340. What Cannot be Written

Letter 7. 340. What Cannot be Written

Letter 7 (340-344)

On my arrival, I thought that first I must put to the test the question whether Dionysios had really been kindled with the fire of philosophy, or whether all the reports which had come to Athens were empty rumours.

^340.b ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀφικόμην͵ ᾤμην τούτου πρῶτον ἔλεγχον δεῖν λαβεῖν͵ πότερον ὄντως εἴη Διονύσιος ἐξημμένος ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας ὥσπερ πυρός͵ ἢ μάτην ὁ πολὺς οὗτος ἔλθοι λόγος Ἀθήναζε.

Now there is a way of putting such things to the test which is not to be despised and is well suited to monarchs, especially to those who have got their heads full of erroneous teaching, which immediately my arrival I found to be very much the case with Dionysios.

ἔστιν δή τις τρόπος τοῦ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πεῖραν λαμβάνειν οὐκ ἀγεννὴς ἀλλ΄ ὄντως τυράννοις πρέπων͵ ἄλλως τε καὶ τοῖς τῶν παρακουσμάτων μεστοῖς͵ ὃ δὴ κἀγὼ Διονύσιον εὐθὺς ἐλθὼν ᾐσθόμην καὶ μάλα πεπονθότα.

One should show such men what philosophy is in all its extent; what their range of studies is by which it is approached, and how much labour it involves.

δει κνύναι δὴ δεῖ τοῖς τοιούτοις ὅτι ἔστι πᾶν τὸ πρᾶγμα οἷόν τε ^340.c καὶ δι΄ ὅσων πραγμάτων καὶ ὅσον πόνον ἔχει.

For the man who has heard this, if he has the true philosophic spirit and that godlike temperament which makes him a kin to philosophy and worthy of it, thinks that he has been told of a marvellous road lying before him, that he must forthwith press on with all his strength, and that life is not worth living if he does anything else.

ὁ γὰρ ἀκούσας͵ ἐὰν μὲν ὄντως ᾖ φιλόσοφος οἰκεῖός τε καὶ ἄξιος τοῦ πρά γματος θεῖος ὤν͵ ὁδόν τε ἡγεῖται θαυμαστὴν ἀκηκοέναι συν τατέον τε εἶναι νῦν καὶ οὐ βιωτὸν ἄλλως ποιοῦντι·

After this he uses to the full his own powers and those of his guide in the path, and relaxes not his efforts, till he has either reached the end of the whole course of study or gained such power that he is not incapable of directing his steps without the aid of a guide.

μετὰ τοῦτο δὴ συντείνας αὐτός τε καὶ τὸν ἡγούμενον τὴν ὁδόν͵ οὐκ ἀνίησιν πρὶν ἂν ἢ τέλος ἐπιθῇ πᾶσιν͵ ἢ λάβῃ δύναμιν ὥστε αὐτὸς αὑτὸν χωρὶς τοῦ δείξοντος δυνατὸς εἶναι ποδηγεῖν. ^340.d

This is the spirit and these are the thoughts by which such a man guides his life, carrying out his work, whatever his occupation may be, but throughout it all ever cleaving to philosophy and to such rules of diet in his daily life as will give him inward sobriety and therewith quickness in learning, a good memory, and reasoning power; the kind of life which is opposed to this he consistently hates.

ταύτῃ καὶ κατὰ ταῦτα διανοηθεὶς ὁ τοιοῦτος ζῇ͵ πράτ των μὲν ἐν αἷστισιν ἂν ᾖ πράξεσιν͵ παρὰ πάντα δὲ ἀεὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐχόμενος καὶ τροφῆς τῆς καθ΄ ἡμέραν ἥτις ἂν αὐτὸν μάλιστα εὐμαθῆ τε καὶ μνήμονα καὶ λογίζεσθαι δυνα τὸν ἐν αὑτῷ νήφοντα ἀπεργάζηται· τὴν δὲ ἐναντίαν ταύτῃ μισῶν διατελεῖ. οἱ δὲ ὄντως μὲν μὴ φιλόσοφοι͵ δόξαις δ΄ μισῶν διατελεῖ.

