(Book 1, concl.)

wisdom (sophia) and understanding (sunesis) and prudence (phronēsis) being intellectual, [Evag. Prk 89]

liberality (eleutheriotēta) and temperance (sōphrosunē) moral.

For in speaking about a man's character we do not say that he is wise or has understanding but that he is good-tempered or temperate; yet we praise the wise man also with respect to his state of mind; and of states of mind we call those which merit praise virtues

  λέγοντες γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἤθους οὐ λέγομεν ὅτι σοφὸς ἢ συνετὸς ἀλλ΄ ὅτι πρᾶος ἢ σώφρων· ἐπαινοῦμεν δὲ καὶ τὸν σοφὸν κατὰ τὴν ἕξιν· τῶν ἕξεων δὲ τὰς ἐπαινετὰς ἀρετὰς λέγομεν.

BOOK 2

2.1.  VIRTUE, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of habit, whence also its name (ethikē) is one that is formed by a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a habit contrary to its nature. For instance the stone which by nature moves downwards cannot be habituated to move upwards, not even if one tries to train it by throwing it up ten thousand times; nor can fire be habituated to move downwards, nor can anything else that by nature behaves in one way be trained to behave in another. Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by habit.

  Διττῆς δὴ τῆς ἀρετῆς οὔσης͵ τῆς μὲν διανοητικῆς τῆς δὲ ἠθικῆς͵ ἡ μὲν διανοητικὴ τὸ πλεῖον ἐκ διδασκαλίας ἔχει καὶ τὴν γένεσιν καὶ τὴν αὔξησιν͵ διόπερ ἐμπειρίας δεῖται καὶ χρόνου͵ ἡ δ΄ ἠθικὴ ἐξ ἔθους περιγίνεται͵ ὅθεν καὶ τοὔνομα ἔσχηκε μικρὸν παρεκκλῖνον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους. ἐξ οὗ καὶ δῆλον ὅτι οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται· οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται͵ οἷον ὁ λίθος φύσει κάτω φερόμενος οὐκ ἂν ἐθισθείη ἄνω φέρεσθαι͵ οὐδ΄ ἂν μυ ριάκις αὐτὸν ἐθίζῃ τις ἄνω ῥιπτῶν͵ οὐδὲ τὸ πῦρ κάτω͵ οὐδ΄ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλως πεφυκότων ἄλλως ἂν ἐθισθείη. οὔτ΄ ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί͵ ἀλλὰ πεφυκόσι μὲν ἡμῖν δέξασθαι αὐτάς͵ τελειουμένοις δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἔθους.

Again, of all the things that come to us by nature we first acquire the potentiality and later exhibit the activity (this is plain in the case of the senses; for it was not by often seeing or often hearing that we got these senses, but on the contrary we had them before we used them, and did not come to have them by using them); but the virtues we get by first exercising them, as also happens in the case of the arts as well.

ἔτι ὅσα μὲν φύσει ἡμῖν παραγίνεται͵ τὰς δυνάμεις τούτων πρότερον κομιζόμεθα͵ ὕστερον δὲ τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀποδί δομεν (ὅπερ ἐπὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων δῆλον· οὐ γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολ λάκις ἰδεῖν ἢ πολλάκις ἀκοῦσαι τὰς αἰσθήσεις ἐλάβομεν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀνάπαλιν ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα͵ οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχο μεν)· τὰς δ΄ ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον͵ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τεχνῶν·

This is confirmed by what happens in states; for legislators make the citizens good by forming habits in them, and this is the wish of every legislator, and those who do not effect it miss their mark, and it is in this that a good constitution differs from a bad one.

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ γινό μενον ἐν ταῖς πόλεσιν· οἱ γὰρ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθί ζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθούς͵ καὶ τὸ μὲν βούλημα παντὸς νομο θέτου τοῦτ΄ ἐστίν͵ ὅσοι δὲ μὴ εὖ αὐτὸ ποιοῦσιν ἁμαρτάνουσιν͵ καὶ διαφέρει τούτῳ πολιτεία πολιτείας ἀγαθὴ φαύλης.

Again, it is from the same causes and by the same means that every virtue is both produced and destroyed, and similarly every art; for it is from playing the lyre that both good and bad lyre-players are produced. And the corresponding statement is true of builders and of all the rest; men will be good or bad builders as a result of building well or badly. For if this were not so, there would have been no need of a teacher, but all men would have been born good or bad at their craft. This, then, is the case with the virtues also; by doing the acts that we do in our transactions with other men we become just or unjust, and by doing the acts that we do in the presence of danger, and being habituated to feel fear or confidence, we become brave or cowardly. The same is true of appetites and feelings of anger; some men become temperate and good-tempered, others self-indulgent and irascible, by behaving in one way or the other in the appropriate circumstances. Thus, in one word, states of character arise out of like activities. This is why the activities we exhibit must be of a certain kind; it is because the states of character correspond to the differences between these. It makes no small difference, then, whether we form habits of one kind or of another from our very youth; it makes a very great difference, or rather all the difference.

ἔτι ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ γίνεται πᾶσα ἀρετὴ καὶ φθείρεται͵ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τέχνη· ἐκ γὰρ τοῦ κιθαρίζειν καὶ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ καὶ κακοὶ γίνονται κιθαρισταί. ἀνάλογον δὲ καὶ οἰκοδόμοι καὶ οἱ λοιποὶ πάντες· ἐκ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ εὖ οἰκοδομεῖν ἀγαθοὶ οἰκοδόμοι ἔσονται͵ ἐκ δὲ τοῦ κακῶς κακοί. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν͵ οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος͵ ἀλλὰ πάντες ἂν ἐγίνοντο ἀγαθοὶ ἢ κακοί. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει· πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γινόμεθα οἳ μὲν δίκαιοι οἳ δὲ ἄδι κοι͵ πράττοντες δὲ τὰ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς καὶ ἐθιζόμενοι φοβεῖ σθαι ἢ θαρρεῖν οἳ μὲν ἀνδρεῖοι οἳ δὲ δειλοί. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ἔχει καὶ τὰ περὶ τὰς ὀργάς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ σώφρονες καὶ πρᾶοι γίνονται͵ οἳ δ΄ ἀκόλαστοι καὶ ὀρ γίλοι͵ οἳ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναστρέφεσθαι͵ οἳ δὲ ἐκ τοῦ οὑτωσί. καὶ ἑνὶ δὴ λόγῳ ἐκ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐνεργειῶν αἱ ἕξεις γίνονται. διὸ δεῖ τὰς ἐνεργείας ποιὰς ἀποδιδόναι· κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τούτων διαφορὰς ἀκολουθοῦσιν αἱ ἕξεις. οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων ἐθίζεσθαι͵ ἀλλὰ πάμπολυ͵ μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ πᾶν.

[1] Emphasis on Practices
(& practical/ethical virtue)

2.2.  SINCE, then, the present inquiry does not aim at theoretical knowledge like the others (for we are inquiring not in order to know what virtue is, but in order to become good, since otherwise our inquiry would have been of no use), we must examine the nature of actions, namely how we ought to do them; for these determine also the nature of the states of character that are produced, as we have said. Now, that we must act according to the right rule is a common principle and must be assumed-it will be discussed later, i.e. both what the right rule is, and how it is related to the other virtues. But this must be agreed upon beforehand, that the whole account of matters of conduct must be given in outline and not precisely, as we said at the very beginning that the accounts we demand must be in accordance with the subject-matter; matters concerned with conduct and questions of what is good for us have no fixity, any more than matters of health. The general account being of this nature, the account of particular cases is yet more lacking in exactness; for they do not fall under any art or precept but the agents themselves must in each case consider what is appropriate to the occasion, as happens also in the art of medicine or of navigation.

Ἐπεὶ οὖν ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκά ἐστιν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι (οὐ γὰρ ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα͵ ἀλλ΄ ἵν΄ ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα͵ ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν ὄφελος αὐτῆς)͵ ἀναγκαῖον ἐπισκέψασθαι τὰ περὶ τὰς πράξεις͵ πῶς πρακτέον αὐτάς· αὗται γάρ εἰσι κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιὰς γενέσθαι τὰς ἕξεις͵ καθάπερ εἰρήκαμεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινὸν καὶ ὑποκείσθωῥηθή σεται δ΄ ὕστερον περὶ αὐτοῦ͵ καὶ τί ἐστιν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος͵ καὶ πῶς ἔχει πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετάς. ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιο 1104a μολογείσθω͵ ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῳ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι͵ ὥσπερ καὶ κατ΄ ἀρχὰς εἴπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητέοι· τὰ δ΄ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει͵ ὥσ περ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ΄ ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου͵ ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ΄ ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τἀκρι βές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ΄ ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει͵ δεῖ δ΄ αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν και ρὸν σκοπεῖν͵ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.

