we hear the majority of men praise and ²⁰ glorify victory at ^{0 1} y mpi a and the erection of one’s statue as good things, and when we hear them speak of defeat and disgrace as evil, why is it that we are readily persuaded? Indeed, P o s i d o n i u s censures ²¹ (Chrysippus) on these points also, and he tries to show that the causes of all false suppositions arise in the theoretical sphere through ignorance, and in the practical through the pull of the affections, but that false opinions precede this pull, because the reasoning part has become weak in judgment. For conation (he says) is sometimes generated in the animal as a result of the judgment of the reasoning part, but often as a result of the movement of the affective part.

⁹ ἐάσας οὖν τὰς δύο ὁ Χρύσιππος εἰκότως ἀπορεῖ περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν κακίαν γενέσεως οὔτ΄ αἰτίαν ἔχων εἰπεῖν αὐτῆς οὔτε τρόπους τῆς συστάσεως οὔθ΄ ὅπως ἁμαρτάνει τὰ παιδία δυνά μενος ἐξευρεῖν͵ ἅπερ εὐλόγως οἶμαι πάντα καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώ ¹⁰ νιος αὐτοῦ καταμέμφεται καὶ ἐλέγχει. εἰ γὰρ δὴ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ᾠκείωται τὰ παιδία͵ τὴν κακίαν οὐκ ἔνδοθεν οὐδ΄ ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἀλλ΄ ἔξωθεν μόνον ἐχρῆν αὐτοῖς ἐγγίγνεσθαι. ¹¹ ἀλλὰ μὴν ὁρᾶταί γε͵ κἂν χρηστοῖς ἔθεσιν ἐν τρέφηται καὶ προσηκόντως παιδεύηται͵ πάντως ἐξαμαρτάνοντά ¹² τι͵ καὶ τοῦτ΄ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ Χρύσιππος ὁμολογεῖ. καίτοι γ΄ ἐνῆν αὐτῷ ὑπεριδόντι τῶν ἐναργῶς φαινομένων αὐτὸ μόνον ὁμολογῆσαι τὸ ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσιν ἀκόλουθον͵ εἰ καλῶς ἀχθείη τὰ παιδία͵ πάντως αὐτὰ φάσκοντι σοφοὺς ἄνδρας ¹³ γενήσεσθαι τοῦ χρόνου προϊόντος. ἀλλ΄ οὐκ ἐτόλμησε τοῦτό γε καταψεύσασθαι τῶν φαινομένων͵ ἀλλὰ κἂν ὑπὸ φιλοσόφῳ τρέφηται μόνῳ καὶ μηδὲν μήτε θεάσηται μήτ΄ ἀκούσῃ πώ ποτε παράδειγμα κακίας͵ ὅμως οὐκ ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτὰ φιλο σοφήσειν· ¹⁴ διττὴν γὰρ εἶναι τῆς διαστροφῆς τὴν αἰτίαν͵ ἑτέ ραν μὲν ἐκ κατηχήσεως τῶν πολλῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐγγιγνομένην͵ ἑτέραν δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς τῶν πραγμάτων τῆς φύσεως. ἐγὼ δὲ ὑπὲρ ἑκατέρας αὐτῶν ἀπορῶ καὶ πρώτης γε τῆς ἐκ τῶν πέλας ¹⁵ γιγνομένης. καὶ γὰρ διὰ τί θεασάμενα καὶ ἀκούσαντα παράδειγμα κακίας οὐχὶ μισεῖ τοῦτο καὶ φεύγει τῷ μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχειν πρὸς αὐτό͵ θαυμάζειν ἐπέρχεταί μοι͵ καὶ πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὰν μήτε θεασάμενα μήτ΄ ἀκούσαντα πρὸς αὐτῶν τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξαπατηθῇ. ¹⁶ τίς γὰρ ἀνάγκη τοὺς παῖδας ὑπὸ μὲν τῆς ἡδονῆς ὡς ἀγαθοῦ δελεάζεσθαι μηδεμίαν οἰκείωσιν ἔχοντας πρὸς αὐτήν͵ ἀποστρέφεσθαι δὲ καὶ φεύγειν τὸν πόνον εἴπερ μὴ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτον ἠλλοτρίωνται φύσει; ¹⁷ τίς δ΄ ἀνάγκη πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐπαίνους καὶ τὰς τιμὰς ἵεσθαί τε καὶ χαίρειν αὐτοῖς͵ ἄχθεσθαι δὲ καὶ φεύγειν τούς τε ψόγους καὶ τὰς ἀτιμίας͵ εἴπερ μὴ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα φύσει τινὰ ἔχουσιν οἰκείωσίν τε καὶ ἀλλοτρίωσιν; ¹⁸ εἰ γὰρ μὴ ταῖς φωναῖς͵ ἀλλὰ τῇ γε δυνάμει τῶν λεγομένων ὁμολογεῖν ἔοικεν ὁ Χρύσιππος ὡς ἔστιν οἰκείωσίς τέ τις ἡμῖν καὶ ἀλλοτρίωσις ¹⁹ φύσει πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐπειδὰν γὰρ λέγῃ τὰς περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν ἐγγίνεσθαι τοῖς φαύλοις διαστρο φὰς διά τε τὴν πιθανότητα τῶν φαντασιῶν καὶ τὴν κατήχη σιν͵ ἐρωτητέον αὐτὸν τὴν αἰτίαν δι΄ ἣν ἡδονὴ μὲν ὡς ἀγα θὸν ἀλγηδὼν δ΄ ὡς κακὸν πιθανὴν προβάλλουσι φαντασίαν. ²⁰ οὕτως δὲ καὶ διὰ τί τὴν μὲν νίκην τὴν [ἐν] Ὀλυμπίασιν καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνδριάντων ἀνάθεσιν ἐπαινούμενά τε καὶ μακαρι ζόμενα πρὸς τῶν πολλῶν ἀκούοντες ὡς ἀγαθά͵ περὶ δὲ τῆς ²¹ ἥττης τε καὶ τῆς ἀτιμίας ὡς κακῶν͵ ἑτοίμως πειθόμεθα; καὶ γὰρ καὶ ταῦθ΄ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος μέμφεται καὶ δεικνύναι πειρᾶ ται πασῶν τῶν ψευδῶν ὑπολήψεων τὰς αἰτίας ἐν μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ γίγνεσθαι δι΄ ἀμαθίας͵ ἐν δὲ τῷ πρακτικῷ διὰ τῆς παθητικῆς ὁλκῆς͵ προηγεῖσθαι δ΄ αὐτῆς τὰς ψευδεῖς δόξας ἀσθενήσαντος περὶ τὴν κρίσιν [τὴν] τοῦ λογιστικοῦ· γεννᾶσθαι γὰρ τῷ ζῴῳ τὴν ὁρμὴν ἐνίοτε μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κρίσει͵ πολλάκις δ΄ ἐπὶ τῇ κινήσει ²² τοῦ παθητικοῦ.

Posidonius plausibly attaches to this discussion the obser ²² vations of the physiognomist: men and animals that are broadchested and warmer are all by nature more given to anger, but those that have wide hips and are colder are more cowardly. And he says that in ²³ different localities men’s characters exhibit no small differences in cowardice and daring, in love of pleasure and of toil, the supposition being that the affective movements of the soul in every case follow the physical state, which is altered in no small degree by the inixture (of elements) in the environment. For even the blood in animals differs, ²⁴ he says, in warmth and coldness, thickness and thinness, and in many other properties, which Aristotle discussed at great length. We shall ²⁵ mention these properties at the appropriate time as the discussion proceeds, when we quote the actual passages from Hippocrates and Plato that deal with them. For the present my argument is with ²⁶ Chry sippus and his followers, who know nothing else that pertains to the affections, nor yet that each mixture in the body produces its own set of ‘affective motions’ — that is the name that Posidonius habitually gave them. But Aristotle comes straight out and calls all ²⁷ settled states of this kind in the souls of animals their ‘characters’, and he explains how they arise from different mixtures. For that reason, ²⁸ I suppose, the cure of the soul’s affections is in some persons agreeable and easy, since their affective motions are not strong and their reasoning part is not by nature weak and uncomprehending; instead it is ignorance and bad habits that compel such men to live under the sway of the affections. But in others the cure is difficult and disagreeable, when the affective motions, occurring of necessity because of the construction of the body, are great and violent, and the reasoning part is by nature weak and uncomprehending. For two things must be ²⁹ done: this latter part must acquire knowledge of the truth, and the affective movements must be blunted by habituation to good practices, if one is to point to an improvement in the man’s Character.

συνάπτει δ΄ εἰκότως τοῖς λόγοις τούτοις ὁ Πο σειδώνιος τὰ κατὰ τὸν φυσιογνώμονα φαινόμενα· καὶ γὰρ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὅσα μὲν εὐρύστερνά τε καὶ θερμότερα θυμικώτερα πάνθ΄ ὑπάρχειν φύσει͵ ὅσα δὲ πλα τυΐσχιά τε καὶ ψυχρότερα δειλότερα. ²³ καὶ κατὰ τὰς χώρας δὲ οὐ σμικρῷ τινι διενηνοχέναι τοῖς ἤθεσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους εἰς δειλίαν καὶ τόλμαν ἢ τὸ φιλήδονόν τε καὶ φιλόπονον͵ ὡς τῶν παθητικῶν κινήσεων τῆς ψυχῆς ἑπομένων ἀεὶ τῇ διαθέσει τοῦ σώματος͵ ἣν ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὸ περιέχον κράσεως ²⁴ οὐ κατ΄ ὀλίγον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι. καὶ γὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ αἷμα δια φέρειν ἐν τοῖς ζῴοις φησὶ θερμότητι καὶ ψυχρότητι καὶ πάχει καὶ λεπτότητι καὶ ἄλλαις [φησὶ] διαφοραῖς οὐκ ὀλίγαις͵ ὑπὲρ ὧν Ἀριστοτέλης ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διῆλθεν. ²⁵ ἡμεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὸν οἰκεῖον καιρὸν ἐπὶ προήκοντι τῷ λόγῳ μνημονεύσομεν αὐτῶν͵ ἡνίκα ἂν καὶ αὐτὰς τὰς Ἱπποκράτους τε καὶ Πλάτωνος ῥήσεις περὶ ²⁶ τούτων παραγράφωμεν. ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι πρὸς τοὺς περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὁ λόγος ἐνέστηκέ μοι μήτ΄ ἄλλο τι γιγνώσκον τας τῶν κατὰ τὰ πάθη μήθ΄ ὡς αἱ τοῦ σώματος κρά σεις οἰκείας ἑαυταῖς ἐργάζονται τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις· οὕτως γὰρ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὀνομάζειν εἴωθεν. ²⁷ Ἀριστοτέλης δ΄ ἄντικρυς ἤθη καλεῖ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάσας τὰς τοιαύτας τῆς ψυχῆς καταστάσεις ἐξηγεῖταί τε καθ΄ ὅντινα τρόπον ἐπὶ ταῖς δια ²⁸ φερούσαις κράσεσι συνίσταται. διόπερ͵ οἶμαι͵ καὶ ἡ τῶν παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἴασις ἐπ΄ ἐνίων μὲν εὔκολός τε καὶ ῥᾳδία διὰ τὸ μήτε τὰς παθητικὰς κινήσεις αὐτοῖς ἰσχυρὰς ὑπάρχειν μήτε τὸ λογιστικὸν ἀσθενὲς φύσει καὶ ἀσύνετον ἀλλὰ δι΄ ἀμαθίαν καὶ μοχθηροὺς ἐθισμοὺς ἐμπαθῶς ἀναγκάζεσθαι ζῆν τοὺς τοιούτους ἀνθρώπους͵ ἐνίοις δὲ χαλεπὴ καὶ δύσκολος ὅταν κινήσεις αἱ κατὰ πάθος αἱ διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κατα σκευὴν ἀναγκαίως γιγνόμεναι μεγάλαι δή τινες οὖσαι τύχωσι καὶ σφοδραὶ τό τε λογιστικὸν ἀσθενὲς καὶ ἀσύνετον φύσει. ²⁹ χρὴ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο μὲν ἐπιστήμην λαβεῖν τῶν ἀληθῶν καὶ τὰς κατὰ πάθος δὲ κινήσεις ἀμβλυνθῆναι χρηστοῖς ἐπιτηδεύ μασιν ἐθισθείσας εἴ τις μέλλοι βελτίονα τὸ ἦθος ἀποδείξειν τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

Thus from the start one should mold a human being with an eye ³⁰ to what is best, with forethought first of all for the very seed, then for the regimen that the pregnant mother will follow in food and drink, exercise and rest, sleep and waking, desire and anger, and the like, all of which Plato discussed with the greatest exactness. But ³¹ Chrysippus not only said nothing himself that was adequate; lie did not even leave to any of his followers a starting point for the investigation, as he rested his argument on a faulty foundation. Posidonius cen ³² sures him for this, while he admires What Plato said about the shaping of unborn children in the womb and about their rearing and training after birth; and in his first book On the Affections he wrote a kind of epitome of Plato’s remarks about children, how they must be reared and trained in order that the affective and irrational part of their soul may exhibit due measure in its motions and obedience to tlie commands of reason. “For this is the best training of children: preparation of the ³³ affective part of the soul in such a way that it may be most amenable to the rule of the rational part.” At first (he says) this (rational part) is ³⁴ small and weak, but it acquires size and strength at about the fourteenth year, which is tlie proper time for it to take control and to rule, as a kind of charioteer, the team of horses conjoined with it, namely, desire and anger, so long as they are not excessively strong or weak, sluggish or restive, or in general disobedient or disorderly or lawless, but ready to follow and obey reason in everything. The education and ³⁵ the virtue of the rational part itself (he says) is the knowledge of the nature of things, just as the education and virtue of the charioteer is the knowledge of the rules of chariotdriving, for knowledge does not arise in the irrational powers of the soul any more than it does in horses : the horses get their proper virtue from a kind of irrational habituation, the charioteers from rational instruction.