Those who have not the true philosophic temper, but a mere surface colouring of opinions penetrating, like sunburn, only skin deep, when they see how great the range of studies is, how much labour is involved in it,

οἱ δὲ ὄντως μὲν μὴ φιλόσοφοι͵ δόξαις δ΄ ἐπικεχρωσμένοι͵ καθάπερ οἱ τὰ σώματα ὑπὸ τῶν ἡλίων ἐπικεκαυμένοι͵ ἰδόντες τε ὅσα μαθήματά ἐστιν καὶ ὁ πόνος ^340.e ἡλίκος καὶ δίαιτα ἡ καθ΄ ἡμέραν ὡς

and how necessary to the pursuit it is to have an orderly regulation of the daily life, come to the conclusion that the thing is difficult and impossible for them, and are actually incapable of carrying out the course of study; while some of them persuade themselves that they have sufficiently studied the whole matter and have no need of any further effort.

πρέπουσα ἡ κοσμία τῷ πράγματι͵ χαλεπὸν ἡγησάμενοι καὶ ἀδύνατον αὑτοῖς͵ οὔτε δὴ ^341.a ἐπιτηδεύειν δυνατοὶ γίγνονται͵ ἔνιοι δὲ αὐτῶν πείθουσιν αὑτοὺς ὡς ἱκανῶς ἀκηκοότες εἰσὶν τὸ ὅλον͵ καὶ οὐδὲν ἔτι δέονταί τινων πραγμάτων.

This is the sure test and is the safest one to apply to those who live in luxury and are incapable of continuous effort; it ensures that such a man shall not throw the blame upon his teacher but on himself, because he cannot bring to the pursuit all the qualities necessary to it. Thus it came about that I said to Dionysios what I did say on that occasion.

ἡ μὲν δὴ πεῖρα αὕτη γίγνεται ἡ σαφής τε καὶ ἀσφαλεστάτη πρὸς τοὺς τρυφῶντάς τε καὶ ἀδυνάτους διαπονεῖν͵ ὡς μηδέποτε βαλεῖν ἐν αἰτίᾳ τὸν δεικνύντα ἀλλ΄ αὐτὸν αὑτόν͵ μὴ δυνάμενον πάντα τὰ πρόσ φορα ἐπιτηδεύειν τῷ πράγματι. οὕτω δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ τότ΄ ἐρρήθη τὰ ῥηθέντα.

I did not, however, give a complete exposition, nor did Dionysios ask for one. For he professed to know many, and those the most important, points, and to have a sufficient hold of them through instruction given by others.

πάντα μὲν οὖν οὔτ΄ ἐγὼ διεξῆλθον οὔτε ^341.b Διονύσιος ἐδεῖτο· πολλὰ γὰρ αὐτὸς καὶ τὰ μέγιστα εἰδέναι τε καὶ ἱκανῶς ἔχειν προσεποιεῖτο διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων παρακοάς.

I hear also that he has since written about what he heard from me, composing what professes to be his own handbook, very different, so he says, from the doctrines which he heard from me; but of its contents I know nothing; I know indeed that others have written on the same subjects; but who they are, is more than they know themselves.

ὕστερον δὲ καὶ ἀκούω γεγραφέναι αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν τότε ἤκουσε͵ συνθέντα ὡς αὑτοῦ τέχνην͵ οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν ἀκούοι· οἶδα δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων. ἄλλους μέν τινας οἶδα γεγραφότας περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων͵ οἵτινες δέ͵ οὐδ΄ αὐτοὶ αὑτούς.

Thus much at least, I can say about all writers, past or future, who say they know the things to which I devote myself, whether by hearing the teaching of me or of others, or by their own discoveries-that according to my view it is not possible for them to have any real skill in the matter.