[2] Vices as Defect or Excess

But though our present account is of this nature we must give what help we can. First, then, let us consider this, that it is the nature of such things to be destroyed by defect and excess, as we see in the case of strength and of health (for to gain light on things imperceptible we must use the evidence of sensible things); both excessive and defective exercise destroys the strength, and similarly drink or food which is above or below a certain amount destroys the health, while that which is proportionate both produces and increases and preserves it. So too is it, then, in the case of temperance and courage and the other virtues. For the man who flies from and fears everything and does not stand his ground against anything becomes a coward, and the man who fears nothing at all but goes to meet every danger becomes rash; and similarly the man who indulges in every pleasure and abstains from none becomes self-indulgent, while the man who shuns every pleasure, as boors do, becomes in a way insensible; temperance and courage, then, are destroyed by excess and defect, and preserved by the mean.

ἀλλὰ καίπερ ὄντος τοιούτου τοῦ παρόντος λόγου πειρατέον βοηθεῖν. πρῶτον οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον͵ ὅτι τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπ΄ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθείρε σθαι͵(δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίοις χρῆσθαι) ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος καὶ τῆς ὑγιείας ὁρῶμεν· τά τε γὰρ ὑπερβάλλοντα γυμνάσια καὶ τὰ ἐλλείποντα φθείρει τὴν ἰσχύν͵ ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὰ ποτὰ καὶ τὰ σιτία πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω γινόμενα φθείρει τὴν ὑγίειαν͵ τὰ δὲ σύμμετρα καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξει καὶ σῴζει. οὕτως οὖν καὶ ἐπὶ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας ἔχει καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετῶν. ὅ τε γὰρ πάντα φεύγων καὶ φοβούμενος καὶ μηδὲν ὑπο μένων δειλὸς γίνεται͵ ὅ τε μηδὲν ὅλως φοβούμενος ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα βαδίζων θρασύς· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ μὲν πά σης ἡδονῆς ἀπολαύων καὶ μηδεμιᾶς ἀπεχόμενος ἀκόλα στος͵ ὁ δὲ πᾶσαν φεύγων͵ ὥσπερ οἱ ἄγροικοι͵ ἀναίσθητός τις· φθείρεται δὴ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία ὑπὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλλείψεως͵ ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς μεσότητος σῴ ζεται.

But not only are the sources and causes of their origination and growth the same as those of their destruction, but also the sphere of their actualization will be the same; for this is also true of the things which are more evident to sense, e.g. of strength; it is produced by taking much food and undergoing much exertion, and it is the strong man that will be most able to do these things. So too is it with the virtues; by abstaining from pleasures we become temperate, and it is when we have become so that we are most able to abstain from them; and similarly too in the case of courage; for by being habituated to despise things that are terrible and to stand our ground against them we become brave, and it is when we have become so that we shall be most able to stand our ground against them.

ἀλλ΄ οὐ μόνον αἱ γενέσεις καὶ αὐξήσεις καὶ αἱ φθοραὶ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν αὐτῶν γίνονται͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ ἐνέργειαι ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔσονται· καὶ γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φανερωτέρων οὕτως ἔχει͵ οἷον ἐπὶ τῆς ἰσχύος· γίνεται γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πολλὴν τροφὴν λαμβάνειν καὶ πολ λοὺς πόνους ὑπομένειν͵ καὶ μάλιστα ἂν δύναιτ΄ αὐτὰ ποιεῖν ὁ ἰσχυρός. οὕτω δ΄ ἔχει καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· ἔκ τε γὰρ τοῦ ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἡδονῶν γινόμεθα σώφρονες͵ καὶ γενό μενοι μάλιστα δυνάμεθα ἀπέχεσθαι αὐτῶν· ὁμοίως δὲ ^1104b καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας· ἐθιζόμενοι γὰρ καταφρονεῖν τῶν φο βερῶν καὶ ὑπομένειν αὐτὰ γινόμεθα ἀνδρεῖοι͵ καὶ γενό μενοι μάλιστα δυνησόμεθα ὑπομένειν τὰ φοβερά.

2.3. WE must take as a sign of states of character the pleasure or pain that ensues on acts; for the man who abstains from bodily pleasures and delights in this very fact is temperate, while the man who is annoyed at it is self-indulgent, and he who stands his ground against things that are terrible and delights in this or at least is not pained is brave, while the man who is pained is a coward. For moral excellence is concerned with pleasures and pains; it is on account of the pleasure that we do bad things, and on account of the pain that we abstain from noble ones. Hence we ought to have been brought up in a particular way from our very youth, as Plato says, so as both to delight in and to be pained by the things that we ought; for this is the right education.

Σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἕξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην ἡδονὴν ἢ λύ πην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων͵ ὁ δ΄ ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος͵ καὶ ὁ μὲν ὑπομένων τὰ δεινὰ καὶ χαίρων ἢ μὴ λυπούμενός γε ἀνδρεῖος͵ ὁ δὲ λυπούμενος δειλός. περὶ ἡδονὰς γὰρ καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή· διὰ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ἡδονὴν τὰ φαῦλα πράττομεν͵ διὰ δὲ τὴν λύπην τῶν καλῶν ἀπεχόμεθα. διὸ δεῖ ἦχθαί πως εὐθὺς ἐκ νέων͵ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησίν͵ ὥστε χαίρειν τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι οἷς δεῖ· ἡ γὰρ ὀρθὴ παιδεία αὕτη ἐστίν.

Again, if the virtues are concerned with actions and passions, and every passion and every action is accompanied by pleasure and pain, for this reason also virtue will be concerned with pleasures and pains. This is indicated also by the fact that punishment is inflicted by these means; for it is a kind of cure, and it is the nature of cures to be effected by contraries.

ἔτι δ΄ εἰ αἱ ἀρεταί εἰσι περὶ πράξεις καὶ πάθη͵ παντὶ δὲ πάθει καὶ πάσῃ πράξει ἕπε ται ἡδονὴ καὶ λύπη͵ καὶ διὰ τοῦτ΄ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας. μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αἱ κολάσεις γινόμε ναι διὰ τούτων· ἰατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν͵ αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

[3] Early Understanding of Apatheia

Again, as we said but lately, every state of soul has a nature relative to and concerned with the kind of things by which it tends to be made worse or better; but it is by reason of pleasures and pains that men become bad, by pursuing and avoiding these- either the pleasures and pains they ought not or when they ought not or as they ought not, or by going wrong in one of the other similar ways that may be distinguished.

ἔτι͵ ὡς καὶ πρῴην εἴπομεν͵ πᾶσα ψυχῆς ἕξις͵ ὑφ΄ οἵων πέφυκε γίνεσθαι χείρων καὶ βελτίων͵ πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φύ σιν ἔχει· δι΄ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας φαῦλοι γίνονται͵ τῷ διώκειν ταύτας καὶ φεύγειν͵ ἢ ἃς μὴ δεῖ ἢ ὅτε οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὡς οὐ δεῖ ἢ ὁσαχῶς ἄλλως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου διορίζεται τὰ τοιαῦτα.

Hence men even define the virtues as certain states of dispassion (apatheia) and rest; not well, however, because they speak absolutely, and do not say ‘as one ought’ and ‘as one ought not’ and ‘when one ought or ought not’, and the other things that may be added. We assume, then, that this kind of excellence tends to do what is best with regard to pleasures and pains, and vice does the contrary.

διὸ καὶ ὁρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἠρεμίας· οὐκ εὖ δέ͵ ὅτι ἁπλῶς λέγουσιν͵ ἀλλ΄ οὐχ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὡς οὐ δεῖ καὶ ὅτε͵ καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα προστίθεται. ὑπόκειται ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ εἶναι ἡ τοιαύτη περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας τῶν βελτίστων πρακτική͵ ἡ δὲ κακία τοὐναντίον.