³⁰ οὕτω δὲ καὶ πλάττειν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄνθρωπον χρὴ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιστον ἁπάντων μὲν πρῶτον αὐτῶν τῶν σπερμάτων προνοουμένους͵ οἷς ἐφεξῆς τῆς διαίτης ἣν ἡ κυοῦσα διαιτήσεται κατά τε τὰς τροφὰς καὶ τὰ πόματα καὶ τὰ γυμνάσια καὶ τὰς ἡσυχίας καὶ τοὺς ὕπνους καὶ τὰς ἐγρη γόρσεις ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ θυμοὺς ὅσα τ΄ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα͵ περὶ ὧν ³¹ ἁπάντων ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἀκριβέστατα διῆλθεν. ὁ δὲ Χρύ σιππος οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς οὐδὲν ἱκνούμενον εἶπεν͵ ἀλλ΄ οὐδὲ τῶν ἀπ΄ αὐτοῦ τινι κατέλιπεν ἀφορμὴν εὑρέσεως μοχθηρὰν ὑποβαλλόμενος τῷ λόγῳ τὴν κρηπῖδα. ³² ταῦτά τοι καὶ ὁ Πο σειδώνιος αὐτῷ μέμφεται μετὰ τοῦ καὶ θαυμάζειν ὅσα Πλά των εἶπεν ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν παίδων ἔτι τε κυουμένων ἐν τῇ μήτρᾳ διαπλάσεως ἀποκυηθέντων τε τροφῆς καὶ παιδείας͵ καὶ γέγραφεν οἷον ἐπιτομήν τινα κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον αὐτοῦ περὶ παθῶν σύγγραμμα τῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένων͵ ὡς χρὴ τρέφεσθαι καὶ παιδεύεσθαι τοὺς παῖδας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὸ παθητικόν τε καὶ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς σύμμετρον ἀποφαίνεσθαι ταῖς κινήσεσι καὶ τοῖς τοῦ λόγου προστάγμασιν εὐπειθές. ³³ αὕτη γὰρ ἀρίστη παίδων παιδεία͵ παρασκευὴ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ὡς ἂν ἐπιτηδειοτάτη ᾖ πρὸς τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ³⁴ λογιστικοῦ. μικρὸν μὲν γὰρ τὰ πρῶτα καὶ ἀσθενὲς ὑπάρ χειν τοῦτο͵ μέγα δὲ καὶ ἰσχυρὸν ἀποτελεῖσθαι περὶ τὴν τεσσαρεσκαιδεκαέτην ἡλικίαν͵ ἡνίκα ἤδη κρατεῖν τε καὶ ἄρχειν αὐτῷ προσήκει καθάπερ ἡνιόχῳ τινὶ τοῦ ζεύγους τῶν συμ φύτων ἵππων ἐπιθυμίας τε καὶ θυμοῦ μήτ΄ ἰσχυρῶν ὑπαρ χόντων ἄγαν μήτε ἀσθενῶν μήτ΄ ὀκνηρῶν μήτ΄ ἐκφόρων μήτε δυσπειθῶν ὅλως ἢ ἀκόσμων ἢ ὑβριστῶν͵ ἀλλ΄ εἰς ἅπαν ἑτοίμων ἕπεσθαί τε καὶ πείθεσθαι τῷ λογισμῷ. ³⁵ τούτου δ΄ αὐτοῦ τὴν παιδείαν γε καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι τῆς τῶν ὄντων φύσεως͵ ὥσπερ τοῦ ἡνιόχου τῶν ἡνιοχικῶν θεωρη μάτων· ἐν γὰρ ταῖς ἀλόγοις τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεσιν ἐπιστήμας οὐκ ἐγγίγνεσθαι͵ καθάπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς ἵπποις͵ ἀλλὰ τούτοις μὲν τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν ἐξ ἐθισμοῦ τινος ἀλόγου παραγίγνε ³⁶ σθαι͵ τοῖς δ΄ ἡνιόχοις ἐκ διδασκαλίας λογικῆς.

The account of the virtues follows directly on this, and it too ³⁶ contains a double error, whether the supposition be that all the virtues are kinds of knowledge, or that all are powers. Of necessity the virtues ³⁷ of the irrational parts of the soul are irrational; that of the rational alone is rational. Therefore it is reasonable that the virtues of the other parts are powers, and knowledge is the virtue only of the rational part. Chrysippus, however, committed a major blunder, not in ³⁸ failing to make any virtue a power — that kind of error is of little consequence, and we are not attacking it — but in saying that there are many kinds of knowledge and many virtues, yet that the power of the soul is single. For it is impossible that a single power have many ³⁹ virtues, since it is impossible that a single thing have many perfect states. The perfect state of each thing that exists is single, and virtue is the perfect state of the nature of each, as lie bimself agrees. Ariston ⁴⁰ of Chios did better : he said that the soul does not have a plurality of virtues, but only one, which he called knowledge of things good and evil; and in his account of the affections he did not contradict his own presuppositions, as Chrysippus did.

ἕπεται δ΄ εὐθὺς τοῖσδε καὶ ὁ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγος͵ καὶ αὐτὸς ἔχων τὸ σφάλμα διττόν͵ εἴτε ἐπιστήμας τις ἁπάσας αὐτὰς εἴτε δυνάμεις ὑπολάβοι. ³⁷ τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγων τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν ἀλόγους ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἶναι͵ τοῦ λογιστικοῦ δὲ μόνου λογικήν. ὥστ΄ εὐλόγως ἐκείνων μὲν αἱ ἀρεταὶ δυνά ³⁸ μεις εἰσίν͵ ἐπιστήμη δὲ μόνου τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. Χρύσιππος δὲ μεγάλα σφάλλεται οὐχ ὅτι μηδεμίαν ἀρετὴν ἐποίησε δύνα μιν͵ οὐ γὰρ μέγα τὸ τοιοῦτον σφάλμα ἐστὶν οὐδὲ διαφερό μεθα πρὸς αὐτό͵ ἀλλ΄ ὅτι πολλὰς ἐπιστήμας τε καὶ ἀρετὰς ³⁹ εἶναι φήσας μίαν ἔφησεν εἶναι δύναμιν τῆς ψυχῆς. οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μιᾶς δυνάμεως ἀρετὰς εἶναι πολλάς͵ εἴ γε μηδὲ τελειότητας πολλὰς ἑνὸς πράγματος. μία γὰρ ἑκάστου τῶν ὄντων ἡ τελειότης͵ ἡ δ΄ ἀρετὴ τελειότης ἐστὶ τῆς ἑκάστου ⁴⁰ φύσεως͵ ὡς αὐτὸς ὁμολογεῖ. κάλλιον οὖν Ἀρίστων ὁ Χῖος οὔτε πολλὰς εἶναι τὰς ἀρετὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποφηνάμενος͵ ἀλλὰ μίαν ἣν ἐπιστήμην ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν εἶναί φησιν͵ οὔτε περὶ τῶν παθῶν ἐναντία ταῖς ἰδίαις ὑποθέσεσι γράψας͵ ὥσπερ ὁ Χρύσιππος.

6. We shall speak of the virtues at a later time, since on that sub­ject too Chrysippus scoffs at Plato. I have mentioned them here because of a kind of logical necessity, inasmuch as the doctrine of the virtues necessarily follows from the doctrine of the passions. Posidonius also says this; in the first (book) of his work On the Affections, not far from the beginning, he writes these very words: “For I believe ² that the examination of things good and evil, of ends and of virtues, depends on a genuine examination of the affections.”

6. Ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ἐροῦμεν͵ ἐπειδὴ καὶ περὶ τούτων ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐπηρεάζει τὸν Πλάτωνα. νυνὶ γὰρ ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τινὸς αὐτῶν ἐμνημόνευσα͵ τῷ περὶ τῶν παθῶν δόγματι καὶ τοῦ περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἑπο μένου͵ ὥσπερ καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιός φησιν ὧδέ πως γράφων αὐτοῖς ὀνόμασι κατὰ τὸ πρῶτον περὶ παθῶν οὐ μετὰ πολλὰ ² τῆς ἀρχῆς τοῦ βιβλίου· νομίζω γὰρ καὶ τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ τὴν περὶ τελῶν καὶ τὴν περὶ ἀρετῶν ἐκ τῆς περὶ παθῶν ὀρθῶς διασκέψεως ἠρτῆσθαι.

I think that I have given sufficient indication that correct opinion ³ about the virtues has been joined to correct opinion about the affections. To establish that this is true also of correct opinion about what is good and about the end, it is enough for me to quote the following words of Posidonius : “The cause of the affections, that is, of ⁴ discord and the unhappy life, is that men do not follow in everything the divinity in themselves which is akin and by nature similar to the divinity that rules the whole universe, but sometimes they turn aside in the company of that part of them which is inferior and beastlike and let it carry them along. Those who have failed to see this give no better ⁵ cause for the affections in those matters, nor do they have correct views in the matter of happiness and concord. For they do not see that what is of first importance in happiness is that one should not be led in anything by the irrational, unhappy and godless part of the soul.” In ⁰ this passage Posidonius clearly taught us the extent to which Chrysippus and his followers err, not only in their reasoning about the affections, but also about the end.

³ ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ὀρθῶς δόξαν ἐζεῦχθαι συμβέβηκε τῇ περὶ τῶν παθῶν͵ αὐτάρκως ἐνδεδεῖχθαί μοι δοκῶ· ὅτι δὲ καὶ τὴν περὶ ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ τοῦ τέλους͵ ἀρκεῖ μοι τὰ Ποσειδωνίου ⁴ παραγράψαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντα· τὸ δὴ τῶν παθῶν αἴτιον͵ τουτέστι τῆς τε ἀνομολογίας καὶ τοῦ κακοδαίμονος βίου͵ τὸ μὴ κατὰ πᾶν ἕπεσθαι τῷ ἐν αὑτῷ δαίμονι συγγε νεῖ τε ὄντι καὶ τὴν ὁμοίαν φύσιν ἔχοντι τῷ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον διοικοῦντι͵ τῷ δὲ χείρονι καὶ ζῳώδει ποτὲ συνεκκλί νοντας φέρεσθαι. ⁵ οἱ δὲ τοῦτο παριδόντες οὔτε ἐν τούτοις βελτιοῦσι τὴν αἰτίαν τῶν παθῶν οὔτ΄ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ὁμολογίας ὀρθοδοξοῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ βλέπουσιν ὅτι πρῶτόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τὸ κατὰ μηδὲν ἄγεσθαι ὑπὸ τοῦ ⁶ ἀλόγου τε καὶ κακοδαίμονος καὶ ἀθέου τῆς ψυχῆς. ἐν τού τοις φανερῶς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐδίδαξε πηλίκον ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον οὐ μόνον ἐν τοῖς περὶ τῶν παθῶν ⁷ λογισμοῖς͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τοῦ τέλους. ·

For the end is to ‘live in concord ⁷ with nature’, not ās they explain the phrase, but as Plat o taught (us). For as one part of the soul in us is better, another worse, the person ⁸ who follows the better (part) would be said to live in concord with nature, but the person who rather follows the worse (part), in discord. The latter person is one who lives by the affections; the former, one who lives by reason. But Posidonius, not content with this, makes a ⁹ more obvious and more forceful attack on Chrysippus and his school, charging that their explanation of the end is not correct. The passage to is as follows : “Some persons, neglecting there matters, reduce ‘living in concord’ to doing everything possible for the rake of the things that are ‘first by nature’, thereby taking an action that is similar to actually setting up pleasure or freedom from troubles or something else of that kind as the goal. But the very statement of their position contains an ¹¹ inconsistency, and it presents nothing that is noble or conducive to happiness. For those things necessarily follow on the end, but they are not the end. When this distinction has been properly made, it can ¹² be used for resolving the questions that the sophists pose ; but one cannot so use the view that the end is cliving in accord with one’s experience of the things that happen in accord with the whole nature’ — which is equivalent to saying, ‘live in concord when this does not tend unworthily toward hitting on differences’. “

οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἐκεῖνοι λέγουσιν ἀλλ΄ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων ἐδίδαξε͵ τὸ τῇ φύσει ζῆν ὁμο λογουμένως ἐστίν. ⁸ ὄντος γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν τοῦ μὲν βελτίονος τῆς ψυχῆς μέρους τοῦ δὲ χείρονος͵ ὁ μὲν τῷ βελτίονι συνεπό μενος ὁμολογουμένως ἂν λέγοιτο τῇ φύσει ζῆν͵ ὁ δὲ τῷ χείρονι μᾶλλον ἑπόμενος ἀνομολογουμένως ἔστι δ΄ οὗτος ⁹ μὲν ὁ κατὰ πάθος ζῶν͵ ἐκεῖνος δὲ ὁ κατὰ λόγον. οὐκ ἀρκεσθεὶς δὲ τούτοις ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐναργέστερόν τε καὶ σφοδρότερον καθάπτεται τῶν περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὡς οὐκ ὀρθῶς ἐξηγουμένων τὸ τέλος. ¹⁰ ἔχει δὲ ἡ ῥῆσις ὧδε· ἃ δὴ παρέντες ἔνιοι τὸ ὁμολογουμένως ζῆν συστέλλουσιν εἰς τὸ πᾶν τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ποιεῖν ἕνεκα τῶν πρώτων κατὰ φύσιν͵ ὅμοιον αὐτῷ ποιοῦντες τῷ σκοπὸν ἐκτίθεσθαι τὴν ἡδονὴν ¹¹ ἢ τὴν ἀοχλησίαν ἢ ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον. ἔστι δὲ μάχην ἐμ φαῖνον κατ΄ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐκφοράν͵ καλὸν δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονι κὸν οὐδέν· παρέπεται γὰρ κατὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον τῷ τέλει͵ τέλος δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν. ¹² ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτου διαληφθέντος ὀρθῶς͵ ἔξεστι μὲν αὐτῷ χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὸ διακόπτειν τὰς ἀπορίας ἃς οἱ σοφισταὶ προτείνουσι͵ μὴ μέντοι γε τῷ κατ΄ ἐμπειρίαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ὅλην φύσιν συμβαινόντων ζῆν͵ ὅπερ ἰσοδυνα μεῖ τῷ ὁμολογουμένως εἰπεῖν ζῆν ἡνίκα μὴ τοῦτο μικροπρεπῶς ¹³ συντείνει εἰς τὸ τῶν διαφορῶν τυγχάνειν.

Perhaps this quotation would be sufficient to indicate the absurd ¹³ ity of the things Chrysippus said about the end, as he explained how a person might succeed in living in cortcord with nature; but it is better, I think, to quote the passage that comes next in P osido  niu s ‘ work: “When the cause of the affections was seen, it removed ¹⁴ this absurdity; it showed the sources of distortion in what is to be sought and avoided; it distinguished the methods of training; and it cleared up the difficulties about the conation that arises from affection.” These are no small or chance benefits that he says we shall derive from ¹⁵ the discovery of the cause of the affections. Indeed, the discovery of the cause of the affections helped us to understand precisely what sort of thing it is to ‘live in concord with nature’. For the person who ¹⁶ lives by the affections does not live in concord with nature, and the person who does not live by the affections lives in concord with nature. The one follows the irrational and unstable part of the soul, the other the rational and divine. “And the discovery of the cause of the affec ¹⁷ tions taught (us) the sources of distortion in what is to be sought and avoided.” Some persons mistakenly suppose that what is suitable to ¹⁸ the irrational powers of the soul is suitable without qualification; they do not know that to experience pleasure and to rule over one’s neighbors are objects sought by the animallike part of the soul, but wisdom and all that is good and noble are objects sought by that (part) which is rational and divine. “And”, he says, “when the cause of the affec ¹⁹ tions was recognized it distinguished the methods of training.” We ²⁰ shall prescribe for some persons a regimen of rhythms and scales and exercises of such and such a sort, and for others another sort, as Plato taught us. We shall rear the dull and heavy and spiritless in highpitched rhythms and in scales that move the soul forcibly and in exercises of the same kind; and we shall rear those who are too highspirited and who rush about too madly in the opposite kind. Why was ²¹ it, in heaven’s name —I shall address this question alsoto Chrysippus’ followers — that when Damon the musician came upon a flute girl playing in the Phrygian mode to some young men who were overcome with wine and acting madly, he told her to play in the Dorian mode, and the youths immediately dropped their wild behavior? Obviously they are not taught anything by the music of the flute that ²² changes the opinions of their rational faculty; but since the affective part of the soul is irrational, they are aroused or calmed by means of irrational motions. For the irrational is helped and harmed by irrational things, the rational by knowledge and ignorance.