τοσόνδε γε μὴν περὶ πάντων ἔχω φράζειν τῶν γε ^341.c γραφότων καὶ γραψόντων͵ ὅσοι φασὶν εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐγὼ ^342.a.4 σπουδάζω͵ εἴτ΄ ἐμοῦ ἀκηκοότες εἴτ΄ ἄλλων εἴθ΄ ὡς εὑρόντες αὐτοί·τούτους οὐκ ἔστιν κατά γε τὴν ἐμὴν δόξαν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἐπαΐειν οὐδέν.

There neither is nor ever will be a treatise of mine on the subject.

 οὔκουν ἐμόν γε περὶ αὐτῶν ἔστιν σύγγραμμα οὐδὲ μήποτε γένηται

FOR it does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge;

·ῥητὸν γὰρ οὐδαμῶς ἐστιν ὡς ἄλλα μαθήματα͵

but after much conversation [communion] about the matter itself

and a life lived together,

ἀλλ΄ ἐκ πολλῆς συνουσίας γιγνομένης περὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα αὐτὸ

      καὶ τοῦ συζῆν ἐξαίφνης͵

suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled ^[341d]  in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself. [see 344c]

 οἷον ἀπὸ πυρὸς ^341.d πηδήσαντος ἐξαφθὲν φῶς͵ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γενόμενον αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ ἤδη τρέφει.

Yet this much I know-that if the things were written or put into words, it would be done best by me, and that, if they were written badly, I should be the person most pained.

καίτοι τοσόνδε γε οἶδα͵ ὅτι γραφέντα ἢ λεχθέντα ὑπ΄ ἐμοῦ βέλτιστ΄ ἂν λεχθείη· καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε γραμμένα κακῶς οὐχ ἥκιστ΄ ἂν ἐμὲ λυποῖ.

Again, if they had appeared to me to admit adequately of writing and exposition, what task in life could I have performed nobler than this, to write what is of great service to mankind and ^[341e]  to bring the nature of things into the light for all to see?

εἰ δέ μοι ἐφαίνετο γραπτέα θ΄ ἱκανῶς εἶναι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ ῥητά͵ τί τούτου κάλλιον ἐπέπρακτ΄ ἂν ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἢ τοῖς τε ἀνθρώποισι μέγα ὄφελος γράψαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν εἰς φῶς ^341.e πᾶσιν προαγαγεῖν;

But I do not think it a good thing for men that there should be a disquisition, as it is called, on this topic-except for some few, who are able with a little teaching to find it out for themselves.

ἀλλ΄ οὔτε ἀνθρώποις ἡγοῦμαι τὴν ἐπι χείρησιν περὶ αὐτῶν λεγομένην ἀγαθόν͵ εἰ μή τισιν ὀλίγοις ὁπόσοι δυνατοὶ ἀνευρεῖν αὐτοὶ διὰ σμικρᾶς ἐνδείξεως͵

As for the rest, it would fill some of them quite illogically with a mistaken feeling of contempt, and others with lofty and vain-glorious expectations, as though they had learnt something high and mighty.

τῶν τε δὴ ἄλλων τοὺς μὲν καταφρονήσεως οὐκ ὀρθῆς ἐμπλήσειεν ἂν οὐδαμῇ ἐμμελῶς͵ τοὺς δὲ ὑψηλῆς καὶ χαύνης ἐλπίδος͵ ὡς ^342.a σέμν΄ ἄττα μεμαθηκότας. ἔτι δὲ μακρότερα περὶ αὐτῶν ἐννῷμοι γέγονεν εἰπεῖν·

On this point I intend to speak a little more at length; for perhaps, when I have done so, things will be clearer with regard to my present subject. There is an argument which holds good against the man ventures to put anything whatever into writing on questions of this nature; it has often before been stated by me, and it seems suitable to the present occasion.

τάχα γὰρ ἂν περὶ ὧν λέγω σα φέστερον ἂν εἴη λεχθέντων αὐτῶν. ἔστι γάρ τις λόγος ἀληθής͵ ἐναντίος τῷ τολμήσαντι γράφειν τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ὁτιοῦν͵ πολλάκις μὲν ὑπ΄ ἐμοῦ καὶ πρόσθεν ῥηθείς͵ ἔοικεν δ΄ οὖν εἶναι καὶ νῦν λεκτέος.