The following facts also may show us that virtue and vice are concerned with these same things. There being three objects of choice and three of avoidance, the noble, the advantageous, the pleasant, and their contraries, the base, the injurious, the painful, about all of these the good man tends to go right and the bad man to go wrong, and especially about pleasure; for this is common to the animals, and also it accompanies all objects of choice; for even the noble and the advantageous appear pleasant.

γένοιτο δ΄ ἂν ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκ τούτων φανερὸν ὅτι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἱρέσεις καὶ τριῶν τῶν εἰς τὰς φυγάς͵ καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος͵ καὶ [τριῶν] τῶν ἐναντίων͵ αἰσχροῦ βλαβεροῦ λυπηροῦ͵ περὶ ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ὁ ἀγαθὸς κατορθωτικός ἐστιν ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἁμαρ τητικός͵ μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· κοινή τε γὰρ αὕτη τοῖς ζῴοις͵ καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἵρεσιν παρακολουθεῖ· ^1105a καὶ γὰρ τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἡδὺ φαίνεται.

Again, it has grown up with us all from our infancy; this is why it is difficult to rub off this passion, engrained as it is in our life. And we measure even our actions, some of us more and others less, by the rule of pleasure and pain. For this reason, then, our whole inquiry must be about these; for to feel delight and pain rightly or wrongly has no small effect on our actions.

ἔτι δ΄ ἐκ νηπίου πᾶσιν ἡμῖν συντέθραπται· διὸ χαλεπὸν ἀπο τρίψασθαι τοῦτο τὸ πάθος ἐγκεχρωσμένον τῷ βίῳ. κα νονίζομεν δὲ καὶ τὰς πράξεις͵ οἳ μὲν μᾶλλον οἳ δ΄ ἧττον͵ ἡδονῇ καὶ λύπῃ. διὰ τοῦτ΄ οὖν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ ταῦτα τὴν πᾶσαν πραγματείαν· οὐ γὰρ μικρὸν εἰς τὰς πράξεις εὖ ἢ κακῶς χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.

Again, it is harder to fight with pleasure than with anger, to use Heraclitus’ phrase’, but both art and virtue are always concerned with what is harder; for even the good is better when it is harder. Therefore for this reason also the whole concern both of virtue and of political science is with pleasures and pains; for the man who uses these well will be good, he who uses them badly bad.

ἔτι δὲ χαλεπώτερον ἡδονῇ μάχεσθαι ἢ θυμῷ͵ καθάπερ φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος͵ περὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον ἀεὶ καὶ τέχνη γίνεται καὶ ἀρετή· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εὖ βέλτιον ἐν τούτῳ. ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πᾶσα ἡ πραγματεία καὶ τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ εὖ τούτοις χρώμενος ἀγαθὸς ἔσται͵ ὁ δὲ κακῶς κακός.

That virtue, then, is concerned with pleasures and pains, and that by the acts from which it arises it is both increased and, if they are done differently, destroyed, and that the acts from which it arose are those in which it actualizes itself- let this be taken as said.

ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας͵ καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν γίνεται͵ ὑπὸ τούτων καὶ αὔξε ται καὶ φθείρεται μὴ ὡσαύτως γινομένων͵ καὶ ὅτι ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο͵ περὶ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεργεῖ͵ εἰρήσθω.

2.4. THE question might be asked,; what we mean by saying that we must become just by doing just acts, and temperate by doing temperate acts; for if men do just and temperate acts, they are already just and temperate, exactly as, if they do what is in accordance with the laws of grammar and of music, they are grammarians and musicians.

Ἀπορήσειε δ΄ ἄν τις πῶς λέγομεν ὅτι δεῖ τὰ μὲν δίκαια πράττοντας δικαίους γίνεσθαι͵ τὰ δὲ σώφρονα σώφρονας· εἰ γὰρ πράττουσι τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα͵ ἤδη εἰσὶ δίκαιοι καὶ σώφρονες͵ ὥσπερ εἰ τὰ γραμματικὰ καὶ τὰ μουσικά͵ γραμματικοὶ καὶ μουσικοί.

Or is this not true even of the arts? It is possible to do something that is in accordance with the laws of grammar, either by chance or at the suggestion of another. A man will be a grammarian, then, only when he has both done something grammatical and done it grammatically; and this means doing it in accordance with the grammatical knowledge in himself.

ἢ οὐδ΄ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει; ἐνδέχεται γὰρ γραμματικόν τι ποιῆσαι καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης καὶ ἄλλου ὑποθεμένου. τότε οὖν ἔσται γραμματικός͵ ἐὰν καὶ γραμματικόν τι ποιήσῃ καὶ γραμματικῶς· τοῦτο δ΄ ἐστὶ τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἐν αὑτῷ γραμ ματικήν.

Again, the case of the arts and that of the virtues are not similar; for the products of the arts have their goodness in themselves, so that it is enough that they should have a certain character, but if the acts that are in accordance with the virtues have themselves a certain character it does not follow that they are done justly or temperately. The agent also must be in a certain condition when he does them; in the first place he must have knowledge, secondly he must choose the acts, and choose them for their own sakes, and thirdly his action must proceed from a firm and unchangeable character. These are not reckoned in as conditions of the possession of the arts, except the bare knowledge; but as a condition of the possession of the virtues knowledge has little or no weight, while the other conditions count not for a little but for everything, i.e. the very conditions which result from often doing just and temperate acts.

ἔτι οὐδ΄ ὅμοιόν ἐστιν ἐπί τε τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν τεχνῶν γινόμενα τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὑτοῖς· ἀρκεῖ οὖν ταῦτά πως ἔχοντα γενέσθαι· τὰ δὲ κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς γινόμενα οὐκ ἐὰν αὐτά πως ἔχῃ͵ δι καίως ἢ σωφρόνως πράττεται͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐὰν ὁ πράττων πῶς ἔχων πράττῃ͵ πρῶτον μὲν ἐὰν εἰδώς͵ ἔπειτ΄ ἐὰν προαι ρούμενος͵ καὶ προαιρούμενος δι΄ αὐτά͵ τὸ δὲ τρίτον ἐὰν καὶ βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως ἔχων πράττῃ. ταῦτα δὲ πρὸς 1105b μὲν τὸ τὰς ἄλλας τέχνας ἔχειν οὐ συναριθμεῖται͵ πλὴν αὐτὸ τὸ εἰδέναι· πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς τὸ μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχύει͵ τὰ δ΄ ἄλλα οὐ μικρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ πᾶν δύναται͵ ἅπερ ἐκ τοῦ πολλάκις πράττειν τὰ δίκαια καὶ σώφρονα περιγίνεται.

[4] Only Practice Establishes Practical Virtues

Actions, then, are called just and temperate when they are such as the just or the temperate man would do; but it is not the man who does these that is just and temperate, but the man who also does them as just and temperate men do them. It is well said, then, that it is by doing just acts that the just man is produced, and by doing temperate acts the temperate man; without doing these no one would have even a prospect of becoming good.

τὰ μὲν οὖν πράγματα δίκαια καὶ σώ φρονα λέγεται͵ ὅταν ᾖ τοιαῦτα οἷα ἂν ὁ δίκαιος ἢ ὁ σώ φρων πράξειεν· δίκαιος δὲ καὶ σώφρων ἐστὶν οὐχ ὁ ταῦτα πράττων͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ [ὁ] οὕτω πράττων ὡς οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ σώ φρονες πράττουσιν. εὖ οὖν λέγεται ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ τὰ δίκαια πράτ τειν ὁ δίκαιος γίνεται καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τὰ σώφρονα ὁ σώφρων ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μὴ πράττειν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν οὐδὲ μελλήσειε γίνεσθαι ἀγαθός.

But most people do not do these, but take refuge in theory and think they are being philosophers and will become good in this way, behaving somewhat like patients who listen attentively to their doctors, but do none of the things they are ordered to do. As the latter will not be made well in body by such a course of treatment, the former will not be made well in soul by such a course of philosophy.