ἤρκει μὲν οὖν ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς ἀτοπίας ὧν ὁ Χρύσιππος εἴρηκε περὶ τοῦ τέλους ἐξηγούμενος ὅπως ἄν τις τυγχάνοι τοῦ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν· ἄμεινον μὴν ἡγοῦμαι καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἑξῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ Ποσειδωνίου γεγραμμένα ¹⁴ παραθέσθαι τόνδε τὸν τρόπον ἔχοντα· ταύτην τε δὴ τὴν ἀτοπίαν διέλυσεν ἡ αἰτία τῶν παθῶν ὁραθεῖσα καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἔδειξε τῆς ἐν τοῖς ὀρεκτοῖς καὶ φευκτοῖς διαστρο φῆς καὶ τοὺς τρόπους τῆς ἀσκήσεως διεῖλε καὶ τὰ διαπορού ¹⁵ μενα περὶ τῆς ἐκ πάθους ὁρμῆς ἐξέφηνεν. οὐ σμικρά γε οὐδὲ τὰ τυχόντα φησὶν ἡμᾶς ἀπολαύσειν ἀγαθὰ τῆς αἰτίας τῶν παθῶν εὑρεθείσης. εἰς γὰρ τὸ μαθεῖν ἀκριβῶς οἷόν τι τὸ ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει ζῆν ἐστιν͵ ἐκ τῆς τῶν παθῶν ¹⁶ αἰτίας εὑρεθείσης ὠφελήθημεν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ πάθος οὐχ ὁμολογουμένως ζῇ τῇ φύσει͵ ὁ δὲ μὴ κατὰ πάθος ὁμολογου μένως ζῇ τῇ φύσει. ἕπεται γὰρ ὁ μὲν τῷ ἀλόγῳ καὶ ἐμ ¹⁷ πλήκτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ὁ δὲ τῷ λογικῷ τε καὶ τῷ θείῳ. καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς δὲ τῆς ἐν τοῖς αἱρετοῖς τε καὶ φευκτοῖς διαστρο φῆς ἐδίδαξεν ἡ αἰτία τῶν παθῶν εὑρεθεῖσα. ¹⁸ τὰ γὰρ οἰκεῖα ταῖς ἀλόγοις δυνάμεσι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐξαπατώμενοί τινες ὡς ἁπλῶς οἰκεῖα δοξάζουσιν οὐκ εἰδότες ὡς τὸ μὲν ἥδεσθαί τε καὶ τὸ κρατεῖν τῶν πέλας τοῦ ζῳώδους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν ὀρεκτά͵ σοφία δὲ καὶ πᾶν ὅσον ἀγαθόν τε καὶ καλὸν ἅμα ¹⁹ τοῦ λογικοῦ τε καὶ θείου. καὶ τοὺς τρόπους δέ φησι τῆς ἀσκήσεως ἡ τῶν παθῶν αἰτία γνωρισθεῖσα διωρίσατο. ²⁰ τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοιοῖσδε ῥυθμοῖς ἅμα καὶ ἁρμονίαις καὶ ἐπιτη δεύμασι͵ τοὺς δὲ ἐν τοιοῖσδε διαιτᾶσθαι κελεύσομεν͵ ὥσπερ ὁ Πλάτων ἡμᾶς ἐδίδαξε͵ τοὺς μὲν ἀμβλεῖς καὶ νωθροὺς καὶ ἀθύμους ἔν τε τοῖς ὀρθίοις ῥυθμοῖς καὶ ταῖς κινούσαις ἰσχυρῶς τὴν ψυχὴν ἁρμονίαις καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις ἐπιτηδεύμασι τρέφοντες͵ τοὺς δὲ θυμικωτέρους καὶ μανικώτερον ᾄττοντας ἐν ταῖς ἐναντίαις. ²¹ ἐπεὶ διὰ τί πρὸς θεῶν͵ ἐρωτήσω γὰρ ἔτι τοῦτο τοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου͵ Δάμων ὁ μουσικὸς αὐλη τρίδι παραγενόμενος αὐλούσῃ τὸ Φρύγιον νεανίσκοις τισὶν οἰνωμένοις καὶ μανικὰ ἄττα διαπραττομένοις ἐκέλευσεν αὐλῆ σαι τὸ Δώριον͵ οἱ δ΄ εὐθὺς ἐπαύσαντο τῆς ἐμπλήκτου φορᾶς; ²² οὐ γὰρ δήπου τὰς δόξας τοῦ λογιστικοῦ μεταδιδάσκονται πρὸς τῶν αὐλημάτων͵ ἀλλὰ τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογον ὑπάρχον ἐπεγείρονταί τε καὶ πραΰνονται διὰ κινήσεων ἀλό γων. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἀλόγῳ διὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ἥ τε ὠφέλεια καὶ ἡ βλάβη͵ τῷ λογικῷ δὲ δι΄ ἐπιστήμης τε καὶ ἀμαθίας.

These too, then, are benefits that Posidonius says we derive ²³ from the knowledge of the cause of the affections; and in addition, he says, “it cleared up the difficulties about the conation that arises from affection.” Then he himself goes on to explain what these difficulties ²⁴ are, in the ,following way: “For I fancy that you have long observed how men do not experience fear or distress when they have been rationally persuaded that evil is present or is approaching, but they do so when they get an image of those same things. For how could you ²⁵ stir the irrational by means of reason, unless you place before it a picture, as it were, that resembles a picture perceived by the eye? Thus some persons fall victim to desire as a result of a verbal account, ²⁶ and when realistically ordered to flee the charging lion, even though they have not seen it they are afraid.” Posidonius’ statements here ²⁷ are correct, and also those that follow, as he explains all the causes of the difficulties encountered by Chrysippus, which I discussed at the end of the preceding book. I have decided therefore to conclude the present account now at this point, after quoting one more passage which comes next in his book and is as follows: “Indeed, persons who ²⁸ are progressing are not distressed at the thought that they are in the presence of great evils; for they are carried to this belief not by the irrational part of the soul, but by the rational.”

²³ καὶ ταῦτ΄ οὖν ἐκ τῆς τῶν παθῶν αἰτίας γνωσθείσης ὠφελεῖσθαί φησιν ἡμᾶς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος καὶ προσέτι τὰ διαπορούμενα ²⁴ φησί περὶ τῆς ἐκ πάθους ὁρμῆς ἐξέφηνεν. εἶτ΄ αὐτὸς ἅττα ποτ΄ αὐτά ἐστιν ἐπιφέρων ἐξηγεῖται τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· οἶμαι γὰρ ὅτι πάλαι βλέπετε πῶς διὰ λόγου μὲν πεισθέντες κακὸν ἑαυτοῖς παρεῖναι ἢ ἐπιφέρεσθαι οὔτε φοβοῦνται οὔτε λυποῦν ²⁵ ται͵ φαντασίας δ΄ ἐκείνων αὐτῶν λαμβάνοντες. πῶς γὰρ ἄν τις λόγῳ κινήσειε τὸ ἄλογον͵ ἐὰν μή τινα ἀναζωγράφη σιν προσβάληται αἰσθητῇ παραπλησίαν; ²⁶ οὕτως γοῦν ἐκ διη γήσεώς τινες εἰς ἐπιθυμίαν ἐκπίπτουσιν καὶ ἐναργῶς ἐγκε λευσαμένου φεύγειν τὸν ἐπιφερόμενον λέοντα οὐκ ἰδόν ²⁷ τες φοβοῦνται. ταῦτά τε οὖν εἴρηται καλῶς τῷ Ποσειδω νίῳ καὶ τὰ τούτων ἐφεξῆς ἔτι συμπάσας τὰς αἰτίας ἐξηγου μένῳ τῶν ἀπορηθέντων ὑπὸ τοῦ Χρυσίππου͵ περὶ ὧν κατὰ τὸ πρὸ τούτου γράμμα διῆλθον ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς· ὅθεν μοι δοκῶ καὶ νῦν ἐνταῦθα καταπαῦσαι τὸν λόγον μίαν ἔτι τὴν ἐφεξῆς αὐτοῦ παραγράψας ῥῆσιν ἔχουσαν ὧδε· ²⁸ καὶ μὴν οἱ προκόπτοντες μεγάλα κακὰ δοκοῦντες ἑαυτοῖς παρεῖναι οὐ λυποῦνται· φέρονται γὰρ οὐ κατὰ τὸ ἄλογον ²⁹ τῆς ψυχῆς οὕτως͵ ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ λογικόν.

He next explains why it is that affections after a time become ²⁹ quieter and weaker, a question that Chrysippus raised in the second book On the Affections and confessed he could not answer. I spoke of ³⁰ this at the end of the fourth book; I shall now review it briefly, giving a kind of summary of the Posidonian passage, which is long. For ³¹ one thing, the affective part of the soul gets its fill of its own desires in the lapse of time; and for another, the affective part is wearied by motions that continue over a long period. Therefore, when for both of these reasons it has become quiet and its movements are moderate, reason is now able to take control. It is as if some runaway horse carried off the rider by force, but then as it grows weary with running and has in addition fulfilled its desire, the man who holds the reins once more establishes control.

εἶτ΄ ἐφεξῆς οὗτος διὰ τί τὰ χρονίζοντα [τε] τῶν παθῶν ἡσυχέστερά τε καὶ ἀσθενέ στερα γίγνεται͵ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσιν ὑπὲρ ἧς ὁ Χρύσιππος ³⁰ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ περὶ παθῶν ἀπορεῖν ὡμολόγησεν. εἴρηται δὲ περὶ αὐτῆς ὑφ΄ ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τῇ τελευτῇ τοῦ τετάρτου καὶ νῦν δ΄ εἰρήσεται διὰ βραχέων οἷον ἐπιτομή τις τῆς Ποσει δωνίου ῥήσεως μακρᾶς ὑπαρχούσης. ³¹ τὸ τοίνυν παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ τοῦτο μὲν ἐμπίπλαται τῶν οἰκείων ἐπιθυμιῶν͵ τοῦτο δὲ κάμνει ταῖς πολυχρονίοις κινήσεσιν͵ ὥστε δι΄ ἄμφω καθησυχάσαντος αὐτοῦ καὶ μέτρια κινουμένου κρατεῖν ὁ λογισμὸς ἤδη δύναται͵ ὥσπερ εἰ καὶ ἵππου τινὸς ἐκφόρου τὸν ἐπιβάτην ἐξενεγκόντος βιαίως͵ εἶτα κάμνοντός τε ἅμα τῷ δρόμῳ καὶ προσέτι καὶ ἐμπλησθέντος ὧν ἐπεθύμη σεν αὖθις ὁ ἡνίοχος ἐγκρατὴς κατασταίη.

This is often observed to happen; and ³² trainers of young animals first permit them to weary themselves and take their fill of uncontrolled rnovement, and afterwards they take them in hand. About these matters, then, Chrysippus was per ³³ plexed, being unable to refer their causes to the affective part of the soul; and besides — Posidonius makes this point also in what follows      he disagrees not only with observed facts but also with Zeno and Cleant hes. Cle anthes ‘ opinion about the affective part ³⁴ of the soul is disclosed, he says, in these lines of verse:

³² φαίνεται γὰρ τοῦτο πολλάκις γιγνόμενον καὶ οἵ γε παιδεύοντες τὰ νέα τῶν ζῴων ἐπιτρέψαντες αὐτοῖς κάμνειν τε ἅμα καὶ ἐμπλησθῆναι κατὰ ³³ τὰς ἐκφόρους κινήσεις͵ ὕστερον ἐπιτίθενται. περί τε οὖν τῶν τοιούτων ἠπόρησεν ὁ Χρύσιππος ὡς ἂν οὐ δυνάμενος εἰς τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναφέρειν αὐτῶν τὰς αἰτίας͵ καὶ προσέτι͵ καὶ γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο δείκνυσιν ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ὁ Ποσει δώνιος͵ οὐ τοῖς φαινομένοις μόνοις ἀλλὰ καὶ Ζήνωνι καὶ ³⁴ Κλεάνθει διαφέρεται. τὴν μὲν οὖν τοῦ Κλεάνθους γνώμην ὑπὲρ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶνδε φαίνεσθαί φησι τῶν ἐπῶν·

“What, Anger, do you wish? Pray tell me that. ³⁵

³⁵  Τί ποτ΄ ἔσθ΄ ὃ βούλει͵ θυμέ; τοῦτό μοι φράσον. 

I, Reason? To do everything I wish.
Why that is royal; yet say it once again.
That all that I desire may come to pass.”

Ἐγώ͵ λογισμέ; πᾶν ὃ βούλομαι ποιεῖν.
βασιλικόν γε· πλὴν ὅμως εἶπον πάλιν.
Ὡς ἂν ἐπιθυμῶ͵ ταῦθ΄ ὅπως γενήσεται.

Posidonius says that this dialogue clearly reveals Cleanthes’ ³⁶ opinion about the affective part of the soul, since Cle ant hes portrayed reason talking to anger as two different things. Chrysippus, however, ³⁷ does not believe that the affective part of the soul is other than the rational, and he denies affections to the irrational animals, although they are obviously ruled by desire and anger, as Posidonius also explains more fully in his discussion of them.

³⁶ ταυτὶ τὰ ἀμοιβαῖα Κλεάνθους φησὶν εἶναι Ποσειδώνιος ἐναργῶς ἐνδεικνύμενα τὴν περὶ τοῦ παθητικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς γνώμην αὐτοῦ͵ εἴ γε δὴ πεποίηκε τὸν λογισμὸν τῷ θυμῷ διαλεγόμενον ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ. ³⁷ ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος οὔθ΄ ἕτερον εἶναι νομίζει τὸ παθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων ἀφαιρεῖται τὰ πάθη φανερῶς ἐπιθυμίᾳ τε καὶ θυμῷ διοικουμένων͵ ὡς καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὑπὲρ ³⁸ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ πλέον διεξέρχεται.

All animals, he says, that ³⁸ are not easily moved and are attached like plants to rocks or the like are ruled by desire alone; all other irrational animals make use of both powers, the desiderative and the spirited; and only man ernploys three, for he has acquired a rational principle also. Posidonius was correct ³⁹ in what he said about this and about much else in the whole of his treatise On the Affections. Just as Chrysippus, then, who erred in the very elements, one might say, of the theory about the affections, was necessarily mistaken on many points, so a person who has employed true principles, if he observes carefully what follows from them, would necessarily give an entirely correct account; and if he does not observe carefully, he would at least be correct in most things.

ὅσα μὲν οὖν τῶν ζῴων δυσκί νητά τ΄ ἐστὶ καὶ προσπεφυκότα δίκην φυτῶν πέτραις ἤ τισιν ἑτέροις τοιούτοις͵ ἐπιθυμίᾳ μόνῃ διοικεῖσθαι λέγει [αὐτά]͵ τὰ δ΄ ἄλλα τὰ ἄλογα σύμπαντα ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἀμφοτέραις χρῆσθαι͵ τῇ τ΄ ἐπιθυμητικῇ καὶ τῇ θυμοειδεῖ͵ τὸν ἄνθρωπον δὲ μόνον ταῖς τρισί͵ προσειληφέναι γὰρ καὶ τὴν λογιστικὴν ἀρχήν. ³⁹ ταῦτά τε οὖν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ καὶ ἄλλα πάμ πολλα καθ΄ ὅλην τὴν περὶ τῶν παθῶν πραγματείαν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Χρύσιππος ἐσφαλμένος ἐν αὐτοῖς͵ ὡς ἄν τις εἴποι͵ τοῖς στοιχείοις τῆς περὶ τῶν παθῶν θεωρίας ἐξ ἀνάγκης πάμπολλα κακῶς εἶπεν͵ οὕτως ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀληθέσι ταῖς ἀρχαῖς χρησάμενον εἰ μὲν ἀκριβῶς φυλάξειε τὸ πρὸς αὐτὰς ἀκόλουθον͵ ἅπαν εἰπεῖν ὀρθῶς͵ εἰ δ΄ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ἀλλὰ τά ⁴⁰ γε πλεῖστα κατορθῶσαι.