FOR everything that exists there are three instruments by which the knowledge of it is necessarily imparted; fourth, there is the knowledge itself, and, as fifth, we must count the thing itself which is known and truly exists.

Ἔστιν τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστῳ͵ δι΄ ὧν τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἀνάγκη παραγίγνεσθαι͵ τρία͵ τέταρτον δ΄ αὐτήπέμπτον δ΄ αὐτὸ ^342.b τιθέναι δεῖ ὃ δὴ γνωστόν τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ἐστιν

The first is the name, the, second the definition, the third. the image, and the fourth the knowledge. If you wish to learn what I mean, take these in the case of one instance, and so understand them in the case of all. A circle is a thing spoken of, and its name is that very word which we have just uttered.

ὄνἓν μὲν ὄνομα͵ δεύτερον δὲ λόγος͵ τὸ δὲ τρίτον εἴδωλον͵ τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη. περὶ ἓν οὖν λαβὲ βουλόμενος μαθεῖν τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον͵ καὶ πάντων οὕτω πέρι νόησον. κύκλος ἐστίν τι λεγόμενον͵ ᾧ τοῦτ΄ αὐτό ἐστιν ὄνομα ὃ νῦν ἐφθέγμεθα.

The second thing belonging to it is its definition, made up names and verbal forms. For that which has the name “round,” “annular,” or, “circle,” might be defined as that which has the distance from its circumference to its centre everywhere equal.

λόγος δ΄ αὐτοῦ τὸ δεύτερον͵ ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων συγ κείμενος· τὸ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν ἐσχάτων ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον ἴσον ἀπέχον πάντῃ͵ λόγος ἂν εἴη ἐκείνου ᾧπερ στρογγύλον καὶ περιφερὲς ^342.c ὄνομα καὶ κύκλος.

Third, comes that which is drawn and rubbed out again, or turned on a lathe and broken up-none of which things can happen to the circle itself-to which the other things, mentioned have reference; for it is something of a different order from them.

τρίτον δὲ τὸ ζωγραφούμενόν τε καὶ ἐξαλειφόμενον καὶ τορνευόμενον καὶ ἀπολλύμενον· ὧν αὐτὸς ὁ κύκλος͵ ὃν πέρι πάντ΄ ἐστὶν ταῦτα͵ οὐδὲν πάσχει͵ τούτων ὡς ἕτερον ὄν.

Fourth, comes knowledge, intelligence and right opinion about these things. Under this one head we must group everything which has its existence, not in words nor in bodily shapes, but in souls-from which it is dear (?clear?) that it is something different from the nature of the circle itself and from the three things mentioned before.

τέταρτον δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ νοῦς ἀληθής τε δόξα περὶ ταῦτ΄ ἐστίν· ὡς δὲ ἓν τοῦτο αὖ πᾶν θετέον͵ οὐκ ἐν φωναῖς οὐδ΄ ἐν σωμάτων σχήμασιν ἀλλ΄ ἐν ψυχαῖς ἐνόν͵ ᾧ δῆλον ἕτερόν τε ὂν αὐτοῦ τοῦ κύκλου τῆς φύσεως τῶν ^342.d τε ἔμπροσθεν λεχθέντων τριῶν.

Of these things intelligence comes closest in kinship and likeness to the fifth, and the others are farther distant.

τούτων δὲ ἐγγύτατα μὲν συγγενείᾳ καὶ ὁμοιότητι τοῦ πέμπτου νοῦς πεπλησίακεν͵

The same applies to straight as well as to circular form, to colours, to the good, the, beautiful, the just, to all bodies whether manufactured or coming into being in the course of nature, to fire, water, and all such things, to every living being, to character in souls, and to all things done and suffered.