ἀλλ΄ οἱ πολλοὶ ταῦτα μὲν οὐ πράττου σιν͵ ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἔσεσθαι σπουδαῖοι͵ ὅμοιόν τι ποιοῦντες τοῖς κάμνουσιν͵ οἳ τῶν ἰατρῶν ἀκούουσι μὲν ἐπιμελῶς͵ ποιοῦσι δ΄ οὐδὲν τῶν προσταττομένων. ὥσπερ οὖν οὐδ΄ ἐκεῖνοι εὖ ἕξουσι τὸ σῶμα οὕτω θεραπευόμενοι͵ οὐδ΄ οὗτοι τὴν ψυ χὴν οὕτω φιλοσοφοῦντες.

2.5. NEXT we must consider what virtue is. Since things that are found in the soul are of three kinds- passions, faculties, states of character, virtue must be one of these. By passions I mean appetite, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain; by faculties the things in virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g. of becoming angry or being pained or feeling pity; by states of character the things in virtue of which we stand well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; and similarly with reference to the other passions.

· Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τί ἐστιν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτέον. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστί͵ πάθη δυνάμεις ἕξεις͵ τούτων ἄν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή. λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν ὀργὴν φόβον θάρσος φθόνον χαρὰν φιλίαν μῖσος πόθον ζῆλον ἔλεον͵ ὅλως οἷς ἕπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη· δυνάμεις δὲ καθ΄ ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα͵ οἷον καθ΄ ἃς δυ νατοὶ ὀργισθῆναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι ἢ ἐλεῆσαι· ἕξεις δὲ καθ΄ ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς͵ οἷον πρὸς τὸ ὀργι σθῆναι͵ εἰ μὲν σφοδρῶς ἢ ἀνειμένως͵ κακῶς ἔχομεν͵ εἰ δὲ μέσως͵ εὖ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πρὸς τἆλλα.

Now neither the virtues nor the vices are passions, because we are not called good or bad on the ground of our passions, but are so called on the ground of our virtues and our vices, and because we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions (for the man who feels fear or anger is not praised, nor is the man who simply feels anger blamed, but the man who feels it in a certain way), but for our virtues and our vices we are praised or blamed.

πάθη μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἰσὶν οὔθ΄ αἱ ἀρεταὶ οὔθ΄ αἱ κακίαι͵ ὅτι οὐ λεγόμεθα κατὰ τὰ πάθη σπουδαῖοι ἢ φαῦλοι͵ κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας λεγόμεθα͵ καὶ ὅτι κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη οὔτ΄ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγόμεθα (οὐ γὰρ ἐπαινεῖται ὁ φο βούμενος οὐδὲ ὁ ὀργιζόμενος͵ οὐδὲ ψέγεται ὁ ἁπλῶς ὀργι ζόμενος ^1106a ἀλλ΄ ὁ πῶς)͵ κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας ἐπαινούμεθα ἢ ψεγόμεθα.

Again, we feel anger and fear without choice, but the virtues are modes of choice or involve choice. Further, in respect of the passions we are said to be moved, but in respect of the virtues and the vices we are said not to be moved but to be disposed in a particular way.

ἔτι ὀργιζόμεθα μὲν καὶ φοβού μεθα ἀπροαιρέτως͵ αἱ δ΄ ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις κατὰ μὲν τὰ πάθη κινεῖσθαι λεγόμεθα͵ κατὰ δὲ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τὰς κακίας οὐ κινεῖσθαι ἀλλὰ διακεῖσθαί πως.

For these reasons also they are not faculties; for we are neither called good nor bad, nor praised nor blamed, for the simple capacity of feeling the passions; again, we have the faculties by nature, but we are not made good or bad by nature; we have spoken of this before. If, then, the virtues are neither passions nor faculties, all that remains is that they should be states of character.

διὰ ταῦτα δὲ οὐδὲ δυνάμεις εἰσίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀγαθοὶ λεγόμεθα τῷ δύνασθαι πάσχειν ἁπλῶς οὔτε κακοί͵ οὔτ΄ ἐπαινούμεθα οὔτε ψεγό μεθα· ἔτι δυνατοὶ μέν ἐσμεν φύσει͵ ἀγαθοὶ δὲ ἢ κακοὶ οὐ γινόμεθα φύσει· εἴπομεν δὲ περὶ τούτου πρότερον. εἰ οὖν μήτε πάθη εἰσὶν αἱ ἀρεταὶ μήτε δυνάμεις͵ λείπεται ἕξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.

Thus we have stated what virtue is in respect of its genus.

ὅ τι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ τῷ γένει ἡ ἀρετή͵ εἴρηται.

2.6. WE must, however, not only describe virtue as a state of character, but also say what sort of state it is. We may remark, then, that every virtue or excellence both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence and makes the work of that thing be done well; e.g. the excellence of the eye makes both the eye and its work good; for it is by the excellence of the eye that we see well. Similarly the excellence of the horse makes a horse both good in itself and good at running and at carrying its rider and at awaiting the attack of the enemy. Therefore, if this is true in every case, the virtue of man also will be the state of character which makes a man good and which makes him do his own work well.

Δεῖ δὲ μὴ μόνον οὕτως εἰπεῖν͵ ὅτι ἕξις͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ ποία τις. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετή͵ οὗ ἂν ᾖ ἀρετή͵ αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδί δωσιν͵ οἷον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τόν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπου δαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρῶμεν. ὁμοίως ἡ τοῦ ἵππου ἀρετὴ ἵππον τε σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ ἀγαθὸν δραμεῖν καὶ ἐνεγκεῖν τὸν ἐπι βάτην καὶ μεῖναι τοὺς πολεμίους. εἰ δὴ τοῦτ΄ ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει͵ καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἕξις ἀφ΄ ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ΄ ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει.

[5] The Mean as Balance

How this is to happen we have stated already, but it will be made plain also by the following consideration of the specific nature of virtue. In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible to take more, less, or an equal amount, and that either in terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal is an intermediate between excess and defect. By the intermediate in the object I mean that which is equidistant from each of the extremes, which is one and the same for all men; by the intermediate relatively to us that which is neither too much nor too little- and this is not one, nor the same for all. For instance, if ten is many and two is few, six is the intermediate, taken in terms of the object; for it exceeds and is exceeded by an equal amount; this is intermediate according to arithmetical proportion. But the intermediate relatively to us is not to be taken so; if ten pounds are too much for a particular person to eat and two too little, it does not follow that the trainer will order six pounds; for this also is perhaps too much for the person who is to take it, or too little- too little for Milo, too much for the beginner in athletic exercises. The same is true of running and wrestling. Thus a master of any art avoids excess and defect, but seeks the intermediate and chooses this- the intermediate not in the object but relatively to us.

πῶς δὲ τοῦτ΄ ἔσται͵ ἤδη μὲν εἰρήκαμεν͵ ἔτι δὲ καὶ ὧδ΄ ἔσται φανερόν͵ ἐὰν θεωρήσωμεν ποία τίς ἐστιν ἡ φύσις αὐτῆς. ἐν παντὶ δὴ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῷ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον τὸ δ΄ ἔλαττον τὸ δ΄ ἴσον͵ καὶ ταῦτα ἢ κατ΄ αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ πρὸς ἡμᾶς· τὸ δ΄ ἴσον μέσον τι ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως. λέγω δὲ τοῦ μὲν πράγμα τος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ΄ ἑκατέρου τῶν ἄκρων͵ ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἓν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πᾶσιν͵ πρὸς ἡμᾶς δὲ ὃ μήτε πλεονά ζει μήτε ἐλλείπει· τοῦτο δ΄ οὐχ ἕν͵ οὐδὲ ταὐτὸν πᾶσιν. οἷον εἰ τὰ δέκα πολλὰ τὰ δὲ δύο ὀλίγα͵ τὰ ἓξ μέσα λαμβάνουσι κατὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα· ἴσῳ γὰρ ὑπερέχει τε καὶ ὑπερέχεται· τοῦτο δὲ μέσον ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν ἀναλογίαν. τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον· οὐ γὰρ 1106b εἴ τῳ δέκα μναῖ φαγεῖν πολὺ δύο δὲ ὀλίγον͵ ὁ ἀλεί πτης ἓξ μνᾶς προστάξει· ἔστι γὰρ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο πολὺ τῷ ληψομένῳ ἢ ὀλίγον· Μίλωνι μὲν γὰρ ὀλίγον͵ τῷ δὲ ἀρχομένῳ τῶν γυμνασίων πολύ. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ δρόμου καὶ πάλης. οὕτω δὴ πᾶς ἐπιστήμων τὴν ὑπερβολὴν μὲν καὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν φεύγει͵ τὸ δὲ μέσον ζητεῖ καὶ τοῦθ΄ αἱρεῖ ται͵ μέσον δὲ οὐ τὸ τοῦ πράγματος ἀλλὰ τὸ πρὸς ἡμᾶς.