I have decided to end the present discussion at this point. An ⁴⁰ investigation at this time into Zeno’s position would not be in accord with the goal I set for myself at the start. For in order to avoid ex ⁴¹ cessive length I said I would pass over the other Stoics and examine only Chrysippus’ doctrines. I did not promise to review in this work the opinion of every philosopher on the soul, but only to inquire whether the teachings of Plato and Hippocrates are true. Therefore ⁴² I gave a refutation of Chrysippus, because my plan demanded it. As for Zeno, if the position he took was the same as that of Chrysippus, he will be liable to the same criticisms; if he followed Platon c principles, as Cleanthes and Posidonius did, he would accordingly be a partner in our philosophy; but if, as I believe, he thought that affections supervene on judgments, he would be intermecliate between the worst view of the matter — that of Chrysippus — and the best view, which Hippocrates and Plato were the very first to expound. Posidonius says that Pythagoras also field this view; he ⁴³ infers this from the writings of some of Pythagoras’ pupils, as no work of Pythagoras himself has been preserved up to our time. But as I said just now, my account did not claim that it would record the history of ancient doctrines, but only that it would investigate what was said by Hippocrates and Plato. And this is being accomplished ⁴⁴ to the best of my ability in the briefest possible form. One ought not look at the fact that the treatise fills many books, but credit this to the number and magnitude of the doctrines I am examining, and look into the matter and consider whether it would have been possible to speak more briefly of these same things without omitting some essential point. The answer rnay be got even from the very treatise of Chrysippus On the Affections: he wrote four books, so long that ⁴⁵ eaeh of them is double the length of mine; yet we took not quite two full (books) to examine directly his view of the affections, and we have also mentioned the comments that Posidonius made on that same treatise. So let there be an end to our refutation of Chrysippus. I ⁴⁶ believe that anyone who has listened attentively to my remarks would have no difficulty in discovering by himself the particular errors in the whole treatise; and if he has not listened attentively, he will not do so even if I should write still more.

δοκῶ μοι καταπαύσειν ἤδη τὸν ἐνεστῶτα λόγον ἐν τῷδε. τὸ γὰρ ἐπισκέπτεσθαι νῦν ὁποίας τινὸς ἔχεται γνώμης ὁ Ζήνων οὐ κατὰ τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἄν μοι ⁴¹ προτεθέντα γίγνοιτο σκοπόν. ἕνεκα γὰρ τοῦ μὴ μακρολογεῖν ἀποχωρήσειν μὲν ἔφην τῶν ἄλλων Στωϊκῶν͵ ἐξετάσειν δὲ μόνα τὰ Χρυσίππου. καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τί ποτε ἕκαστος ἐγίγνωσκε τῶν φιλοσόφων ὑπὲρ ψυχῆς ὑπεσχόμην ἐν τῇδε τῇ πραγμα τείᾳ διελθεῖν ἀλλ΄ ὅπως ἀληθείας ἔχει τὰ Πλάτωνός τε καὶ Ἱπποκράτους δόγματα διασκέψασθαι. ⁴² ὥστε καὶ τὰ πρὸς τὸν Χρύσιππον ἀντειρημένα μοι διὰ τὸ προκείμενον ἐγένετο͵ καὶ Ζήνων͵ εἰ μὲν τὰ αὐτὰ βούλοιτο Χρυσίππῳ͵ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν ὑπεύθυνος καθεστήξεται͵ εἰ δὲ ταῖς τοῦ Πλάτω νος ἀρχαῖς ἕποιτο Κλεάνθει τε καὶ Ποσειδωνίῳ παραπλησίως͵ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἂν οὕτω μετέχοι φιλοσοφίας͵ εἰ δ΄͵ ὅπερ ἐγὼ πείθομαι͵ κρίσεσιν ἐπιγίνεσθαι τὰ πάθη νομίζοι͵ μέσος ἂν εἴη τῆς τε χειρίστης ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν αἱρέσεως τῆς Χρυσίππου καὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ἣν Ἱπποκράτης τε καὶ Πλάτων ἁπάντων πρῶτοι μετεχειρίσαντο. ⁴³ Ποσειδώνιος δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν φησίν͵ αὐτοῦ μὲν τοῦ Πυθαγόρου συγγράμματος οὐδενὸς εἰς ἡμᾶς διασωζομένου τεκμαιρόμενος δ΄ ἐξ ὧν ἔνιοι τῶν μαθη τῶν αὐτοῦ γεγράφασιν. ἀλλ΄ ὅπερ εἶπον ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν͵ οὐχ ἱστορίαν δογμάτων παλαιῶν ὁ λόγος διδάξειν ἐπηγγείλατο μόνα δὲ τὰ πρὸς Ἱπποκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένα δια ⁴⁴ σκέψεσθαι. καί μοι τοῦτο καθ΄ ὅσον οἷός τ΄ ἦν περαίνε ται διὰ βραχυτάτων. οὐ γὰρ ὅτι πολύβιβλος ἡ πραγματεία χρὴ σκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν εἰς τὸ πλῆθός τε καὶ τὸ μέγε θος ὧν ἂν ἐπισκεπτώμεθα δογμάτων ἀναφέρειν͵ ἐξετάζειν δὲ καὶ σκοπεῖν εἰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐνεχώρει βραχύτερον εἰπεῖν ἄνευ τοῦ παραλιπεῖν τι τῶν ἀναγκαίων͵ ὡς τοῦτό γε καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν ὧν ἔγραψε Χρύσιππος περὶ παθῶν ἔνεστι καταμαθεῖν. ⁴⁵ τεττάρων γὰρ βιβλίων οὕτω μεγάλων αὐτῷ γεγραμμένων ὥσθ΄ ἕκαστον εἶναι διπλάσιον τῶν ἡμετέρων͵ ὅμως ἡμεῖς οὐδ΄ ἐν ὅλοις δύο τὴν περὶ τῶν παθῶν αὐτοῦ γνώμην ἐξητάκαμεν εὐθὺς καὶ τῶν τῷ Ποσειδωνίῳ γραφέντων εἰς τὴν αὐτὴν πραγματείαν ἐπιμνησθέντες. ⁴⁶ ἡ μὲν δὴ πρὸς Χρύ σιππον ἀντιλογία τέλος ἐχέτω. νομίζω γὰρ εἰ μέν τις προσ έσχε τὸν νοῦν τοῖς εἰρημένοις οὐκ ἂν χαλεπῶς αὐτὸν ἐξευ ρεῖν ὅσα κατὰ μέρος ἐν ὅλῃ τῇ πραγματείᾳ διημάρτηται͵ εἰ δέ τις οὐ προσέσχε τούτοις͵ οὐδ΄ ἂν ἔτι πλείω γράφηται͵ προσέξει.

7. I shall now pass to Plat o’ s proof in the fourth (book) of the Republic that the parts of the soul that move us by conation are three in number. Here again one must acknowledge that he does not give a ² necessary proof that they are parts, each differing from the others, for the argument is no more a proof that the three are powers than that they are parts. But that they are three in all, whether parts of the soul or powers, by which our Life is controlled, this he proves cogently and irrefutably. Therefore the things we are about to say will overthrow ³ the Chrysippean view and will establish the doctrine eommon to Aristotle, Plato, and Posidonius, that by one power we reason, by another we are angry, and by a third we desire. That they differ ⁴ also in their substances, and even more that they are stationed in different places, cannot be scientifically demonstrated from the statements now to be made; • but in the next book, which will be the sixth of the entire treatise, these things will be demonstrated from evident premises, in accord with the methods of Hippocrates and Plato.

7. Μεταβήσομαι δ΄ ἤδη πρὸς τὴν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένην ἐπίδειξιν ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὑπὲρ τοῦ τρία τῆς ² ψυχῆς εἶναι μόρια τὰ καθ΄ ὁρμὴν ἡμᾶς κινοῦντα. γινώσκειν δὲ χρὴ κἀνταῦθα τὸ μὲν ὅτι μόρια διαφέροντ΄ ἀλλήλων ἐστίν͵ οὐκ ἀναγκαστικῶς ἀποδεικνύμενον· οὐδὲ γὰρ μᾶλλον τρεῖς εἶναι δυνάμεις ἢ τρία μόρια δείκνυσιν ὁ λόγος· ὅτι μέντοι γε τρία τὰ σύμπαντ΄ ἐστὶν εἴτε μόρια ψυχῆς εἴτε δυνάμεις ὑφ΄ ὧν ὁ βίος ἡμῶν διοικεῖται͵ βιαστικῶς τε καὶ ἀναντιρρήτως ἀποδείκνυται. ³ ὥστε καὶ ἐκ τῶν νῦν λεχθησο μένων ἡ μὲν τοῦ Χρυσίππου διαβληθήσεται δόξα κατασκευα σθήσεται δὲ τὸ κοινὸν Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ποσει δωνίῳ δόγμα͵ τὸ καθ΄ ἑτέραν μὲν ἡμᾶς δύναμιν λογίζεσθαι͵ καθ΄ ἑτέραν δὲ θυμοῦσθαι͵ κατ΄ ἄλλην δ΄ ἐπιθυμεῖν. ⁴ ὅτι μέντοι καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις ἀλλήλων ταῦτα διαφέρει καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ὅτι κατὰ διαφέροντας ἵδρυται τόπους ἐκ μὲν τῶν νῦν λεχθησομένων ἐπιστημονικὴν ἀπόδειξιν οὐκ ἔνεστι λαβεῖν· ἐν δὲ τῷ μετὰ ταῦθ΄ ὑπομνήματι γραφησομένῳ μοι͵ τῆς ὅλης πραγματείας ἕκτῳ γενήσεσθαι μέλλοντι͵ δι΄ ἐναργῶν λημμάτων ἀποδειχθήσεται κατὰ τὰς Ἱπποκράτους τε καὶ Πλάτωνος ⁵ μεθόδους.

It must be recognized that Plato himself understood the force of ⁵ the proofs here to be presented. Thus as he was about to enter upon them, he first wrote the following words: “Be assured, dear Glau con, G that in my opinion we shall never get a precise understanding of the matter from the kind of methods we are now using in our discussion. Another longer and fuller way” exists which leads to the demonstration ⁷ that there are three parts of the soul, differing not only in their location in the body, but also in their substances, powers, and activities, as I shall show in the next book, where I shall also recount the actual way at which he is here hinting. Why he uses this proof, even ⁸ though he does not have full confidence in it, is clear, I believe, to anyone who has been attentive to what we said just now: the argument clearly proves that the powers controlling our life are three, but not that they differ in their substances. For Plat o’s purpose in the ⁹ Republic, where the concern is with justice and the other virtues, all of which he subsequently discusses, it was sufficient to prove that there are three powers different in kind. Thus Posidonius, who also ¹⁰ saw the matter in this light, parted company with Chrysippus and followed Aristotle and Plato to a greater extent. I have added the qualification ‘to a greater extent’, since on particular points the three men are found to have some disagreements about the difference in the virtues, but on the whole they agree. I shall also clarify this point ¹¹ later on, when I give my detailed account of the virtues. In the present (book) I shall now proceed with my account of the proofs that Plato gives in the fourth book of the Republic; I shall first quote the passage with which he begins the argument. It is as follows : “Obviously the ¹² same thing will not consent to do or undergo opposite things at the same time in the same respect and in relation to the same object.” Then, after having confirmed this and examined things apparently ¹³ inconsistent with it, he continues, “Well then, I said, what about assent as against dissent, seeking to obtain a thing as against refusing it, and drawing it to oneself as against pushing it away? Would you not put all such things in the Class of opposites to each other, whether they are things we do or things done to us? •For that will make no difference. — Yes, he said, in the Class of opposites. — Then, said I, ¹⁴ what about thirst and hunger and the desires generally, and also consenting and wishing? Would you not assign them all to one or another of those classes just now mentioned? For example, would you not say that in every case the soul of the person who desires a thing either seeks the thing it desires or draws to itself the thing it wishes to possess, or again, to the extent that it is willing that something be brought to it, does it not assent with a nod to itself as though (in answer) to a question, and yearn for the occurrence of the thing? — I would say so. —And what of not wishing and not consenting or desiring ? Shall we not ¹⁵ put them in the Class of repelling and rejecting from oneself, and all that is opposite to the former Class? — Of course.”

ἰστέον δ΄ ὅτι καὶ ὁ Πλάτων αὐτὸς ἐπί σταται τὴν δύναμιν τῶν λεχθησομένων ἀποδείξεων. ἄρχεσθαι γοῦν αὐτῶν μέλλων τάδε προὔγραψε· ⁶ καὶ εὖ γ΄ ἴσθι ὦ Γλαύκων ὡς ἡ ἐμὴ δόξα ἀκριβῶς μὲν τοῦτο ἐκ τοιούτων μεθόδων οἵαις δὴ νῦν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις χρώμεθα͵ οὐ μή ποτε ⁷ λάβωμεν· ἄλλη γὰρ μακροτέρα καὶ πλείων ὁδός ἐστι͵ δι΄ ἧς ἀποδείκνυται τρία τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν εἶναι τὰ μέρη οὐ μόνον τοῖς τόποις τοῦ σώματος͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ταῖς οὐσίαις καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσι καὶ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις διαφέροντα͵ ὡς κατὰ τὸν ἑξῆς λόγον ἐπιδείξω͵ καθ΄ ὃν καὶ τὴν μέθοδον αὐτὴν ἣν ἐνταῦθ΄ αἰνίττεται μέλλω διεξέρχεσθαι. ⁸ διὰ τί δὲ καίτοι μὴ θαρρῶν ᾗ μέλλει λέγειν ἀποδείξει͵ ὅμως χρῆται͵ πρόδηλον ὑπάρχειν οἶμαι τῷ γε προσεσχηκότι τὸν νοῦν οἷς [δὲ] ἀρτίως ἐλέγομεν͵ ὡς ὅτι μὲν τρεῖς εἰσιν αἱ διοικοῦσαι τὸν βίον ἡμῶν δυνάμεις ἐναργῶς ἀποδείκνυται͵ μὴ μέντοι τὸ ὅτι διαφέρουσαι ταῖς ⁹ οὐσίαις. πρὸς δὲ τὴν προκειμένην αὐτῷ πραγματείαν ἐν τῇ Πολιτείᾳ͵ τὴν περὶ δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν͵ ὑπὲρ ἁπασῶν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ποιεῖται τὸν λόγον͵ ἤρκει τὸ δειχθῆναι τρεῖς εἶναι δυνάμεις ἑτερογενεῖς. ¹⁰ οὕτω γοῦν καὶ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ὑπολαβὼν ἀπεχώρησέ τε τοῦ Χρυσίππου καὶ μᾶλλον ἠκολούθησεν Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Πλάτωνι. προσέθηκα δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ κατὰ μέρος εὑρίσκονταί τινα διαφωνοῦντες οἱ τρεῖς ἄνδρες ὑπὲρ τῆς τῶν ἀρετῶν διαφορᾶς͵ ¹¹ κατὰ δὲ τὸ σύμπαν ὁμολογοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. ἐπιδείξω δὲ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦτο σαφῶς ἡνίκ΄ ἂν ἐν τοῖς ἔπειτα τὸν ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀρετῶν διεξέρχωμαι λόγον· ἐν δὲ τῷ παρόντι τῶν ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένων ἀπο δείξεων ἤδη μνημονεύσω προγράψας τὴν ῥῆσιν ἀφ΄ ἧς ἄρχεται τοῦ λόγου· ¹² ἔχει δὲ ὧδε· ταὐτὸν δηλονότι τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν [ἢ] κατὰ ταὐτόν τε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ ἐθε ¹³ λήσει ἅμα. εἶθ΄ ἑξῆς πιστωσάμενός τε τοῦτο καὶ περὶ τῶν δοκούντων μάχεσθαι διελθὼν ἐπιφέρει ἆρ΄ οὖν͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαί τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι͵ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἀλλήλοις θείης εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων; οὐδὲν γὰρ ταύτῃ διοίσει. ἀλλ΄͵ ἦ δ΄ ὅς͵ τῶν ἐναντίων. ¹⁴ τί οὖν͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι͵ οὐ ταῦτα πάντα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἂν θείης τὰ εἴδη τὰ νῦν λεχθέντα; οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἂν ἐπιθυμῇ͵ ἢ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἂν βούληταί οἱ γενέσθαι͵ ἢ αὖ οὐ καθ΄ ὅσον ἐθέλει τί οἱ πορι σθῆναι͵ ἐπινεύειν τοῦτο πρὸς αὑτὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ἐρωτῶντος ¹⁵ ἐπορεγομένην αὐτοῦ τῆς γενέσεως; ἔγωγε. τί δέ; τὸ ἀβου λεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ΄ ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀπωθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ΄ αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τἀναντία ἐκείνοις θή σομεν; πῶς γὰρ οὔ;