^342.d.4  περιφεροῦς σχήματος καὶ χρόας͵ περί τε ἀγαθοῦ καὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου͵ καὶ περὶ σώματος ἅπαντος σκευαστοῦ τε καὶ κατὰ φύσιν γεγονότος͵ πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πάντων͵ καὶ ζῴου σύμπαντος πέρι καὶ ἐν ψυχαῖς ἤθους͵ καὶ περὶ ποιήματα καὶ παθήματα σύμπαντα·

For in the case of all these, no one, if he has not some how or other got hold of the four things first mentioned, can ever be completely a partaker of knowledge of the fifth.

οὐ γὰρ ἂν τούτων ^342.e μή τις τὰ τέτταρα λάβῃ ἁμῶς γέ πως͵ οὔποτε τελέως ἐπιστήμης τοῦ πέμπτου μέτοχος ἔσται.

Further, on account of the weakness of language, these (i.e., the four) attempt to show what each thing is like, not less than what each thing is.

πρὸς γὰρ τούτοις ταῦτα οὐχ ἧττον ἐπιχειρεῖ τὸ ποῖόν τι περὶ ἕκαστον δηλοῦν ^343.a ἢ τὸ ὂν ἑκάστου διὰ τὸ τῶν λόγων ἀσθενές·

For this reason no man of intelligence will venture to express his philosophical views in language, especially not in language that is unchangeable, which is true of that which is set down in written characters.

ὧν ἕνεκα νοῦν ἔχων οὐδεὶς τολμήσει ποτὲ εἰς αὐτὸ τιθέναι τὰ νενοημένα ὑπ΄ αὐτοῦ͵ καὶ ταῦτα εἰς ἀμετακίνητον͵ ὃ δὴ πάσχει τὰ γεγραμμένα τύποις. τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον δεῖ μαθεῖν.

Again you must learn the point which comes next. Every circle, of those which are by the act of man drawn or even turned on a lathe, is full of that which is opposite to the fifth thing. For everywhere it has contact with the straight.

κύκλος ἕκαστος τῶν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι γραφο μένων ἢ καὶ τορνευθέντων μεστὸς τοῦ ἐναντίου ἐστὶν τῷ πέμπτῳτοῦ γὰρ εὐθέος ἐφάπτεται πάντῃαὐτὸς δέ͵ φαμέν͵

But the circle itself, we say, has nothing in either smaller or greater, of that which is its opposite.

ὁ κύκλος οὔτε τι σμικρότερον οὔτε μεῖζον τῆς ἐναντίας ἔχει ἐν αὑτῷ φύσεως.

We say also that the name is not a thing of permanence for any of them, and that nothing prevents the things now called round from being called straight, and the straight things round; for those who make changes and call things by opposite names, nothing will be less permanent (than a name).

ὄνομά τε αὐτῶν φαμεν οὐδὲν οὐδενὶ ^343.b βέβαιον εἶναι͵ κωλύειν δ΄ οὐδὲν τὰ νῦν στρογγύλα καλού μενα εὐθέα κεκλῆσθαι τά τε εὐθέα δὴ στρογγύλα͵ καὶ οὐδὲν ἧττον βεβαίως ἕξειν τοῖς μεταθεμένοις καὶ ἐναντίως καλοῦσιν.

Again with regard to the definition, if it is made up of names and verbal forms, the same remark holds that there is no sufficiently durable permanence in it. And there is no end to the instances of the ambiguity from which each of the four suffers; but the greatest of them is that which we mentioned a little earlier,

καὶ μὴν περὶ λόγου γε ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος͵ εἴπερ ἐξ ὀνομάτων καὶ ῥημάτων σύγκειται͵ μηδὲν ἱκανῶς βεβαίως εἶναι βέ βαιον· μυρίος δὲ λόγος αὖ περὶ ἑκάστου τῶν τεττάρων ὡς τοῦτο δὲ πάλιν αὖ τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον δεῖ μαθεῖν. ἀσαφές͵ τὸ δὲ μέγιστον͵ ὅπερ εἴπομεν ὀλίγον ἔμπροσθεν͵

that, whereas there are two things, that which has real being, and that which is only a quality, when the soul is seeking to know, not the quality, but the essence, each of the four, presenting to the soul by word and in act that which it is not seeking (i.e., the quality),