If it is thus, then, that every art does its work well- by looking to the intermediate and judgling its works by this standard (so that we often say of good works of art that it is not possible either to take away or to add anything, implying that excess and defect destroy the goodness of works of art, while the mean preserves it; and good artists, as we say, look to this in their work), and if, further, virtue is more exact and better than any art, as nature also is, then virtue must have the quality of aiming at the intermediate. I mean moral virtue; for it is this that is concerned with passions and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. Similarly with regard to actions also there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. Now virtue is concerned with passions and actions, in which excess is a form of failure, and so is defect, while the intermediate is praised and is a form of success; and being praised and being successful are both characteristics of virtue. Therefore virtue is a kind of mean, since, as we have seen, it aims at what is intermediate.

εἰ δὴ πᾶσα ἐπιστήμη οὕτω τὸ ἔργον εὖ ἐπιτελεῖ͵ πρὸς τὸ μέσον βλέπουσα καὶ εἰς τοῦτο ἄγουσα τὰ ἔργα (ὅθεν εἰώ θασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι οὔτ΄ ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι͵ ὡς τῆς μὲν ὑπερβολῆς καὶ τῆς ἐλ λείψεως φθειρούσης τὸ εὖ͵ τῆς δὲ μεσότητος σῳζούσης͵ οἱ δ΄ ἀγαθοὶ τεχνῖται͵ ὡς λέγομεν͵ πρὸς τοῦτο βλέποντες ἐργάζονται)· ἡ δ΄ ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων ἐστὶν ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις͵ τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στο χαστική. λέγω δὲ τὴν ἠθικήν· αὕτη γάρ ἐστι περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις͵ ἐν δὲ τούτοις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. οἷον καὶ φοβηθῆναι καὶ θαρρῆσαι καὶ ἐπι θυμῆσαι καὶ ὀργισθῆναι καὶ ἐλεῆσαι καὶ ὅλως ἡσθῆναι καὶ λυπηθῆναι ἔστι καὶ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον͵ καὶ ἀμφότερα οὐκ εὖ· τὸ δ΄ ὅτε δεῖ καὶ ἐφ΄ οἷς καὶ πρὸς οὓς καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὡς δεῖ͵ μέσον τε καὶ ἄριστον͵ ὅπερ ἐστὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ τὸ μέσον. ἡ δ΄ ἀρετὴ περὶ πάθη καὶ πράξεις ἐστίν͵ ἐν οἷς ἡ μὲν ὑπερβολὴ ἁμαρτάνεται καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις [ψέγεται]͵ τὸ δὲ μέσον ἐπαινεῖται καὶ κατορθοῦ ται· ταῦτα δ΄ ἄμφω τῆς ἀρετῆς. μεσότης τις ἄρα ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή͵ στοχαστική γε οὖσα τοῦ μέσου.

[6] Many Forms of Vice; only One of Virtue

Again, it is possible to fail in many ways (for evil belongs to the class of the unlimited, as the Pythagoreans conjectured, and good to that of the limited), while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason also one is easy and the other difficult- to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult); for these reasons also, then, excess and defect are characteristic of vice, and the mean of virtue;

ἔτι τὸ μὲν ἁμαρ τάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστιν (τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου͵ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἴκαζον͵ τὸ δ΄ ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου)͵ τὸ δὲ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς (διὸ καὶ τὸ μὲν ῥᾴδιον τὸ δὲ χα λεπόν͵ ῥᾴδιον μὲν τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν τοῦ σκοποῦ͵ χαλεπὸν δὲ τὸ ἐπιτυχεῖν)· καὶ διὰ ταῦτ΄ οὖν τῆς μὲν κακίας ἡ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἡ ἔλλειψις͵ τῆς δ΄ ἀρετῆς ἡ μεσότης·

For people are good in but one way, but bad in many.

ἐσθλοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἁπλῶς͵ παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί.

and again it is a mean because the vices respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both passions and actions, while virtue both finds and chooses that which is intermediate. Hence in respect of its substance and the definition which states its essence virtue is a mean, with regard to what is best and right an extreme.

καὶ ἔτι τῷ τὰς μὲν ἐλλείπειν τὰς δ΄ ὑπερβάλλειν τοῦ δέοντος ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι͵ τὴν δ΄ ἀρετὴν τὸ μέσον καὶ εὑρίσκειν καὶ αἱρεῖσθαι. διὸ κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή͵ κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης. οὐ πᾶσα δ΄ ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν μεσότητα·

But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder; for all of these and suchlike things imply by their names that they are themselves bad, and not the excesses or deficiencies of them. It is not possible, then, ever to be right with regard to them; one must always be wrong. Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way, but simply to do any of them is to go wrong. It would be equally absurd, then, to expect that in unjust, cowardly, and voluptuous action there should be a mean, an excess, and a deficiency; for at that rate there would be a mean of excess and of deficiency, an excess of excess, and a deficiency of deficiency. But as there is no excess and deficiency of temperance and courage because what is intermediate is in a sense an extreme, so too of the actions we have mentioned there is no mean nor any excess and deficiency, but however they are done they are wrong; for in general there is neither a mean of excess and deficiency, nor excess and deficiency of a mean.

ἔνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος͵ οἷον ἐπιχαιρεκακία ἀναισχυντία φθόνος͵ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων μοιχεία κλοπὴ ἀνδροφονία· πάντα γὰρ ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα λέγεται τῷ αὐτὰ φαῦλα εἶναι͵ ἀλλ΄ οὐχ αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ αὐτῶν οὐδ΄ αἱ ἐλλείψεις. οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν οὐδέποτε περὶ αὐτὰ κατ ορθοῦν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἀεὶ ἁμαρτάνειν· οὐδ΄ ἔστι τὸ εὖ ἢ μὴ εὖ περὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐν τῷ ἣν δεῖ καὶ ὅτε καὶ ὡς μοιχεύειν͵ ἀλλ΄ ἁπλῶς τὸ ποιεῖν ὁτιοῦν τούτων ἁμαρτάνειν ἐστίν. ὅμοιον οὖν τὸ ἀξιοῦν καὶ περὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν καὶ δειλαίνειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν εἶναι μεσότητα καὶ ὑπερβολὴν καὶ ἔλ λειψιν· ἔσται γὰρ οὕτω γε ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως με σότης καὶ ὑπερβολῆς ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἐλλείψεως. ὥσπερ δὲ σωφροσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας οὐκ ἔστιν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις διὰ τὸ τὸ μέσον εἶναί πως ἄκρον͵ οὕτως οὐδ΄ ἐκείνων μεσότης οὐδ΄ ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις͵ ἀλλ΄ ὡς ἂν πράττηται ἁμαρτάνεται· ὅλως γὰρ οὔθ΄ ὑπερβολῆς καὶ ἐλλείψεως μεσότης ἔστιν͵ οὔτε μεσότητος ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις.

2.7. WE must, however, not only make this general statement, but also apply it to the individual facts. For among statements about conduct those which are general apply more widely, but those which are particular are more genuine, since conduct has to do with individual cases, and our statements must harmonize with the facts in these cases.

Δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι͵ ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς καθ΄ ἕκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν. ἐν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις λόγοις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κοινότεροί εἰσιν͵ οἱ δ΄ ἐπὶ μέρους ἀληθινώτεροι· περὶ γὰρ τὰ καθ΄ ἕκαστα αἱ πράξεις͵ δέον δ΄ ἐπὶ τούτων συμφωνεῖν.

We may take these cases from our table.

ληπτέον οὖν ταῦτα ἐκ τῆς διαγραφῆς.

[7] List of Virtues and Vices

[1] With regard to feelings of FEAR and CONFIDENCE courage is the mean; of the people who exceed, he who exceeds in fearlessness has no name (many of the states have no name), while the man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward.