In this passage and in all that follows Plato shows that the part of ¹⁶ the soul which desires is other than the part which rationally determines how and in what manner we seek to be filled with food when we are hungry, and with drink when we are thirsty. When we are children ¹⁷ we readily proceed to get filled, like irrational animals, without considering whether it will benefit or harm (us); but when we have arrived at maturity and rationality it often happens that we do not drink at all when we are persuaded that harm would result from the drink; and often we drink less than we desire if here too the greater amount would be harmful; and sometimes we drink water when our desire is to drink wine, or we take a warm drink when we strongly crave a cold one. Unreasoning persons, however, are like children and beasts: ¹⁸ they do not wait for the opportune time and do not consider the amount or kind of drink. Now Chrysipp us and his followers have admitted ¹⁹ that beasts and children do not employ reason ; and sometimes they admit that beasts and children proceed to the satisfaction of their desires through the agency of some power contrary to reason, but at other times they deny it, twisting the argurnents up and down. And yet as truthloving men they could have readily concluded that there is an irrational power which ]eads not only cattle and children but also cattlelike men to the enjoyment of drink. Thus our account has led us ²⁰ first to a proof such as this, a proof which by virtue of a certain logical necessity also gives no small support to the words of Plato.

¹⁶ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ῥήσει καὶ ταῖς ἑξῆς ἁπά σαις δείκνυσιν ἕτερον εἶναι μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ λογιζομένου πῶς καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐν μὲν τῷ πεινῆν ἐφιέμεθα πληρωθῆναι σιτίων͵ ἐν δὲ τῷ διψῆν πόματος. ¹⁷ ἀλλὰ παῖδες μὲν ὄντες ὁμοίως τοῖς ἀλόγοις ζῴοις ἑτοίμως ἐπὶ τὸ πληρωθῆναι ἐρχόμεθα μήτ΄ εἰ συνοίσει τοῦτο μήτ΄ εἰ βλάψει σκοπούμενοι· κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν γενόμενοι πολλάκις μὲν οὐδ΄ ὅλως πίνομεν ἐπειδὰν πεισθῶμεν ὑπὸ τοῦ πόματος βλάβην ἔσεσθαι͵ πολλάκις δὲ ὀλιγώτερον ἢ ὅσον ἐπιθυμοῦμεν εἰ κἀνταῦθα μέλλοι βλάψειν τὸ πλέον͵ ἐνίοτε δ΄ ὕδωρ πίνομεν οἶνον ἐπιθυμοῦντες πιεῖν ἢ σφοδρῶς ὀρεγό μενοι ψυχροῦ θερμὸν προσφερόμεθα. ¹⁸ οἱ δέ γε ἀλόγιστοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὡσαύτως τοῖς βρέφεσι καὶ θηρίοις οὔτε τὸν καιρὸν ἀναμένουσιν οὔτε ποσότητα καὶ ποιότητα τοῦ πόμα ¹⁹ τος ἐπισκέπτονται. τὸ μὲν δὴ μὴ χρῆσθαι λογισμῷ μήτε τὰ θηρία μήτε τὰ βρέφη καὶ πρὸς τῶν περὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ὡμολόγηται· τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ δυνάμεώς τινος ἑτέρας παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπόλαυσιν ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἔρχεσθαι ποτὲ μὲν ὁμολογοῦσιν͵ ἔστιν ὅτε δ΄ ἀρνοῦνται περιπλέκοντες ἄνω καὶ κάτω τοὺς λόγους͵ ἐνὸν ὡς ἄνδρας ἐραστὰς ἀληθείας ἐκ προχείρου συλλογίζεσθαι δύναμίν τινα ὑπάρχειν ἄλογον ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ πόματος ἀπόλαυσιν ἄγουσαν οὐ τὰ βοσκήματα μόνα καὶ τοὺς παῖδας͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς βοσκήμασιν ὁμοίους ἀνθρώ ²⁰ πους. εἰς μὲν οὖν τὴν τοιαύτην ἀπόδειξιν ὁ λόγος ἡμᾶς ἤγαγε προτέραν ἐξ ἀκολουθίας τινὸς οὐ σμικρὰ συντελοῦσαν οὐδ΄ αὐτὴν ταῖς ὑπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος λεγομέναις.

As we have now come to the consideration of men who are already ²¹ mature not only in years but in rationality, let us proceed to examine in them the struggle of the rational power against the desiderative in times of illness and in many other circumstances where the time is not yet thought to be right for the thirsty man to take drink or the hungry man food, for the cold man to be warmed or the warm man cooled, or for sexual appetite to be indulged. The irrational power in ²² us draws the person who feels the need to each of the desired objects, while reason pulls in the opposite direction and checks the untimely motion. And often the conflict between the two becomes violent, thus indicating clearly that the nature of the contending powers in us is twofold. If there were only one (power), as in children, nothing would ²³ prevent our enjoying inopportunely the things we desire; and similarly, if there were only the rational power, not accustomed to resist and contend with anything, then it would be nothing for the thirsty man not to drink, or the hungry man not to eat; and you would not call the person who does not drink selfcontrolled or temperate, any more than you would the person who does not walk if he does not wish to. But as ²⁴ it is, since there are two powers that pull the human being, since there is an irrational (power) that desires the drink and a rational (power) that holds the irrational in check, in that sort of situation temperance and selfcontrol have their origin. But let this matter of no small ²⁵ importance, which we have proved in passing, be remembered for our discussion of the virtues, that there is no such thing as selfcontrol or temperance if the desiderative power is eliminated in our theory.

²¹ ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς ἤδη τελείους ἄνδρας οὐ κατὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν μόνον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἀφικόμενοι τῷ λόγῳ θεασώμεθα ἤδη τὴν ἐν αὐτοῖς μάχην τῆς λογιστικῆς δυνάμεως πρὸς τὴν ἐπι θυμητικὴν ἔν τε νόσοις καὶ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς περιστάσεσιν ἐν αἷς οὔπω δοκεῖ καιρὸς εἶναι προσφέρεσθαι πόμα τὸν διψῶντα καὶ σιτία τὸν πεινῶντα καὶ θάλπεσθαι τὸν ῥιγοῦντα καὶ ψύχεσθαι τὸν θαλπόμενον ἀφροδισίοις τε χρῆσθαι τὸν ἐπὶ ταῦτ΄ ὀργῶντα. ²² ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἄλογος ἐν ἡμῖν δύναμις ἐφ΄ ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ἕλκει τὸν δεόμενον͵ ὁ δὲ λο γισμὸς ἀντισπᾷ καὶ κατέχει τὴν οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ φοράν. καὶ μάχη γε πολλάκις ἑκατέρων ἰσχυρὰ γίγνεται πρὸς ἄλληλα φανερῶς ἐνδεικνυμένη διττὴν εἶναι φύσιν ἐν ἡμῖν τῶν στα σιαζουσῶν ἀλλήλαις δυνάμεων. ²³ εἴπερ γὰρ ἦν μία μόνη καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς παισίν͵ οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκώλυεν ἀκαίρως ἡμᾶς ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἐπιθυμουμένων ὥσπερ γε καὶ εἰ μόνος ὁ λογισμὸς ἦν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἀνθέλκειν τε καὶ στασιάζειν εἰθι σμένος οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πρᾶγμα διψῶντα μὴ πίνειν ἢ πεινῶντα μὴ ἐσθίειν οὐδ΄ ἐγκρατὴς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἂν ὁ μὴ πίνων ὠνομάζετο καθάπερ οὐδ΄ ὁ μὴ βαδίζων εἰ μὴ βούλοιτο. ²⁴ νυνὶ δ΄ ἐπεὶ διτταί τινές εἰσιν αἱ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπισπώ μεναι δυνάμεις͵ ἔστι δὲ ἄλογος ἡ τοῦ πόματος ἐπιθυμοῦσα͵ ἡ δὲ κατέχουσα ταύτην λογική͵ σωφροσύνης ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ καὶ ἐγκρατείας ἡ γένεσις. ²⁵ ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὲν ἡμῖν οὐ σμικρὸν ἐν παρέργῳ δειχθὲν εἰς τὸν περὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν λόγον μνημο νευέσθω μήτ΄ ἐγκράτειαν εἶναί τι μήτε σωφροσύνην ἀναιρε ²⁶ θείσης τῷ λόγῳ τῆς ἐπιθυμητικῆς δυνάμεως.

I return to the matter before us, that the soul of the person who ²⁶ is thirsty but does not wish to drink seeks drink through one of its powers or parts but through another flees from it and turns away; for it is not possible that through one and the same part it should accept and reject a thing, or pursue and avoid it. It makes no difference ²⁷ whether you say that it accepts and avoids, or pursues, or seeks, or whether you say it wishes, or has an appetition, or lays claim to, or welcomes or desires. The differentiation of these terms contributes nothing to ²⁸ the present inquiry; quite the contrary, it is untimely and it diverts the investigation of things to a dispute about names. Some persons ²⁹ therefore deliberately contrive to raise objections to every term, in order that no conclusion may be reached. If you say that the thirsty man ‘has an appetition’ for drink, they will not agree to the term appetition; for appetition is something commendable and pertains only to the sage : it is in fact a rational conation for something that gives pleasure to the extent that it should. But if you say that he ‘desires’ (drink), they will not admit this word either; for thirst is found not only among inferior men but also among the better sort, whereas desire is itself inferior and arises only in inferior persons, for desire is an appetition that moves in a rush to the attainment of its object. If one does not define it at such length but says that it is at ³⁰ any rate an irrational appetition, then our opponent Will very solemnly censure a man who is on many occasions vastly superior not only in the knowledge of things but also in the use of words. Even among the ³¹ ancients there were no few men of that kind, as P ¹ at o himself tells (us), who used words in strange new meanings. It was because of them, I think, that here again he did not simply write down a single term in the passage before us but intentionally used all the terms with which it is possible to refer to the same thing. Thus we see that Plato uses ³² the terms ‘have an appetition for’, ‘desire’, ‘seek’, ‘nod assent to’, ‘yearn for’, ‘be willing’, ‘wish’, ‘draw to oneself’, and indeed he uses their opposites also, ‘not wish’, ‘be unwilling’, with reference to just one thing. For it is his aim to indicate and express clearly what he ³³ wishes to say. He is intent on the proof ; he uses language in the service of conveying meaning ; and he does not quibble about syllables.

ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ προκείμενον αὖθις ἐπάνειμι͵ ὡς ἡ τοῦ διψῶντος μὲν μὴ βουλομένου δὲ πίνειν ψυχὴ κατὰ μέν τινα τῶν ἑαυτῆς δυνά μεων ἢ μερῶν ἐφίεται ποτοῦ͵ καθ΄ ἕτερον δέ τι φεύγει καὶ ἀποτρέπεται· ἑνὶ γὰρ καὶ ταὐτῷ προσίεσθαί τι καὶ ἀπαρ νεῖσθαι καὶ διώκειν καὶ φεύγειν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται. ²⁷ εἴτε δὲ προσ ίεσθαι καὶ φεύγειν λέγεις εἴτε διώκειν εἴτ΄ ἐφίεσθαι διαφέρει οὐδέν͵ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ εἰ βούλεσθαι ἢ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ ἀντιποιεῖσθαι ἢ ²⁸ ἀσπάζεσθαι ἢ ἐπιθυμεῖν. ἡ γὰρ τῶν τοιούτων ὀνομάτων διαίρεσις οὐδὲν εἰς τὴν παροῦσαν σκέψιν ὀνίνησιν͵ ἀλλ΄ αὐτὸ τοὐναντίον ἄκαιρός τ΄ ἐστὶ καὶ τὴν περὶ τῶν πραγμά των ζήτησιν εἰς τὴν περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀμφισβήτησιν ἀπάγει. ²⁹ διὸ καὶ τεχνάζονταί τινες ἐξεπίτηδες ὑπὲρ τοῦ μηδὲν περαν θῆναι πρὸς ἕκαστον τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐνίστασθαι· εἰ μὲν ὀρέ γεσθαι πόματος εἴποις τὸν διψῶντα͵ μὴ συγχωροῦντες ὀρέ γεσθαι λέγειν· ἀστεῖον γάρ τι τὴν ὄρεξιν εἶναι καὶ μόνου τοῦ σοφοῦ͵ ὑπάρχειν γοῦν αὐτὴν ὁρμὴν λογικὴν ἐπί τινος ὅσον χρὴ ἥδοντος· ἂν δὲ ἐπιθυμεῖν͵ οὐδὲ οὕτως ὀνο μάζειν συγχωροῦντες͵ τὸ μὲν γὰρ διψῆν οὐκ ἐν τοῖς φαύλοις μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἀστείοις γίγνεσθαι͵ τὴν δ΄ ἐπιθυμίαν αὐτήν τε φαύλην εἶναι καὶ μόνοις τοῖς φαύλοις ἐγγίγνεσθαι͵ εἶναι γὰρ ὄρεξιν ἀθρόως ῥεπτικὴν πρὸς τὸ τυγχάνειν. ³⁰ εἰ δέ τις μὴ μακρὸν οὕτως αὐτῆς ὁρισμὸν ποιήσειεν ἀλλ΄ ὄρεξίν γε ἄλογον ὑπάρχειν εἰπών͵ ἐπιτιμήσει μάλα σεμνῶς ἀνδρὶ πολλάκις οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐπιστήμῃ μόνον͵ ἀλλὰ ³¹ κἀν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων χρήσει μυρίον διαφέροντι. τοιοῦτοι δ΄ ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν ἦσαν οὐκ ὀλίγοι καθάπερ καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν͵ ὀνόμασι χρώμενοι καινῶς μετωνο μασμένοις· δι΄ οὕς μοι δοκεῖ καὶ νῦν οὐχ ἓν ἁπλῶς γράψαι κατὰ τὸν προκείμενον λόγον ὄνομα͵ χρήσασθαι δὲ ἐξεπίτη δες ἅπασιν οἷς ἐγχωρεῖ ταὐτὸν δηλῶσαι πρᾶγμα. ³² τῷ τε γὰρ ὀρέγεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπιθυμεῖν καὶ τῷ ἐφίεσθαι καὶ τῷ ἐπινεύειν ἐπορέγεσθαί τε καὶ θέλειν καὶ βούλεσθαι καὶ προσάγεσθαι καὶ μέντοι καὶ τοῖς ἐναντίοις αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῦ ἑνὸς πράγματος ³³ φαίνεται χρώμενος͵ τῷ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν. ἐνδείξασθαι γὰρ αὐτῷ πρόκειται καὶ δηλῶσαι σαφῶς ὃ βούλεται͵ περὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν ἐσπουδακότι καὶ δουλεύοντι διὰ τῆς λέξεως τῇ μηνύσει τοῦ πράγματος͵ οὐ τερθρευομένῳ περὶ τὰς συλλαβάς.