ὅτι δυοῖν ὄντοιν͵ τοῦ τε ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ποιοῦ τινος͵ οὐ τὸ ^343.c ποιόν τι͵ τὸ δὲ τί͵ ζητούσης εἰδέναι τῆς ψυχῆς͵ τὸ μὴ ζητού μενον ἕκαστον τῶν τεττάρων προτεῖνον τῇ ψυχῇ λόγῳ τε καὶ κατ΄ ἔργα͵

a thing open to refutation by the senses, being merely the thing presented to the soul in each particular case whether by statement or the act of showing, fills, one may say, every man with puzzlement and perplexity.

αἰσθήσεσιν εὐέλεγκτον τό τε λεγόμενον καὶ δεικνύμενον ἀεὶ παρεχόμενον ἕκαστον͵ ἀπορίας τε καὶ ἀσα φείας ἐμπίμπλησι πάσης ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν πάντ΄ ἄνδρα.

Now in subjects in which, by reason of our defective education, we have not been accustomed even to search for the truth, but are satisfied with whatever images are presented to us,

ἐν οἷσι μὲν οὖν μηδ΄ εἰθισμένοι τὸ ἀληθὲς ζητεῖν ἐσμεν ὑπὸ πονηρᾶς τροφῆς͵ ἐξαρκεῖ δὲ τὸ προταθὲν τῶν εἰδώλων͵

we are not held up to ridicule by one another, the questioned by questioners, who can pull to pieces and criticise the four things. But in subjects where we try to compel a man to give a clear answer about the fifth, any one of those who are capable of overthrowing an antagonist gets the better of us, and makes the man,

οὐ καταγέλαστοι γιγνόμεθα ὑπ΄ ἀλλήλων͵ οἱ ἐρωτώμενοι ὑπὸ ^343.d τῶν ἐρωτώντων͵ δυναμένων δὲ τὰ τέτταρα διαρρίπτειν τε καὶ ἐλέγχειν· ἐν οἷς δ΄ ἂν τὸ πέμπτον ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ δηλοῦν ἀναγκάζωμεν͵ ὁ βουλόμενος τῶν δυναμένων ἀνατρέπειν κρατεῖ.

who gives an exposition in speech or writing or in replies to questions, appear to most of his hearers to know nothing of the things on which he is attempting to write or speak; for they are sometimes not aware that it is not the mind of the writer or speaker which is proved to be at fault, but the defective nature of each of the four instruments.

καὶ ποιεῖ τὸν ἐξηγούμενον ἐν λόγοις ἢ γράμ μασιν ἢ ἀποκρίσεσιν τοῖς πολλοῖς τῶν ἀκουόντων δοκεῖν μηδὲν γιγνώσκειν ὧν ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ γράφειν ἢ λέγειν͵ ἀγνο ούντων ἐνίοτε ὡς οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ γράψαντος ἢ λέξαντος ἐλέγχεται͵ ἀλλ΄ ἡ τῶν τεττάρων φύσις ἑκάστου͵ πεφυκυῖα 343.e φαύλως.

The process however of dealing with all of these, as the mind moves up and down to each in turn, does after much effort give birth in a well-constituted mind to knowledge of that which is well constituted.

ἡ δὲ διὰ πάντων αὐτῶν διαγωγή͵ ἄνω καὶ κάτω μεταβαίνουσα ἐφ΄ ἕκαστον͵ μόγις ἐπιστήμην ἐνέτεκεν εὖ πεφυκότος εὖ πεφυκότι·

But if a man is ill-constituted by nature (as the state of the soul is naturally in the majority both in its capacity for learning and in what is called moral character)-or it may have become so by deterioration-not even Lynceus could endow such men with the power of sight.