περὶ μὲν οὖν φόβους καὶ θάρρη ἀνδρεία μεσό ^1107b της· τῶν δ΄ ὑπερβαλλόντων ὁ μὲν τῇ ἀφοβίᾳ ἀνώνυμος (πολλὰ δ΄ ἐστὶν ἀνώνυμα)͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐν τῷ θαρρεῖν ὑπερβάλ λων θρασύς͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐν τῷ μὲν φοβεῖσθαι ὑπερβάλλων τῷ δὲ θαρρεῖν ἐλλείπων δειλός.

[2] With regard to PLEASURES and PAINS - not all of them, and not so much with regard to the pains- the mean is temperance, the excess self-indulgence. Persons deficient with regard to the pleasures are not often found; hence such persons also have received no name. But let us call them ‘insensible’.

περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας͵ ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπαςμεσότης μὲν σω φροσύνη͵ ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. ἐλλείποντες δὲ περὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς οὐ πάνυ γίνονται· διόπερ οὐδ΄ ὀνόματος τετυχή κασιν οὐδ΄ οἱ τοιοῦτοι͵ ἔστωσαν δὲ ἀναίσθητοι.

[3a] With regard to giving and taking of MONEY the mean is liberality, the excess and the defect prodigality and meanness. In these actions people exceed and fall short in contrary ways; the prodigal exceeds in spending and falls short in taking, while the mean man exceeds in taking and falls short in spending.

περὶ δὲ δό σιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν μεσότης μὲν ἐλευθεριότης͵ ὑπερ βολὴ δὲ καὶ ἔλλειψις ἀσωτία καὶ ἀνελευθερία. ἐναντίως δ΄ ἐν αὐταῖς ὑπερβάλλουσι καὶ ἐλλείπουσιν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄσωτος ἐν μὲν προέσει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ λήψει ἐλλείπει͵ ὁ δ΄ ἀνελεύθερος ἐν μὲν λήψει ὑπερβάλλει ἐν δὲ προέσει ἐλλείπει.

[3b] With regard to MONEY there are also other dispositions- a mean, magnificence (for the magnificent man differs from the liberal man; the former deals with large sums, the latter with small ones), an excess, tastelessness and vulgarity, and a deficiency, niggardliness; these differ from the states opposed to liberality, and the mode of their difference will be stated later.

περὶ δὲ χρήματα καὶ ἄλλαι διαθέσεις εἰσί͵ μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοπρέπεια (ὁ γὰρ μεγαλοπρεπὴς διαφέρει ἐλευθερίου· ὃ μὲν γὰρ περὶ μεγάλα͵ ὃ δὲ περὶ μικρά)͵ ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀπειροκαλία καὶ βαναυσία͵ ἔλλει ψις δὲ μικροπρέπεια· διαφέρουσι δ΄ αὗται τῶν περὶ τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα͵ πῇ δὲ διαφέρουσιν͵ ὕστερον ῥηθήσεται.

[4a] With regard to HONOUR and DISHONOUR the mean is proper pride, the excess is known as a sort of ‘empty vanity’, and the deficiency is undue humility; and as we said liberality was related to magnificence, differing from it by dealing with small sums, so there is a state similarly related to proper pride, being concerned with small honours while that is concerned with great. For it is possible to desire honour as one ought, and more than one ought, and less, and the man who exceeds in his desires is called ambitious, the man who falls short unambitious, while the intermediate person has no name.

περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία͵ ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης τις λεγομένη͵ ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία· ὡς δ΄ ἐλέγομεν ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοπρέπειαν τὴν ἐλευ θεριότητα͵ τῷ περὶ μικρὰ διαφέρουσαν͵ οὕτως ἔχει τις καὶ πρὸς τὴν μεγαλοψυχίαν͵ περὶ τιμὴν οὖσαν μεγάλην͵ αὐτὴ περὶ μικρὰν οὖσα· ἔστι γὰρ ὡς δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι τιμῆς καὶ μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ καὶ ἧττον͵ λέγεται δ΄ ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ταῖς ὀρέξεσι φιλότιμος͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐλλείπων ἀφιλότιμος͵ ὁ δὲ μέσος ἀνώνυμος.

[4b] The dispositions also are nameless, except that that of the ambitious man is called AMBITION . Hence the people who are at the extremes lay claim to the middle place; and we ourselves sometimes call the intermediate person ambitious and sometimes unambitious, and sometimes praise the ambitious man and sometimes the unambitious. The reason of our doing this will be stated in what follows; but now let us speak of the remaining states according to the method which has been indicated.

ἀνώνυμοι δὲ καὶ αἱ διαθέσεις͵ πλὴν ἡ τοῦ φιλοτίμου φιλοτιμία. ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας· καὶ ἡμεῖς δὲ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε τὸν μέσον φιλό τιμον καλοῦμεν ἔστι δ΄ ὅτε ἀφιλότιμον͵ καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὅτε ^1108a ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸν φιλότιμον ἔστι δ΄ ὅτε τὸν ἀφιλότιμον. διὰ τίνα δ΄ αἰτίαν τοῦτο ποιοῦμεν͵ ἐν τοῖς ἑξῆς ῥηθήσεται· νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν κατὰ τὸν ὑφηγημένον τρόπον.

[5] With regard to ANGER also there is an excess, a deficiency, and a mean. Although they can scarcely be said to have names, yet since we call the intermediate person good-tempered let us call the mean good temper; of the persons at the extremes let the one who exceeds be called irascible, and his vice irascibility, and the man who falls short an inirascible sort of person, and the deficiency inirascibility.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ περὶ τὴν ὀργὴν ὑπερβολὴ καὶ ἔλλειψις καὶ μεσότης͵ σχεδὸν δὲ ἀνωνύμων ὄντων αὐτῶν τὸν μέσον πρᾶον λέγοντες τὴν μεσότητα πραότητα καλέσωμεν· τῶν δ΄ ἄκρων ὁ μὲν ὑπερβάλλων ὀργίλος ἔστω͵ ἡ δὲ κακία ὀρ γιλότης͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐλλείπων ἀόργητός τις͵ ἡ δ΄ ἔλλειψις ἀοργησία.

There are also three other means, which have a certain likeness to one another, but differ from one another: for they are all concerned with intercourse in words and actions, but differ in that one is concerned with truth in this sphere, the other two with pleasantness; and of this one kind is exhibited in giving amusement, the other in all the circumstances of life. We must therefore speak of these too, that we may the better see that in all things the mean is praise-worthy, and the extremes neither praiseworthy nor right, but worthy of blame. Now most of these states also have no names, but we must try, as in the other cases, to invent names ourselves so that we may be clear and easy to follow.

εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἄλλαι τρεῖς μεσότητες͵ ἔχουσαι μέν τινα ὁμοιότητα πρὸς ἀλλήλας͵ διαφέρουσαι δ΄ ἀλλήλων· πᾶσαι μὲν γάρ εἰσι περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν͵ διαφέρουσι δὲ ὅτι ἣ μέν ἐστι περὶ τἀληθὲς τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς͵ αἳ δὲ περὶ τὸ ἡδύ· τούτου δὲ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ τὸ δ΄ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς κατὰ τὸν βίον. ῥητέον οὖν καὶ περὶ τούτων͵ ἵνα μᾶλλον κατίδωμεν ὅτι ἐν πᾶσιν ἡ μεσότης ἐπαινετόν͵ τὰ δ΄ ἄκρα οὔτ΄ ἐπαινετὰ οὔτ΄ ὀρθὰ ἀλλὰ ψεκτά. εἰσὶ μὲν οὖν καὶ τούτων τὰ πλείω ἀνώνυμα͵ πειρατέον δ΄͵ ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων͵ αὐτοὺς ὀνοματοποιεῖν σαφηνείας ἕνε κα καὶ τοῦ εὐπαρακολουθήτου.

[6] With regard to TRUTH, then, the intermediate is a truthful sort of person and the mean may be called truthfulness, while the pretence which exaggerates is boastfulness and the person characterized by it a boaster, and that which understates is false modesty and the person characterized by it false-modesty.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τὸ ἀληθὲς ὁ μὲν μέσος ἀληθής τις καὶ ἡ μεσότης ἀλήθεια λεγέσθω͵ ἡ δὲ προσποίησις ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸ μεῖζον ἀλαζονεία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν ἀλαζών͵ ἡ δ΄ ἐπὶ τὸ ἔλαττον εἰρωνεία καὶ εἴρων ὁ ἔχων.