Now in the passage quoted above Plato pointed out that that ³⁴ which desires is other than that which reasons. It seemed to me tedious to copy out all that he says, as anyone who wishes may read in its entirety the part that comes next in his book. If it should be necessary, ³⁵ as I think it is, to transcribe also the passage at the end of the whole discussion in order to make a clearer transition to the second main head, I shall not fail to do so. It is as follows : “Then the soul of the ³⁶ thirsty man, insofar as it is thirsty, has no other wish than to drink; it has a craving for drink, and is impelled toward it? — That is clear. — Then if ever anything exerts a contrary pull on the thirsty soul, that ³⁷ would be something in it other than the part which is thirsting and, like a brute, is leading it to drink? For we would not say that the same thing acts in opposite ways at the same time on the same object with the same part of itself. No indeed. — For example, it would not ³⁸ be right, I think, to say of the archer that his handl simultaneously push and pull the bow, but rather that one hand pushes and the other pulls. — Quite so, he said. — Now shall we say that some thirsty persons are sometimes unwilling to drink? — Yes, he said; many persons, and many times. — What then, I said, would one say about ³⁹ there men? Would it not• be that there is in their soul something that commands them to drink, but that there is some other thing that forbids it, the master of the former? — That is my opinion, he said. Then does not that which forbids such actions arise, when it arises, from reasoning, while the things that draw and pull (the soul) enter through affections and diseases? — It appears so. — Then, I said, it ⁴⁰ Will not be unreasonable for us to judge them to be two, each different from the other, and to call the one by which the soul reasons its rational part, and the one by which it loves, hungers, thirsts, and flutters over the other desires, its irrational and desiderative part, the companion of certain repletions and pleasures.” By these (words) he ⁴¹ showed that the rational part of the soul is different in kind from the desiderative. But as I said earlier, my aim is not yet to show that these ⁴² two parts of the soul are different in kind; for my present purpose it is sufficient to conclude indisputably that it is not within the province of the same power both to reason and to desire food or drink or sexual pleasure, a fact that somehow escaped Chrysippus and many Stoics. Ignorance of a thing is pardonable, as I said before; ⁴³ but it is not pardonable to handle the argument so ineptly as to cite as proof of so important a doctrine the words of comic and tragic poets — men who do not try to prove anything but only adorn with beauty of language the speeches they think appropriate to the character speaking in the play — and to fail to mention what Plato said in proof of it, and to make no attempt to answer him,, but to assume readily and without question that where the soul’s affections are, there its rational part is also.

³⁴ ἐκ μὲν δὴ τῶν προειρημένων ἕτερον ἐπέδειξε τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν τοῦ λογιζομένου. παραγράφειν γὰρ ἁπάσας αὐτοῦ τὰς ῥήσεις μακρὸν ἔδοξέ μοι δυναμένου γε παντὸς τοῦ βουλομένου τὸ ³⁵ ἐφεξῆς ἅπαν ἀναγνῶναι τοῦ βιβλίου χωρίον. εἰ δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπὶ τῆς τελευτῆς ὅλου τοῦ λόγου δέοι παραγράψαι ῥῆσιν͵ ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ͵ χάριν τοῦ σαφεστέραν γενέσθαι τὴν ἐπὶ τὸ δεύ τερον κεφάλαιον μετάβασιν͵ οὐδὲ ταύτην παρήσω· ἔχει δ΄ ³⁶ ὧδε· ἆρα τοῦ διψῶντος ἡ ψυχὴ καθ΄ ὅσον δὴ διψῇ οὐκ ἄλλο τι βούλεται ἢ πιεῖν καὶ τούτου ὀρέγεται καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦτο ὁρμᾷ; δῆλον δή. ³⁷ οὐκοῦν εἴ ποτέ τι αὐτὴν ἀνθέλκει διψῶσαν͵ ἕτερον ἄν τι ἐν αὐτῇ εἴη αὐτοῦ τοῦ διψῶντος καὶ ἄγοντος ὥσπερ θηρίου ἐπὶ τὸ πιεῖν; οὐ γὰρ δή φαμεν τό γε αὐτὸ τῷ αὐτῷ ἑαυτοῦ περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἅμα τἀναντία πράττειν. οὐ ³⁸ γὰρ οὖν. ὥσπερ γε͵ οἶμαι͵ τοῦ τοξότου οὐ καλῶς ἔχει λέγειν ὅτι αὐτοῦ ἅμα αἱ χεῖρες τὸ τόξον ἀπωθοῦνταί τε καὶ προσ έλκονται͵ ἀλλ΄ ὅτι ἄλλη μὲν ἡ ἀπωθοῦσα χείρ͵ ἑτέρα δ΄ ἡ προσαγομένη. παντάπασι μὲν οὖν͵ ἔφη. πότερον δὴ φῶ μέν τινας ἔστιν ὅτε διψῶντας οὐκ ἐθέλειν πιεῖν; καὶ μάλα γ΄ ἔφη πολλοὺς καὶ πολλάκις. ³⁹ τί οὖν͵ ἔφην ἐγώ͵ φαίη τις ἂν τούτων πέρι; οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὸ κελεῦον͵ εἶναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν ἄλλο ὄν͵ τὸ κρατοῦν τοῦ κελεύοντος; ἔμοιγ΄ ἔφη δοκεῖ. ἆρ΄ οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται͵ ὅταν ἐγγένηται͵ ἐκ τοῦ λογισμοῦ͵ τὰ δὲ ἄγοντα καὶ ἕλκοντα διὰ παθημάτων τε καὶ νοσημά των παραγίγνεται; φαίνεται. ⁴⁰ οὐ δὴ ἀλόγως͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ ἀξιώσομεν αὐτὰ διττά τε καὶ ἕτερα ἀλλήλων εἶναι͵ τὸ μὲν ᾧ λογίζεται λογιστικὸν προσαγορεύοντες τῆς ψυχῆς͵ τὸ δ΄ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυ μίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυμητικόν͵ πληρώσεών ⁴¹ τινων καὶ ἡδονῶν ἑταῖρον. διὰ τούτων ἔδειξεν ἕτερον εἶδος εἶναι ψυχῆς τὸ λογιστικὸν τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ. ⁴² ἀλλ΄ ὡς εἶπον καὶ πρόσθεν͵ οὔπω μοι πρόκειται δεικνύειν ὡς ἕτερα τῷ εἴδει ταυτὶ τὰ δύο μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστιν͵ ἀλλ΄ εἴς γε τὸ προκείμενον ἀπόχρη τὸ περαινόμενον ἀναμφισβητήτως͵ ὅτι μὴ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστι δυνάμεως τό τε λογίζεσθαι καὶ τὸ σιτίων ἢ ποτῶν ἢ ἀφροδισίων ἐπιθυμεῖν͵ ὅπερ οὐκ οἶδ΄ ὅπως ὁ Χρύσιππος ἅμα πολλοῖς Στωϊκοῖς ἠγνόησεν. ⁴³ ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγνοῆσαί τι συγγνωστόν͵ ὡς καὶ πρόσθεν ἔλεγον͵ οὐ συγγνωστὸν δὲ τὸ πλημμελῶς οὕτως μεταχειρίσασθαι τὸν λό γον ὥστε τῶν μὲν τοῖς κωμικοῖς ἢ τραγικοῖς ποιηταῖς εἰρη μένων μνημονεύειν εἰς τηλικούτου δόγματος ἀπόδειξιν͵ ἀν θρώποις οὐδ΄ ἐπιχειροῦσιν ἀποδεικνύειν οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ μόνον οἷα ἂν αὐτοῖς δόξῃ πρέπειν τῷ λέγοντι προσώπῳ κατὰ τὸ δρᾶμα͵ κοσμοῦσι διὰ τῆς ἑρμηνείας͵ τῶν δ΄ ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος εἰρημένων εἰς τὴν ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῦ μήτε μνημονεῦσαι μήτ΄ ἀντειπεῖν ἐπιχειρῆσαι͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐξ ἑτοίμου τε καὶ προχείρου λαμ βάνειν ὡς ἔνθ΄ ἂν ᾖ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ἐνταῦθ΄ ἐστὶ καὶ τὸ λογιζόμενον.

Now Chrysippus always behaves in this way. But Plato, ⁴⁴ after distinguishing the desiderative from the rational in the passage quoted above, next tries to distinguish also between them and the spirited part. The passage begins as follows: “Well then, said I, let ⁴⁵ us accept these as two distinct forms present in the soul. But is the form of anger, and that by which we experience anger, a third, or would it be of the same nature as one of the other two? — Perhaps, he said, the same as one of the others, the desiderative. — But, I said, ⁴⁶ I accept as trustworthy a story I once heard, that when Leontius, son of Aglaion, was coming up from the Peiraeus outside the north wall and became aware of corpses lying by the place of pub]ic execution, he desired to look at them, yet at the same time was repelled and turned away; for a time he resisted and covered his head, but being overcome none the less by the desire, he opened his eyes wide and ran over to the corpses and said, ‘Look, you wretches; Lake your fill of the beautiful sight’. — I too have heard it, he said. — This story, ⁴⁷ I said, indicates that anger sometimes fights against the desires, as one thing against another. — Yes, it does, he said.” Again in this ⁴⁸ passage Plato shows that that which desires is other than that which is angered, obviously using as a premise the initial postulate, that a thing that is strictly one, single, and uncompounded cannot have an appetition for something and also reject it, or be pleased and displeased by the same object; there must be one thing that desires to see the corpses, another that tries to prevent it. And he shows that the sight would surely give a certain pleasure to the part that desires it, but displeasure and distress to the part that opposes. For to be angry ⁴⁹ with the part that desires, displeased at its conations and opposed to them, to be willing to reprove and censure the desires, and all things of this kind, are the act of another part of the soul, not that which has the desire — or if not of another part, at any rate of another power. I have already stated repeatedly that in this book I am not yet ⁵⁰ challenging Aristotle and P osido nius , who agree that reasoning, being angry, and desiring are effected in us by agencies that differ from one another, yet who say that these agencies are powers, not forms or parts, of the soul. In subsequent books I shall show that they are not powers only, but also parts of the soul that differ from each other in form. In the present book, in order to indicate Chrysippus’ ⁵¹ carelessness in such matters, it is enough merely to demonstrate that he did not mention any of the strong arguments formulated by Plato for the Proof of the doctrine we are now investigating, nor did he try to answer them, although he filled the whole of his first book On the Soul, in which he discussed the ruling part, with lengthy discourses, or rather, with verses from the poets. Not only in this (book) was he ⁵² completely silent about Plato’s arguments, but also in his writings On the Affections, both the three (books) of theory and the separate (book) that he wrote entitled Therapy and Ethics.

⁴⁴ Χρύσιππος μὲν οὖν ἀεὶ τοιοῦτος. ὁ δὲ Πλάτων ἐπειδὴ διώρισται ἐν τῇ προγεγραμμένῃ ῥήσει τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τοῦ λογιστικοῦ͵ μετὰ ταῦτα πειρᾶται καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς αὐτῶν διορίζειν· ἔχει δ΄ ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς ῥήσεως ὧδε· ⁴⁵ ταῦτα μὲν τοίνυν͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ δύ΄ ἡμῖν ὡρίσθω εἴδη ἐν ψυχῇ ἐνόντα· τὸ δὲ δὴ τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ ᾧ θυμούμεθα πότε ρον τρίτον ἢ τούτων ποτέρῳ εἴη ἂν ὁμοφυές; ἴσως͵ ἔφη͵ τῷ ἑτέρῳ͵ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ. ⁴⁶ ἀλλ΄͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ ποτὲ ἀκούσας τι πιστεύω τούτῳ͵ ὡς ἄρα Λεόντιος ὁ Ἀγλαΐωνος ἀνιὼν ἐκ Πειραιέως ὑπὸ τὸ βόρειον τεῖχος ἐκτὸς αἰσθόμενος νεκροὺς παρὰ τῷ δημίῳ κειμένους ἅμα μὲν ἰδεῖν ἐπιθυμοῖ͵ ἅμα δὲ δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ἀποτρέποι ἑαυτὸν καὶ τέως μὲν μάχοιτό τε καὶ παρακαλύπτοιτο͵ κρατούμενος δ΄ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας διελκύσας τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς προσδραμὼν πρὸς τοὺς νεκρούς͵ ἰδοὺ ὑμῖν ἔφη ὦ κακοδαίμονες͵ ἐμπλήσθητε τοῦ καλοῦ θεάματο. ἤκουσα͵ ἔφη͵ καὶ αὐτός. ⁴⁷ οὗτος μέντοι͵ ἔφην͵ ὁ λόγος σημαίνει τὴν ὀργὴν πολεμεῖν ἐνίοτε ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ⁴⁸ ὡς ἄλλο ὂν ἄλλῳ. σημαίνει γε͵ ἔφη. πάλιν κἀν τούτοις ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιδείκνυσιν ὡς ἕτερόν ἐστι τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν τοῦ ὀργιζομένου͵ προσχρώμενος δηλονότι τῷ κατ΄ ἀρχὰς ὑποκει μένῳ ἀξιώματι ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται τὸ ἀκριβῶς ἓν καὶ ἁπλοῦν καὶ ἀσύνθετον ὀρέγεσθαί τινος καὶ ἀποτρέπεσθαι καὶ χαίρειν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ δυσχεραίνειν ἀλλ΄ ἀναγκαῖον ἕτερον μὲν τὸ ἐπιθυμοῦν θεάσασθαι τοὺς νεκρούς͵ ἕτερον δὲ τὸ κωλῦον θεά σασθαι͵ καὶ ὡς τῷ μὲν ἐπιθυμοῦντι πάντως πού τις ἡδονὴ κατὰ τὴν θέαν ἤμελλεν ἔσεσθαι͵ τῷ δὲ κωλύοντι δυσχέρειά ⁴⁹ τε καὶ ἀνία. τὸ γὰρ ὀργίζεσθαι τῷ ἐπιθυμοῦντι καὶ δυσχε ραίνειν αὐτοῦ ταῖς ὁρμαῖς καὶ κωλύειν ἐθέλειν τε ταῖς ἐπι θυμίαις ἐπιτιμᾶν τε καὶ μέμφεσθαι καὶ πάνθ΄ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μέρους ἑτέρου τῆς ψυχῆς ἔργον ἐστίν͵ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐπιθυ μοῦντος· εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ μέρους ἀλλὰ δυνάμεώς γε πάντως ἑτέρας. ⁵⁰ εἴρηται γὰρ ἤδη γε τοῦτο πολλάκις͵ ὡς οὐδέπω κατὰ τόδε τὸ βιβλίον ἀγωνιζόμεθα πρὸς Ἀριστοτέλην καὶ Ποσειδώνιον ὁμολογοῦντας μὲν ἑτέροις ἀλλήλων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ θυμοῦσθαι καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖν ἡμᾶς͵ οὐ μὴν εἴδεσί γε ἢ μορίοις ψυχῆς ἀλλὰ δυνάμεσιν· ἐν γὰρ τοῖς ἐφεξῆς λόγοις ἐπιδείξομεν ὅτι μὴ δυνάμεσι μόνον͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρεσι τῆς ψυχῆς ἑτέροις ἀλλήλων κατ΄ εἶδος. ⁵¹ ἐν δὲ τῷδε τῷ νῦν ἐνεστῶτι τοῦτ΄ ἀρκεῖ μόνον ἀποδεῖξαι πρὸς ἔνδειξιν τῆς Χρυσίππου περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ῥᾳθυμίας͵ ὡς αὐτὸς ἰσχυρῶν λόγων ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἠρωτημένων εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ νῦν ἡμῖν ζητουμένου δόγματος οὔτ΄ ἐμνήσθη τινὸς αὐτῶν οὔτ΄ ἀντειπεῖν ἐπεχείρησε͵ καίτοι πληρώσας λόγων μακρῶν͵ μᾶλλον δὲ ποιητικῶν ἐπῶν͵ ὅλον τὸ πρῶτον βιβλίον περὶ ψυχῆς͵ ἐν ᾧ περὶ ἡγεμονικοῦ διεξῆλθεν. ⁵² οὐ μόνον δὲ κατὰ τοῦτο τελέως ἐσιώπησε τοὺς τοῦ Πλάτωνος λόγους ἀλλὰ καὶ κατὰ τὰ περὶ παθῶν συγγράμματα͵ τά τε τρία τὰ λογικὰ καὶ τὸ χωρὶς αὐτῶν ἰδίᾳ γεγραμμένον ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ͵ τὸ θεραπευτικόν ⁵³ τε καὶ ἠθικὸν ἐπιγραφόμενον.