κακῶς δὲ ἂν φυῇ͵ ὡς ἡ τῶν πολλῶν ἕξις τῆς ψυχῆς εἴς τε τὸ μαθεῖν εἴς τε τὰ λεγόμενα ἤθη ^344.a.1  πέφυκεν͵ τὰ δὲ διέφθαρται͵ οὐδ΄ ἂν ὁ Λυγκεὺς ἰδεῖν ποιή σειεν τοὺς τοιούτους.

In one word, the man who has no natural kinship with this matter cannot be made akin to it by quickness of learning or memory; for it cannot be engendered at all in natures which are foreign to it.

ἑνὶ δὲ λόγῳ͵ τὸν μὴ συγγενῆ τοῦ πράγματος οὔτ΄ ἂν εὐμάθεια ποιήσειέν ποτε οὔτε μνήμη τὴν ἀρχὴν γὰρ ἐν ἀλλοτρίαις ἕξεσιν οὐκ ἐγγίγνεταιὥστε

Therefore, if men are not by nature kinship allied to justice and all other things that are honourable, though they may be good at learning and remembering other knowledge of various kinds-or if they have the kinship but are slow learners and have no memory-none of all these will ever learn to the full the truth about virtue and vice.

ὁπόσοι τῶν δικαίων τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα καλὰ μὴ προσφυεῖς εἰσιν καὶ συγγενεῖς͵ ἄλλοι δὲ ἄλλων εὐμαθεῖς ἅμα καὶ μνήμονες͵ οὐδ΄ ὅσοι συγγενεῖς͵ δυσμαθεῖς δὲ καὶ ἀμνή μονες͵ οὐδένες τούτων μήποτε μάθωσιν ἀλήθειαν ἀρετῆς εἰς 344.b τὸ δυνατὸν οὐδὲ κακίας.

After much effort, as names, definitions, sights, and other data of sense, are brought into contact and friction one with another, in the course of scrutiny and kindly testing by men who proceed by question and answer without ill will,

μόγις δὲ τριβόμενα πρὸς ἄλληλα αὐτῶν ἕκαστα͵ ὀνόματα καὶ λόγοι ὄψεις τε καὶ αἰσθήσεις͵ ἐν εὐμενέσιν ἐλέγχοις ἐλεγχόμενα καὶ ἄνευ φθόνων ἐρωτήσεσιν καὶ ἀποκρίσεσιν χρωμένων͵

WITH a sudden flash [illumination] there shines forth understanding about every problem, and nous [an intelligence]

whose efforts reach the furthest limits of human powers. [see 341c]

ἐξέλαμψε φρόνησις περὶ ἕκαστον καὶ νοῦς͵

συντείνων ὅτι 344.c μάλιστ΄ εἰς δύναμιν ἀνθρωπίνην.

 In one word, then, it may be known from this that, if one sees written treatises composed by anyone, either the laws of a lawgiver, or in any other form whatever, these are not for that man the things of most worth, if he is a man of worth, but that his treasures are laid up in the fairest spot that he possesses. But if these things were worked at by him as things of real worth, and committed to writing, then surely, not gods, but men “have themselves bereft him of his wits.”

 ἑνὶ δὴ ἐκ τούτων δεῖ γιγνώσκειν λόγῳ͵ ὅταν ἴδῃ τίς του συγγράμματα γεγραμμένα εἴτε ἐν νόμοις νομοθέτου εἴτε ἐν ἄλλοις τισὶν ἅττ΄ οὖν͵ ὡς οὐκ ἦν τούτῳ ταῦτα σπουδαιότατα͵ εἴπερ ἔστ΄ αὐτὸς σπουδαῖος͵ κεῖται δέ που ἐν χώρᾳ τῇ καλλίστῃ τῶν τούτου· εἰ δὲ ὄντως αὐτῷ ταῦτ΄ ἐσπουδασμένα ἐν γράμ ^344.d μασιν ἐτέθη͵ ἐξ ἄρα δή τοι ἔπειτα͵ θεοὶ μὲν οὔ͵ βροτοὶ δὲ φρένας ὤλεσαν αὐτοί.