[7] With regard to PLEASANTNESS in the GIVING of AMUSEMENT the intermediate person is ready-witted and the disposition ready wit, the excess is buffoonery and the person characterized by it a buffoon, while the man who falls short is a sort of boor and his state is boorishness.

περὶ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τὸ μὲν ἐν παιδιᾷ ὁ μὲν μέσος εὐτράπελος καὶ ἡ διάθεσις εὐτραπελία͵ ἡ δ΄ ὑπερβολὴ βωμολοχία καὶ ὁ ἔχων αὐτὴν βωμολόχος͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐλλείπων ἄγροικός τις καὶ ἡ ἕξις ἀγροικία·

[8] With regard to the REMAINING kind of PLEASANTNESS, that which is exhibited in life in general, the man who is pleasant in the right way is friendly and the mean is friendliness, while the man who exceeds is an obsequious person if he has no end in view, a flatterer if he is aiming at his own advantage, and the man who falls short and is unpleasant in all circumstances is a quarrelsome and surly sort of person.

περὶ δὲ τὸ λοιπὸν ἡδὺ τὸ ἐν τῷ βίῳ ὁ μὲν ὡς δεῖ ἡδὺς ὢν φίλος καὶ ἡ μεσό της φιλία͵ ὁ δ΄ ὑπερβάλλων͵ εἰ μὲν οὐδενὸς ἕνεκα͵ ἄρε σκος͵ εἰ δ΄ ὠφελείας τῆς αὑτοῦ͵ κόλαξ͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐλλείπων καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἀηδὴς δύσερίς τις καὶ δύσκολος.

[9] the bashful man who is ashamed of everything; while he who falls short or is not ashamed of anything at all is shameless, and the intermediate person is modest.

[10] Righteous indignation is a mean between envy and spite, and these states are concerned with the pain and pleasure that are felt at the fortunes of our neighbours; the man who is characterized by righteous indignation is pained at undeserved good fortune, the envious man, going beyond him, is pained at all good fortune, and the spiteful man falls so far short of being pained that he even rejoices.

νέμεσις ^1108b  δὲ μεσότης φθόνου καὶ ἐπιχαιρεκακίας͵ εἰσὶ δὲ περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι τοῖς πέλας γινομένας· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νεμεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνα ξίως εὖ πράττουσιν͵ ὁ δὲ φθονερὸς ὑπερβάλλων τοῦτον ἐπὶ πᾶσι λυπεῖται͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐπιχαιρέκακος τοσοῦτον ἐλλείπει τοῦ λυπεῖσθαι ὥστε καὶ χαίρειν.

But these states there will be an opportunity of describing elsewhere; with regard to justice, since it has not one simple meaning, we shall, after describing the other states, distinguish its two kinds and say how each of them is a mean; and similarly we shall treat also of the rational virtues.

ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων καὶ ἄλλοθι καιρὸς ἔσται· περὶ δὲ δικαιοσύνης͵ ἐπεὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς λέγεται͵ μετὰ ταῦτα διελόμενοι περὶ ἑκατέρας ἐροῦμεν πῶς μεσότητές εἰσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν λογικῶν ἀρετῶν.

2.8.THERE are three kinds of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and one a virtue, viz. the mean, and all are in a sense opposed to all; for the extreme states are contrary both to the intermediate state and to each other, and the intermediate to the extremes; as the equal is greater relatively to the less, less relatively to the greater, so the middle states are excessive relatively to the deficiencies, deficient relatively to the excesses, both in passions and in actions.

Τριῶν δὴ διαθέσεων οὐσῶν͵ δύο μὲν κακιῶν͵ τῆς μὲν καθ΄ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ΄ ἔλλειψιν͵ μιᾶς δ΄ ἀρετῆς τῆς μεσότητος͵ πᾶσαι πάσαις ἀντίκεινταί πως· αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄκραι καὶ τῇ μέσῃ καὶ ἀλλήλαις ἐναντίαι εἰσίν͵ ἡ δὲ μέση ταῖς ἄκραις· ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ ἴσον πρὸς μὲν τὸ ἔλατ τον μεῖζον πρὸς δὲ τὸ μεῖζον ἔλαττον͵ οὕτως αἱ μέσαι ἕξεις πρὸς μὲν τὰς ἐλλείψεις ὑπερβάλλουσι πρὸς δὲ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς ἐλλείπουσιν ἔν τε τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ταῖς πρά ξεσιν.

For the brave man appears rash relatively to the coward, and cowardly relatively to the rash man; and similarly the temperate man appears self-indulgent relatively to the insensible man, insensible relatively to the self-indulgent, and the liberal man prodigal relatively to the mean man, mean relatively to the prodigal. Hence also the people at the extremes push the intermediate man each over to the other, and the brave man is called rash by the coward, cowardly by the rash man, and correspondingly in the other cases.

ὁ γὰρ ἀνδρεῖος πρὸς μὲν τὸν δειλὸν θρασὺς φαίνε ται͵ πρὸς δὲ τὸν θρασὺν δειλός· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ σώφρων πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀναίσθητον ἀκόλαστος͵ πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἀκόλαστον ἀναίσθητος͵ ὁ δ΄ ἐλευθέριος πρὸς μὲν τὸν ἀνελεύθερον ἄσω τος͵ πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἄσωτον ἀνελεύθερος. διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἑκάτερος πρὸς ἑκάτερον͵ καὶ καλοῦσι τὸν ἀνδρεῖον ὁ μὲν δειλὸς θρασὺν ὁ δὲ θρασὺς δειλόν͵ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνάλογον.

These states being thus opposed to one another, the greatest contrariety is that of the extremes to each other, rather than to the intermediate; for these are further from each other than from the intermediate, as the great is further from the small and the small from the great than both are from the equal. Again, to the intermediate some extremes show a certain likeness, as that of rashness to courage and that of prodigality to liberality; but the extremes show the greatest unlikeness to each other; now contraries are defined as the things that are furthest from each other, so that things that are further apart are more contrary.

οὕτω δ΄ ἀντικειμένων ἀλλήλοις τούτων͵ πλείστη ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον· πορρωτέρω γὰρ ταῦτα ἀφέστηκεν ἀλλήλων ἢ τοῦ μέσου͵ ὥσπερ τὸ μέγα τοῦ μικροῦ καὶ τὸ μικρὸν τοῦ μεγάλου ἢ ἄμφω τοῦ ἴσου. ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται͵ ὡς τῇ θρασύτητι πρὸς τὴν ἀνδρείαν καὶ τῇ ἀσωτίᾳ πρὸς τὴν ἐλευθεριότητα· τοῖς δὲ ἄκροις πρὸς ἄλληλα πλείστη ἀνομοιότης· τὰ δὲ πλεῖ στον ἀπέχοντα ἀπ΄ ἀλλήλων ἐναντία ὁρίζονται͵ ὥστε καὶ μᾶλλον ἐναντία τὰ πλεῖον ἀπέχοντα.