Let us now pass to the remainder of the Platonic passage, which ⁵³ is as follows : “And on many other oecasions also, I said, when desires are driving a man to go against reason, do we not observe him scolding himself and angry at that part of himself which would force him; and as in a struggle between two hostile factions, do we not observe the anger of such a man taking the side of reason? But that anger ⁵⁴ should ally itself with the desires and perform some act when reason decides it ought not, I imagine you would say that you have never perceived this sort of thing happening in yourself or in anyone else. —No indeed, he said.” In the former passage, where Plato mentioned ⁵⁵ the man who had a craving to see the corpses, he clearly demonstrated that the part that feels anger is other than the part that desires, but he did not clearly state that the reasoning part is other than both; yet even in that argument he gave some indication of this latter point, and now he presents an adequate account of it. For when a desire ⁵⁶ exerts a force on someone against his reason, as it did on the above-mentioned Leontius , in that situation anger is aroused as an ally of reason, and often in company with reason it overpowers the immoderate movement of the intemperate form of the soul; it restrains and impedes it, and checks the impulse. So L eontius too could have scolded himself for incontinence about viewing the corpses and then passed by without looking at them. But sometimes when both parts of the soul are pressing and scolding, the desiderative part overcomes their opposition and contrary pull, just as P¹ ato describes its happening to this very man who viewed the corpses. With this story Plato indicates many things at once. By this one aforementioned ⁵⁷ example he indicated that the part which feels anger is other than the part which desires, that the rational part is different from both, and that the angry part never allies itself with the desiderative. No one ⁵⁸ over censured himself and got angry at himself for choosing to abstain from untimely desires. What sick person, who has a high fever and de ⁵⁹ sires a cold drink but reasons that the drink will destroy him and do him the utmost harm and so checks the urge and stills it, has censured himself or been angered at himself for reasoning correctly ? None at all, I think. Where the rational part (of the soul) voluntarily follows ⁶⁰ the desiderative, there the spirited part follows along with the rational — for the spirited was given by nature to the rational as a hound to a hunter to serve and help it against the third form of the soul —; but where the rational part opposes, dissents and fights, the spirited accompanies it and fights beside it. That the spirited part always sides ⁶¹ with the rational against the desiderative P¹ at o makes clear also in the next passage, where he writes : “Tell me, I said; when a person ⁶² believes himself the author of an unjust act, is he not the less able, the nobler he is, to be angry when he suffers hunger or cold or anything of that kind at the hands of the man who, he believes, is treating him justly, and, as I say, is not his anger unwilling to be aroused against that person? — That is true, he said. — But what happens when ⁶³ a person thinks that he is the victim of injustice? Does not his anger seek about in this situation and become indignant and ally itself with what it thinks just? And because it is suffering hunger, cold, and everything of that kind, does it not persevere and triumph and refuse to leave off its noble acts until it has accomplished its purpose or died or, like a dog called back by the shepherd, it is called back by reason, which stands beside it, and is calmed?”

ἐπὶ τὰς ὑπολοίπους οὖν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥήσεις ἴωμεν ἐχούσας ὧδε· οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄλλοθι͵ ἔφην͵ πολλαχοῦ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅταν βιάζωνταί τινα παρὰ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐπιθυμίαι͵ λοιδοροῦντά τε αὑτὸν καὶ θυμού μενον τῷ βιαζομένῳ ἐν αὑτῷ καὶ ὥσπερ δυοῖν στασιαζόν τοιν σύμμαχον τῷ λόγῳ γιγνόμενον τὸν θυμὸν τοῦ τοιού του; ⁵⁴ ταῖς δ΄ ἐπιθυμίαις αὐτὸν κοινωνήσαντα αἱροῦντος λό γου μὴ δεῖν τι πράττειν οἶμαί σε οὐκ ἂν φάναι γενομένου ποτ΄ ἐν ἑαυτῷ τοιούτου αἰσθέσθαι͵ οἶμαι δ΄ οὐδ΄ ἐν ἄλλῳ. ⁵⁵ οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία͵ ἔφη. κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν προτέραν ῥῆσιν ὁ Πλάτων ἐν ᾗ τοῦ ποθοῦντος θεάσασθαι τοὺς νεκροὺς ἐμνημόνευσεν͵ ἐναργῶς μὲν ἀπέδειξεν ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ θυμούμενον τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος͵ οὐ μὴν ὅτι τὸ λογιζόμενον ἕτερον ἀμφοῖν ἐστιν ἐναργῶς εἶπεν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐνεδείξατο καὶ κατ΄ ἐκεῖνον μέν πως τὸν λόγον͵ ἐνταυθοῖ δ΄ ἱκανῶς ἐπεξέρχεται. ⁵⁶ ὅταν γάρ τινα βιάζηταί τις ἐπιθυμία παρὰ τὸν λογισμόν͵ ὥσπερ τὸν ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένον Λεόντιον͵ ὁ θυμὸς ἐνταῦθα κινεῖται συμμαχῶν τῷ λογισμῷ καὶ πολλάκις μὲν ἐκράτησεν ἅμα τῷ λογισμῷ τῆς ἀμέτρου κινήσεως τοῦ ἀκολάστου τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδους καὶ κατέσχε τε καὶ διεκώλυσεν αὐτὸ καὶ τῆς ὁρμῆς ἐπέσχεν͵ ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ ὁ Λεόντιος ἐδυνήθη λοιδορη θεὶς ἑαυτῷ τῆς περὶ τὸ θεάσασθαι τοὺς νεκροὺς ἀκρασίας παρελθεῖν μὴ θεασάμενος αὐτούς͵ ἐνίοτε δ΄ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν μερῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀγχόντων τε καὶ λοιδορουμένων ἀντιπρατ τόντων τε καὶ ἀνθελκόντων ἐκράτησε τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν͵ ὥσπερ ἐπ΄ αὐτοῦ τοῦδε τοῦ θεασαμένου τοὺς νεκροὺς ὁ Πλάτων ⁵⁷ διηγεῖται γενέσθαι συνενδεικνύμενος ἐν τῷ λόγῳ πολλά. καὶ γὰρ ὅτι τὸ θυμαινόμενον ἕτερόν ἐστι τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος καὶ ὅτι τὸ λογιζόμενον ἀμφοῖν ἄλλο καὶ ὡς τὸ θυμαινόμενον οὐδέποτε συμμαχεῖ τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ͵ δι΄ ἑνὸς ἐνεδείξατο τοῦδε ⁵⁸ τοῦ προειρημένου παραδείγματος. οὐδεὶς γοῦν ἐπετίμησεν ἑαυτῷ ποτε καὶ ὠργίσθη͵ διότι τῶν ἀκαίρων ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀφίστασθαι προαιρεῖται. ⁵⁹ τίς γὰρ ἐν νόσῳ τῶν ἀμέτρως δια καιομένων ἐπιθυμούντων τε πόματος ψυχροῦ λογισάμενος ὄλεθρον οἴσειν αὑτῷ τὸ πόμα καὶ βλάβην ἐσχάτην͵ εἶτ΄ ἐπι σχὼν τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ καθησυχάσας ἐπετίμησεν αὑτῷ καὶ ὠρ γίσθη͵ διότι καλῶς ἐλογίσατο; οὐδεὶς ὡς οἶμαι τῶν πάντων. ⁶⁰ ἀλλ΄ ἔνθα μὲν ἂν ἑκὼν ὁ λογισμὸς ἕπηται τῷ ἐπιθυμητικῷ͵ συνέπεται καὶ τὸ θυμοειδὲς τῷ λογισμῷ· τούτῳ γὰρ ὑπηρε τεῖν καὶ συμπράττειν ὥσπερ τις κύων κυνηγέτῃ κατὰ τοῦ τρίτου τῆς ψυχῆς εἴδους ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἐδόθη· ἔνθα δὲ ἐναντιοῦται καὶ στασιάζει καὶ μάχεται͵ μετὰ τοῦ λογιομοῦ ⁶¹ γίγνεται καὶ τούτῳ συμμαχεῖ. ὅτι δὲ τῷ λογιστικῷ τὸ θυ μοειδὲς ἀεὶ κατὰ τοῦ ἐπιθυμητικοῦ συμμαχεῖ καὶ διὰ τῆς ⁶² ἐπιφερομένης ῥήσεως δῆλον ποιεῖται γράφων ὧδε· τί δέ; ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ· ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν͵ οὐχ ὅσῳ ἂν γενναιότερος ᾖ τοσούτῳ ἧττον δύναται ὀργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ΄ ἐκείνου ὃν ἂν οἴηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν͵ καὶ ὃ λέγω οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός; ἀληθῆ͵ ἔφη. ⁶³ τί δέ; ὅταν ἀδικεῖσθαί τις ἡγῆται͵ οὐκ ἐν τούτῳ ζητεῖ τε καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ καὶ διὰ τὸ πεινῆν καὶ διὰ τὸ ῥιγοῦν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα πάσχειν ὑπομένων καὶ νικᾷ καὶ οὐ λήγει τῶν γενναίων πρὶν ἂν ἢ διαπράξηται ἢ τελευτήσῃ ἢ ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ΄ αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεὶς πραϋνθῇ;

Again in this passage Plato mentions two men, both of whom ⁶⁴ receive the same treatment at the hands of some powerful ruler, so that they are hungry, thirsty, and cold; but one of them is persuaded that he is justly treated, the other that he is not. Then Plato says that the one who considers the treatment just, because earlier he had himself acted unjustly, submits calmly and is not angry at the man who justly punishes him; and the nobler he is (P¹ at o says), the more calmly he submits. He was referring here to the man who is actually ⁶⁵ being punished: the nobler this man is by nature, the more nobly he endures the punishment. But the other man, who believes himself a victim of injustice, is angry and indignant and allies himself with what he thinks is just. Behavior of this kind can also be seen every ⁶⁶ day • in slaves. Those who are caught stealing or doing something elle of that kind, even when whipped, starved and disgraced by their masters, are not angry; but those who believe they are suffering or have suffered any of these things unjustly have Inside them an anger that is always savage and craves vengeance on the wrongdoer.

⁶⁴ ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ῥήσει πάλιν ὁ Πλάτων ἐμνημόνευσεν δυοῖν ἀνθρώπων͵ ἀμφοῖν μὲν ταὐτὰ πασχόντων ὑπό τινος ἄρχοντός τε καὶ κρατοῦντος ὡς καὶ πεινῆν καὶ διψῆν καὶ ῥιγοῦν͵ ἀλλὰ τοῦ μὲν ἑτέρου δικαίως πεπεισμένου πάσχειν αὐτά͵ τοῦ δὲ ἑτέρου ἀδίκως· εἶτά φησιν ὡς ὁ μὲν ἕτερος ὅστις ἂν οἴηται δικαίως πάσχειν ταῦτα διὰ τὸ πρότερον αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν τι͵ φέρει πρᾴως αὐτὰ καὶ οὐκ ὀργίζεται τῷ δικαίως κολάζοντι͵ καὶ τοσούτῳ γε μᾶλλόν φησιν ὅσῳπερ ἂν καὶ γενναιότερος. ⁶⁵ εἴρηκε δὲ τοῦτο περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ κολαζομένου· οὗτος γὰρ ὅσῳπερ ἂν εὐγενέστερος ὑπάρχῃ φύσει͵ τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ὑπομένει γενναίως τὰς κολά σεις. ὁ δ΄ ἕτερος͵ ὅστις ἂν ἀδικεῖσθαι νομίζῃ͵ θυμοῦται ⁶⁶ καὶ χαλεπαίνει καὶ συμμαχεῖ τῷ δοκοῦντι δικαίῳ. ταῦθ΄ ὁσημέραι τὰ γιγνόμενα κἀπὶ τῶν οἰκετῶν ἐστι θεάσασθαι· ὅσοι μὲν γὰρ ἂν αὐτῶν ἢ κλέπτοντες ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερον δρῶν τες ἁλῶσι͵ καὶ μαστιγούμενοι καὶ λιμαγχονούμενοι καὶ ἀτι μαζόμενοι πρὸς τῶν δεσποτῶν οὐκ ὀργίζονται· ὅσοι δ΄ ἂν οἰηθῶσιν ἀδίκως τι τούτων ἢ πάσχειν ἢ πεπονθέναι͵ ἀεὶ τούτων ἔνδον ὁ θυμὸς ἀγριούμενός ἐστι καὶ ποθῶν ἀντιτι ⁶⁷ μωρήσασθαι τὸν ἀδικοῦντα.

Both examples make it clear that the spirited part was given us ⁶⁷ by nature as an ally of the rational. Thus it is observed to be on the side of reason when it believes that it is being wronged and coerced by something either internal or external. Now the belief that one is ⁶⁸ being wronged pertains to the rational part, but help in combatting the coercive force is the special function of the spirited part. When ⁶⁹ the desiderative part of the soul is carried immoderately toward something and forcibly pulls reason against its will, the spirited part becomes an ally of reason against the desiderative; and when the injustice is the work of someone outside, the spirited part is eager to avenge itself on him. But when the rational part believes it is not ⁷⁰ wronged by anyone, then anger does not boil up either, even if the body is severely punished by being justly compelled by someone to undergo cold or hunger or thirst. Hence it is clear that the spirited ⁷¹ part in its natural state follows the opinions of the rational part. For it is possible that this (part) too, if in a corrupted condition, may sometimes move in disobedience to reason. Plato himself indicates ⁷² this a little further on, when he says: “Or as in the city the classes that held it together were three, the money-makers, the defenders and the deliberators, so in the soul this spirited part is the third class, by nature a defender of the rational, if it is not corrupted by evil nurture.” This is not the place for a discussion of the corruptions of the ⁷³ spirited part; for in the next book I have decided to treat in detail Plato‘s view of the affections of the soul, its diseases and errors and all its vices, how they arise and how after arising they are cured, and again its beauty and health and all its virtues; for in these matters too Chrysippus makes no small mistakes.