To the mean in some cases the deficiency, in some the excess is more opposed; e.g. it is not rashness, which is an excess, but cowardice, which is a deficiency, that is more opposed to courage, and not insensibility, which is a deficiency, but self-indulgence, which is an excess, that is more opposed to temperance. This happens from two reasons, one being drawn from the thing itself; for because one extreme is nearer and liker to the intermediate, we oppose not this but rather its contrary to the intermediate. E.g. since rashness is thought liker and nearer to courage, and cowardice more unlike, we oppose rather the latter to courage; for things that are further from the intermediate are thought more contrary to it. This, then, is one cause, drawn from the thing itself; another is drawn from ourselves; for the things to which we ourselves more naturally tend seem more contrary to the intermediate. For instance, we ourselves tend more naturally to pleasures, and hence are more easily carried away towards self-indulgence than towards propriety. We describe as contrary to the mean, then, rather the directions in which we more often go to great lengths; and therefore self-indulgence, which is an excess, is the more contrary to temperance.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον 1109a ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ΄ ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις ἐφ΄ ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή͵ οἷον ἀνδρείᾳ μὲν οὐχ ἡ θρασύτης ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα͵ ἀλλ΄ ἡ δειλία ἔλλειψις οὖσα͵ τῇ δὲ σωφροσύνῃ οὐχ ἡ ἀναισθησία ἔνδεια οὖσα͵ ἀλλ΄ ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερ βολὴ οὖσα. διὰ δύο δ΄ αἰτίας τοῦτο συμβαίνει͵ μίαν μὲν τὴν ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· τῷ γὰρ ἐγγύτερον εἶναι καὶ ὁμοιότερον τὸ ἕτερον ἄκρον τῷ μέσῳ͵ οὐ τοῦτο ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἀντιτίθεμεν μᾶλλον· οἷον ἐπεὶ ὁμοιότερον εἶναι δοκεῖ τῇ ἀνδρείᾳ ἡ θρασύτης καὶ ἐγγύτερον͵ ἀνομοιότερον δ΄ ἡ δειλία͵ ταύτην μᾶλλον ἀντιτίθεμεν· τὰ γὰρ ἀπέ χοντα πλεῖον τοῦ μέσου ἐναντιώτερα δοκεῖ εἶναι. μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη͵ ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος· ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν· πρὸς ἃ γὰρ αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμέν πως͵ ταῦτα μᾶλλον ἐναντία τῷ μέσῳ φαίνεται. οἷον αὐτοὶ μᾶλλον πεφύκαμεν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονάς͵ διὸ εὐκαταφορώτεροί ἐσμεν πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς κοσμιότητα. ταῦτ΄ οὖν μᾶλ λον ἐναντία λέγομεν͵ πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἡ ἀκολασία ὑπερβολὴ οὖσα ἐναντιωτέρα ἐστὶ τῇ σωφροσύνῃ.

2.9. THAT moral virtue is a mean, then, and in what sense it is so, and that it is a mean between two vices, the one involving excess, the other deficiency, and that it is such because its character is to aim at what is intermediate in passions and in actions, has been sufficiently stated. Hence also it is no easy task to be good. For in everything it is no easy task to find the middle, e.g. to find the middle of a circle is not for every one but for him who knows; so, too, any one can get angry- that is easy- or give or spend money; but to do this to the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, with the right motive, and in the right way, that is not for every one, nor is it easy; wherefore goodness is both rare and laudable and noble.

Ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ ἡ ἠθικὴ μεσότης͵ καὶ πῶς͵ καὶ ὅτι μεσότης δύο κακιῶν͵ τῆς μὲν καθ΄ ὑπερβολὴν τῆς δὲ κατ΄ ἔλλειψιν͵ καὶ ὅτι τοιαύτη ἐστὶ διὰ τὸ στοχαστικὴ τοῦ μέσου εἶναι τοῦ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν͵ ἱκα νῶς εἴρηται. διὸ καὶ ἔργον ἐστὶ σπουδαῖον εἶναι. ἐν ἑκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον͵ οἷον κύκλου τὸ μέσον οὐ παν τὸς ἀλλὰ τοῦ εἰδότος· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ μὲν ὀργισθῆναι παν τὸς καὶ ῥᾴδιον͵ καὶ τὸ δοῦναι ἀργύριον καὶ δαπανῆσαι· τὸ δ΄ ᾧ καὶ ὅσον καὶ ὅτε καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα καὶ ὥς͵ οὐκέτι παν τὸς οὐδὲ ῥᾴδιον· διόπερ τὸ εὖ καὶ σπάνιον καὶ ἐπαινετὸν καὶ καλόν.

Hence he who aims at the intermediate must first depart from what is the more contrary to it, as Calypso advises-

διὸ δεῖ τὸν στοχαζόμενον τοῦ μέσου πρῶτον μὲν ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου͵ καθάπερ καὶ ἡ Καλυψὼ παραινεῖ

Hold the ship out beyond that surf and spray.

τούτου μὲν καπνοῦ καὶ κύματος ἐκτὸς ἔεργε νῆα.

For of the extremes one is more erroneous, one less so; therefore, since to hit the mean is hard in the extreme, we must as a second best, as people say, take the least of the evils; and this will be done best in the way we describe. But we must consider the things towards which we ourselves also are easily carried away; for some of us tend to one thing, some to another; and this will be recognizable from the pleasure and the pain we feel. We must drag ourselves away to the contrary extreme; for we shall get into the intermediate state by drawing well away from error, as people do in straightening sticks that are bent.

τῶν γὰρ ἄκρων τὸ μέν ἐστιν ἁμαρτωλότερον τὸ δ΄ ἧττον· ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦ μέσου τυχεῖν ἄκρως χαλεπόν͵ κατὰ τὸν δεύ τερον͵ φασί͵ πλοῦν τὰ ἐλάχιστα ληπτέον τῶν κακῶν· τοῦτο 1109b δ΄ ἔσται μάλιστα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ὃν λέγομεν. σκοπεῖν δὲ δεῖ πρὸς ἃ καὶ αὐτοὶ εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν· ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν· τοῦτο δ΄ ἔσται γνώριμον ἐκ τῆς ἡδονῆς καὶ τῆς λύπης τῆς γινομένης περὶ ἡμᾶς. εἰς τοὐναν τίον δ΄ ἑαυτοὺς ἀφέλκειν δεῖ· πολὺ γὰρ ἀπάγοντες τοῦ ἁμαρτάνειν εἰς τὸ μέσον ἥξομεν͵ ὅπερ οἱ τὰ διεστραμμένα τῶν ξύλων ὀρθοῦντες ποιοῦσιν.

Now in everything the pleasant or pleasure is most to be guarded against; for we do not judge it impartially. We ought, then, to feel towards pleasure as the elders of the people felt towards Helen, and in all circumstances repeat their saying; for if we dismiss pleasure thus we are less likely to go astray. It is by doing this, then, (to sum the matter up) that we shall best be able to hit the mean.

ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλα κτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν· οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν. ὅπερ οὖν οἱ δημογέροντες ἔπαθον πρὸς τὴν Ἑλένην͵ τοῦτο δεῖ παθεῖν καὶ ἡμᾶς πρὸς τὴν ἡδονήν͵ καὶ ἐν πᾶσι τὴν ἐκείνων ἐπιλέγειν φωνήν· οὕτω γὰρ αὐτὴν ἀποπεμπό μενοι ἧττον ἁμαρτησόμεθα. δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν.

But this is no doubt difficult, and especially in individual cases; for or is not easy to determine both how and with whom and on what provocation and how long one should be angry; for we too sometimes praise those who fall short and call them good-tempered, but sometimes we praise those who get angry and call them manly. The man, however, who deviates little from goodness is not blamed, whether he do so in the direction of the more or of the less, but only the man who deviates more widely; for he does not fail to be noticed. But up to what point and to what extent a man must deviate before he becomes blameworthy it is not easy to determine by reasoning, any more than anything else that is perceived by the senses; such things depend on particular facts, and the decision rests with perception. So much, then, is plain, that the intermediate state is in all things to be praised, but that we must incline sometimes towards the excess, sometimes towards the deficiency; for so shall we most easily hit the mean and what is right.

ταῦτ΄ οὖν ποιοῦντες͵ ὡς ἐν κε φαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν͵ μάλιστα χαλεπὸν δ΄ ἴσως τοῦτο͵ καὶ μάλιστ΄ ἐν τοῖς καθ΄ ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾴδιον διορίσαι καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πό σον χρόνον ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὁτὲ μὲν τοὺς ἐλλείπον τας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πράους φαμέν͵ ὁτὲ δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαί νοντας ἀνδρώδεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. ἀλλ΄ ὁ μὲν μικρὸν τοῦ εὖ παρεκβαίνων οὐ ψέγεται͵ οὔτ΄ ἐπὶ τὸ μᾶλλον οὔτ΄ ἐπὶ τὸ ἧττον͵ ὁ δὲ πλέον· οὗτος γὰρ οὐ λανθάνει. ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος καὶ ἐπὶ πόσον ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾴδιον τῷ λόγῳ ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ΄ ἕκαστα͵ καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. τὸ μὲν ἄρα τοσοῦτο δηλοῖ ὅτι ἡ μέση ἕξις ἐν πᾶσιν ἐπαινετή͵ ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὁτὲ μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ὁτὲ δ΄ ἐπὶ τὴν ἔλλειψιν· οὕτω γὰρ ῥᾷστα τοῦ μέσου καὶ τοῦ εὖ τευξόμεθα.