δηλοῦται δ΄ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων τῶν παραδειγμάτων ὡς τὸ θυμοειδὲς ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως ἡμῖν ἐδόθη σύμμαχον τῷ λογιστικῷ. τούτῳ γοῦν δὴ φαίνεται συμμα χοῦν͵ ὅταν ὑπό τινος ἢ ἔνδοθεν ἢ ἔξωθεν ἀδικεῖσθαί τε καὶ ⁶⁸ βιάζεσθαι δοξάζῃ. τὸ μὲν οὖν δοξάζειν ἀδικεῖσθαι τοῦ λογι στικοῦ͵ τὸ δ΄ ἐπαμύνειν αὐτῷ κατὰ τοῦ βιαζομένου τοῦ θυμοειδοῦς ἴδιον. ⁶⁹ ἐπειδὰν μὲν οὖν ἀμέτρως ἐπί τι φερό μενον τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμητικὸν ἄκοντα τὸν λογισμὸν ἕλκῃ βιαίως͵ κατ΄ ἐκείνου σύμμαχον τῷ λογιστικῷ τὸ θυμοειδὲς γίγνεται· ὅταν δὲ ἔξωθεν ᾖ τις ἀδικῶν͵ ἐκεῖνον ἀντιτιμωρεῖσθαι ⁷⁰ σπεύδει. ἐπειδὰν δ΄ ὑπὸ μηδενὸς ἀδικεῖσθαι δοξάζῃ τὸ λογι στικόν͵ οὐδ΄ ὁ θυμὸς ἀναζεῖ τηνικαῦτα͵ κἂν ὅτι μάλιστα κολάζηται τὸ σῶμα δικαίως ὑπό τινος ἢ ῥιγοῦν ἢ πεινῆν ἢ ⁷¹ διψῆν ἀναγκαζόμενον. ᾧ δῆλον ὡς ταῖς δόξαις ἕπεται τοῦ λογιστικοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἔχον τὸ θυμοειδές. ἐνδέχεται γάρ ποτε καὶ τοῦτο μοχθηρῶς διακείμενον ἀπειθῶς κινεῖσθαι ⁷² τῷ λογισμῷ. μετ΄ ὀλίγα γοῦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων ἐνδεικνύ μενος τοῦτό φησιν ἢ καθάπερ ἐν τῇ πόλει συνεῖχεν αὐτὴν τρία ὄντα γένη͵ χρηματιστικόν͵ ἐπικουρητικόν͵ βουλευτικόν͵ οὕτω καὶ ἐν ψυχῇ τοῦτο τρίτον ἐστὶ τὸ θυμοειδές͵ ἐπίκου ρον ὂν τῷ λογιστικῷ φύσει͵ ἐὰν μὴ ὑπὸ κακῆς τροφῆς ⁷³ διαφθείρηται; τίνες μὲν οὖν εἰσιν αἱ διαφθοραὶ τοῦ θυμοει δοῦς͵ οὐκ ἐν καιρῷ νῦν λέγειν· ἐν γὰρ τῷ μετὰ τοῦτον λόγῳ περί τε τῶν παθῶν τῆς ψυχῆς͵ ὡς ἐδόκει Πλάτωνι͵ καὶ περὶ νοσημάτων καὶ ἁμαρτημάτων τῶν κατ΄ αὐτὴν ἁπάσης τε τῆς κακίας͵ ὅπως γίγνεταί τε καὶ θεραπεύεται μετὰ τὸ γενέσθαι͵ διελθεῖν ἔγνωκα καὶ δὴ καὶ περὶ κάλλους τε καὶ ὑγιείας αὐτῆς ἁπασῶν τε τῶν ἀρετῶν· οὐ σμικρὰ γὰρ οὐδ΄ ⁷⁴ ἐν τούτοις ὁ Χρύσιππος σφάλλεται.

For the present I wish to append one more passage from Plato ⁷⁴ in which he shows that the spirited part is other than the rational. It follows immediately after the passages already quoted from the fourth book of the Republic: “This much, at least, can be seen in children: ⁷⁵ right from birth they are full of anger; and some, as I believe, never get a share of reason, while the majority get it late. — Yes indeed, I said; you put it very well. And one can see in the brutes too that What you say is true. And besides, the line of Homer that we quoted ⁷⁶ earlier in that other discussion will testify to it, the line (that says), ‘Striking his breast he rebuked his heart with words.’ Here Homer has clearly presented the two parts as distinct: the part that has reflected on what is better or worse rebukes the part that is irrationally angry.” In this passage Plato clearly shows that the ⁷⁷ angry part is other than the rational. Thus children, and brutes too, are full of anger and have no share at all in reason. Some persons ⁷⁸ have dared to say of animals that there is neither anger nor desire in their souls, and I don’t know what they will say of children. But ⁷⁹ surely no reasoning is needed to teach us about children’s affections; it is sufficient merely to recall that there is no difference between the way we are angry now and the way we were angry as children. The power is the same and the manner in which the affection occurs is similar. Only one thing is peculiar to mature persons, whenever they ⁸⁰ do not live by affections but make reason their guide in life: they check their anger in many actions, as a shepherd checks his nob]e dog when it rushes too fiercely at persons close by. But nothing of ⁸¹ the sort happens in children or in brutes because the conations of the former are not yet ruled by reason, and those of the latter are never so ruled. Plat o stated this correctly, and what he wrote at the end ⁸² of the passage is also correct, where he introduces the testimony of Homer:

νυνὶ δὲ ἔτι μίαν ῥῆσιν ὑπογράψαι βούλομαι τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν ᾗ δείκνυσιν ἕτερον ὑπάρχειν τὸ θυμοειδὲς τοῦ λογιστικοῦ. γέγραπται δ΄ ἐφεξῆς τῶν προειρημένων ἐν τῷ τετάρτῳ τῆς Πολιτείας τόνδε τὸν τρόπον· ⁷⁵ καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς παιδίοις τοῦτό γ΄ ἄν τις ἴδοι͵ ὅτι θυμοῦ μὲν εὐθὺς γενόμενα μεστά ἐστι͵ λογισμοῦ δ΄ ἔνιοι μὲν ἔμοιγε δοκοῦσιν οὐδέποτε μεταλαμβάνειν͵ οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ ὀψέ ποτε. ναὶ μὰ Δία͵ ἦν δ΄ ἐγώ͵ καλῶς εἶπες. ἔτι γ΄ ⁷⁶ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις͵ ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὃ ἄνω που ἐκεῖ εἴπομεν͵ τὸ τοῦ Ὁμήρου μαρτυρήσει͵ τό στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον πε ποίηκεν Ὅμηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ βελτίονός τε ⁷⁷ καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ. ἐν τούτοις ἐναργῶς ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιδείκνυσιν ἕτερον ὑπάρχον τὸ θυμούμενον τοῦ λογιζομένου. οἱ γοῦν παῖδες ὥσπερ καὶ τὰ θηρία θυμοῦ ⁷⁸ μὲν πλήρεις εἰσί͵ λογισμοῦ δὲ ἥκιστα μετέχουσιν. ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν θηρίων ἐτόλμησαν ἔνιοι λέγειν οὔτε θυμὸν οὔτ΄ ἐπιθυμίαν ἐνυπάρχειν αὐτῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς͵ ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν παίδων οὐκ οἶδ΄ ὅ τι φήσουσιν. ⁷⁹ οὐ γὰρ δή γε καὶ τὰ τούτων πάθη διὰ συλλογισμοῦ χρὴ μαθεῖν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀναμνησθῆναι μό νον αὔταρκες ὡς οὐκ ἄλλως μὲν νῦν ἄλλως δὲ παῖδες ὄντες θυμούμεθα· καὶ γὰρ δύναμις ἡ αὐτὴ καὶ ὁ τρόπος τῆς τοῦ ⁸⁰ πάθους γενέσεως ὅμοιος. ἓν δὲ μόνον ἐξαίρετον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τελείοις ἀνδράσιν͵ ὅταν γε μὴ κατὰ πάθος ζῶσιν ἀλλὰ λογισμὸς αὐτῶν ἐξηγῆται τοῦ βίου· κατέχουσιν ἐν πολ λαῖς πράξεσι τὸν θυμόν͵ ὥσπερ τις νομεὺς κύνα γενναῖον ἀγριώτερον ἐκφερόμενον ἐπὶ τοὺς πέλας. ⁸¹ ἐν δὲ τοῖς παισὶν οὐδὲν γίγνεται τοιοῦτον͵ ὥσπερ οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις͵ ὅτι τοῖς μὲν οὐδέπω τοῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε λογισμὸς ἄρχει τῶν ὁρμῶν. ⁸² ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς εἴρηται τῷ Πλάτωνι καὶ προσέτι τὸ κατὰ τὴν τελευτὴν τῆς ῥήσεως γεγραμμένον͵ ἔνθα τὸν Ὅμη ρον ἐπάγεται μάρτυρα ταυτὶ λέγοντα·

“Striking his breast he rebuked his heart with words.” “Here”, Plato says, “Homer has presented the two parts as distinct: the part that has reflected on what is better or worse rebukes the part that is irrationally angry.”

στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ· ἐνταῦθα γάρ φησιν ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ πεποίηκεν ἐπιπλῆττον τὸ ἀναλογισάμενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ ἀλογίστως θυμουμένῳ.

I could have wished that Chrysippus had read this passage ⁸³ and given it his attention. He would surely have derived some profit from it himself, by learning on what occasions one may properly call Homer as a witness, and about what subjects. For one thing, witnesses ⁸⁴ should not be called at the beginning of the argument, but when you have proved adequately what you set out to prove, then there is no objection to calling on men of earlier times to testify; and also, they should not be called to testify about matters that are utterly obscure but either about evident facts or about things the indication of which lies close to sense-perception — as is the case with the affections of the soul which do not require extended arguments or more precise proofs, but only reminders of what we experience on each occasion, as Posidonius also said. Witnesses contribute little to the proof ⁸⁵ that the reasoning part is in the brain or the angry part in the heart; there the entire matter must be turned over to scientific demonstration. But no lengthy proof or testimony of sages is required to establish ⁸⁶ that the rational part (of the soul) is other than the angry part. It is enough to quote the evidence of H o m e r in the passages just eited, or again of Thucydides when he says, “And those who least use reason most often turn to action in anger”; or even of Dem osthenes , who says, “Indeed if a person is carried away suddenly, outstripping his reason, he will perforin acts lawlessly; it can be said that he did Chem in anger”; and in addition, of all the other orators, poets, and storytellers. For because the fact is so clear there is no one who does not understand it in this way. The passage from Plato quoted above ⁸⁷ must therefore be read attentively for a number of reasons, and especially in order to observe how unerringly he called upon Homer, not for testimony that reason is in the brain and anger in the heart, but only that the angry part of the soul is not the same as the rational. All men know the latter, because it is obvious; but they do not all know the former in the same way, and the point itself requires demonstration. I have decided, therefore, to terminate the present book ⁸⁸ at this point and to turn in the next (book) to the proof that the three parts of the soul are spatially separate.

⁸³ ἠβουλόμην δ΄ ἂν καὶ τὸν Χρύσιππον ἀνεγνακέναι τε τὴν ῥῆσιν αὐτοῦ προσεσχηκέναι τε τὸν νοῦν αὐτῇ. πάντως γὰρ ἄν τι καὶ αὐτὸς ὤνητο μαθὼν ὁπηνίκα τε προσήκει καλεῖν Ὅμηρον μάρτυρα καὶ περὶ τίνων πραγμά των. ⁸⁴ οὔτε γὰρ ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν λόγων͵ ἀλλ΄ ἐπειδὰν ἱκανῶς ἀποδείξῃ τις τὸ προκείμενον ἀνεπίφθονον ἤδη καὶ τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους ἐπικαλεῖσθαι μαρτυρήσοντας οὔτε περὶ πραγμά των ἀδήλων παντάπασιν ἀλλ΄ ἤτοι περὶ φαινομένων ἐναρ γῶς ἢ παρακειμένην αἰσθήσει τὴν ἔνδειξιν ἐχόντων͵ οἷάπερ ἐστὶ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς͵ οὐ μακρῶν λόγων οὐδ΄ ἀποδείξεων ἀκριβεστέρων δεόμενα͵ μόνης δὲ ἀναμνήσεως ὧν ἑκάστοτε ⁸⁵ πάσχομεν͵ ὡς καὶ Ποσειδώνιος εἶπεν. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἐγκε φάλῳ τὸ λογιζόμενόν ἐστιν ἢ ἐν καρδίᾳ τὸ θυμούμενον οὐ μεγάλην μοῖραν πρὸς πίστιν ἐκ τῶν μαρτύρων͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀποδείξει χρὴ τὸ πᾶν ἐπιτρέπειν ἐνταῦθα· ⁸⁶ τὸ δὲ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ θυμουμένου τὸ λογιζόμενον οὔτ΄ ἀποδείξεως δεῖται μακρᾶς οὔτε σοφῶν τῶν μαρτυρησόντων ἀλλ΄ ἀρκεῖ μὲν καὶ Ὅμηρος ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀρτίως ῥηθεῖσι μαρτυρῶν͵ ἀρκεῖ δὲ καὶ Θουκυδίδης λέγων καὶ οἱ λογισμῷ ἐλάχιστα χρώμενοι θυμῷ πλεῖστα εἰς ἔργον καθίστανται͵ ἀρκεῖ δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένης εἰπών ἀλλὰ μὴν ἄν τις ἄφνω τὸν λογισμὸν φθάσας ἐξαχθῇ͵ πράξεις ὑβριστικῶς ποιήσει͵ δι΄ ὀργήν γ΄ ἔνι [Πλάτων] φῆσαι πεποιηκέναι· πρὸς τούτοις οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες καὶ ῥήτορες καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ μυθολόγοι· διὰ γὰρ τὴν ἐνάργειαν τοῦ πράγμα ⁸⁷ τος οὐδείς ἐστιν ὃς οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκει. προσεκτέον οὖν ἐστι τῇ προγεγραμμένῃ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ῥήσει τῶν τε ἄλλων ἕνεκα καὶ ὅπως ἀσφαλῶς οὐ περὶ τοῦ κατὰ μὲν τὸν ἐγκέ φαλον εἶναι τὸ λογιζόμενον͵ ἐν καρδίᾳ δὲ τὸ θυμούμενον͵ ἐπεκαλέσατο μαρτυρήσοντα τὸν Ὅμηρον͵ ἀλλὰ περὶ μόνου τοῦ διαφέρειν τὸ θυμούμενον τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ λογιζομένου. τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντες ἄνθρωποι γιγνώσκουσι δι΄ ἐνάργειαν͵ ἐκεῖνο ⁸⁸ δ΄ οὐκέθ΄ ὁμοίως ἅπαντες͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀποδείξεως αὐτὸ δεῖ. διό μοι δοκῶ κἀγὼ καταπαύειν μὲν ἤδη τὸν ἐνεστῶτα λόγον͵ ἐν δὲ τῷ μετ΄ αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπόδειξιν τρέπεσθαι τοῦ καὶ τοῖς τόποις διωρίσθαι τὰ τρία μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς.